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Chapter 1 
 
African integration
1 
 
There is considerable interest in the concept of African integration, with the starting point of a 
continent-wide Free Trade Area (FTA). Recent tralac work (Sandrey et al., 2011; Jensen et al., 
2012) has concentrated upon the Tripartite Free Trade Area (TFTA) that to date has 
examined tariff reductions and a 2% tariff reduction to simulate non-tariff barriers (NTBs). 
This current research will now take our earlier TFTA analysis further and examine different 
aspects of an Africa-wide trade integration that extends our NTB analysis significantly. In 
undertaking this analysis we use the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) model with the 
Version 9.2 pre-release database, with a trade base year of 2011. Earlier tralac research used 
Version 8 of the GTAP database with a trade base year of 2007. 
 
Jensen et al. (2012) found that both the full TFTA and the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC) FTA as the first step along the road to full regional integration are 
beneficial for South Africa. The intermediate steps of the East African Community (EAC) and 
the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) FTAs are not, but they are 
almost certainly necessary; however, they are probably not sufficient to ensure a TFTA. Results 
for the rest of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) (Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland) 
are impressive, while Botswana actually loses. Most other tripartite partners gain, although the 
aggregation of Angola and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) loses heavily and all 
countries outside of the agreement lose. 
 
Intra-African trade 
 
One factor that will influence any simulation result is the initial levels of intra-African trade, 
while another is the initial barriers to this trade. We start by looking at intra-African trade and in 
subsequent chapters we will look at barriers to this trade such as non-tariff barriers (NTBs) or 
non-tariff measures (NTMs). This intra-African trade is low, and the data in Table 1 shows just 
how low by firstly presenting the total values and then the percentage shares of African 
imports and exports. Row 3 of the table shows the data for the total intra-African trade for 
2012 and 2013, and subsequent rows show the data for the top 10 HS 2 product chapters. For 
2013, Africa exported $78,475 million to Africa and this represented some 13.3% of African 
imports and a slightly larger 13.5% of total African exports. By HS chapter, mineral fuels ($18.6 
billion) was the largest product by value, and this value represented 19.7% of African fuel 
imports but only 5.4% of its exports. Chapter 89 (ships and related products) is somewhat 
misleading. The reason is that although the data suggests that this is a major trade line with 
significant value, closer examination of the data seems to indicate that much of it is merely the 
re-exports (rather than new products) of oil-related equipment (rigs, etc.) that is transferred 
between Angola and neighbouring countries. Note also the discrepancies in the data for HS 71 
(precious stones and metals) as the data does not reconcile: tralac research indicates that this 
is largely a nondisclosure of African trade to the global reporting agencies such as the 
International Trade Centre (ITC). Vehicles are an interesting entry, with only 8.5% of African 
                                                          
1
  This publication was prepared by Ron Sandrey, tralac Associate and Extra-Ordinary Professor in the 
Department of Agricultural Economics, University of Stellenbosch, and Hans Grinsted Jensen, Researcher 
Ph.D. in the Institute of Food and Resource Economics, University of Copenhagen. 
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imports being from Africa but a significantly higher 36.5% of the exports being destined for 
Africa. This sector includes vehicle parts, trucks and vans, etc. and is therefore much more 
than just standard passenger motor cars. 
 
Table 1: Details of intra-African trade, $ (millions) and % shares of imports and exports 
 
Africa to Africa $ 
(millions) 
 
% Africa imports 
 
% Africa exports 
Code Product 2012 2013 2012 2013 2012 2013 
 All products 83,993 78,475 14.7% 13.3% 12.9% 13.5% 
27 Mineral fuels 25,820 18,566 26.9% 19.7% 6.6% 5.4% 
89 Ships, etc. 4,930 6,319 29.8% 34.1% 73.1% 80.0% 
84 Machinery 3,888 4,472 6.0% 6.5% 43.5% 48.0% 
87 Vehicles 2,905 4,157 5.6% 8.5% 29.6% 36.5% 
71 Precious stone/metal 9,335 3,705 227% 61.7% 20.1% 11.4% 
85 Electrical 2,033 2,550 5.0% 5.8% 19.3% 22.1% 
72 Iron/steel 1,990 2,102 10.5% 11.0% 22.4% 24.3% 
39 Plastics 1,887 1,996 10.5% 10.1% 49.7% 49.4% 
73 Articles iron/steel 1,637 1,924 10.2% 11.4% 62.0% 68.5% 
24 Tobacco 1,727 1,713 66.4% 66.5% 54.7% 57.1% 
Source: ITC 
 
Note that we suspect the exports of HS 89 (ships, etc,) to be biased by what are probably re- 
exports of oil rigs and related equipment between the Angola-DRC aggregation and immediate 
neighbouring countries. 
 
Graph 1 shows the changes in intra-African trade over the period from 2001 to 2013. A feature 
is that there was little overall change in the imports (from Africa), while exports to Africa 
increased to a new level in 2009 before slowly declining somewhat. 
 
Graph 1: Percentage shares of intra-African trade, 2001 to 2013 
 
 
Source: ITC 
 
The salient point is that intra-African trade is relatively low, and the question that we are asking 
in this report is how much further integration and improvements in non-tariff barriers and 
infrastructure may impact upon both trade and economic welfare. 
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Destinations and sources of intra-African trade 
 
Table 2 shows the destinations for intra-African exports from 2009 to 2013 inclusive, with 
the data expressed in dollars (millions) and then in percentage shares of these exports/imports. 
Note the influence of South Africa – firstly as a major destination itself and then the placing on 
the table for the next six destinations. Five of these are virtually contiguous with South Africa 
and suggest that South Africa is likely to be the source of a large percentage of these imports. 
 
Table 2: Destinations of intra-African exports 
 
Importers 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Africa $ (millions) 54,316 64,667 73,508 78,138 76,934 
South Africa 8.7% 9.7% 10.4% 12.4% 15.9% 
Zambia 4.2% 5.2% 5.9% 6.5% 7.9% 
Botswana 6.8% 6.6% 6.8% 7.2% 7.2% 
Namibia 8.2% 7.0% 7.0% 6.9% 6.7% 
Zimbabwe 4.9% 5.4% 7.8% 5.2% 5.8% 
Congo 3.3% 2.8% 6.3% 5.0% 5.6% 
Mozambique 2.7% 2.2% 3.2% 2.7% 4.6% 
Angola 4.5% 3.6% 4.2% 3.0% 3.3% 
Morocco 3.1% 3.2% 3.2% 2.9% 3.1% 
Libya 1.7% 1.7% 1.9% 3.0% 3.0% 
DRC 2.8% 3.7% 3.4% 3.0% 2.9% 
Algeria 2.5% 2.0% 2.3% 2.5% 2.7% 
Subtotal 53.5% 53.3% 62.4% 60.3% 68.9% 
Source: ITC 
 
The hypothesis that South Africa is likely to be the source of a significant percentage of intra- 
African trade is confirmed in Table 3. The table shows that some 34.9% of this trade originated 
in South Africa during 2013. Also note that the 2013 figure shows a large difference from the 
earlier data. We suggest that this is likely due to a more comprehensive reporting from South 
Africa in that intra-SACU trade is fully included. Nigeria, Egypt and Algeria fill the next 
three places and, in total, the data shown accounts for 78.2% of the total intra-African exports 
in 2013. 
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Table 3: Sources of intra-African exports 
 
Exporters 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Africa $ 
(millions) 
 
54,324 
 
65,529 
 
82,128 
 
83,993 
 
78,475 
South Africa 19.4% 18.8% 18.0% 19.1% 34.9% 
Nigeria 15.7% 16.0% 15.9% 16.9% 6.1% 
Egypt 6.1% 6.2% 5.2% 5.4% 5.6% 
Algeria 2.6% 2.8% 2.9% 3.5% 4.4% 
Namibia 5.6% 3.8% 3.0% 2.6% 4.4% 
Zambia 2.0% 2.2% 2.7% 3.3% 4.2% 
Angola 4.3% 4.5% 3.2% 5.8% 4.2% 
Zimbabwe 2.8% 3.2% 3.3% 3.7% 4.0% 
Kenya 3.9% 3.6% 3.4% 2.6% 2.8% 
Tunisia 3.5% 2.9% 2.5% 2.4% 2.6% 
Morocco 1.9% 1.9% 1.7% 2.4% 2.5% 
Congo 2.9% 2.3% 3.0% 1.7% 2.4% 
Subtotal 70.6% 68.3% 65.0% 69.4% 78.2% 
Source: ITC 
 
The overall conclusion from this analysis is that 1) intra-African trade is low and not really 
changing; 2) a large percentage of this trade is concentrated in mineral fuels and a rather suspect 
category of ships and related vessels; 3) South Africa is the main destination for this trade; and 
4) similarly, South Africa is even more dominant as the main source of the trade. This paper 
will not go into the regional economic communities (RECs) in Africa. Note that intra-SACU 
trade may account for a significant percentage of this trade and that SADC exports into 
South Africa are largely duty- and quota-free. 
 
Research on African integration 
 
An excellent background information source on intra-African trade is given in the African Union 
Commission and Economic Commission for Africa (2012) paper. A particularly telling point the 
paper makes is that ‘intra-African trade owes its current modesty to a lack of diversification and 
competitiveness’, and this statement is backed up by a cataloguing of the raft of barriers such 
as infrastructural problems in the widest sense. Equally cutting is the final paragraph 
(paragraph 98) that states in its entirety: ‘If there is one single conclusion or recommendation 
to this end, it would be to emphasise that it is time to move from rhetoric to reality’. Moreover, 
these statements are backed by some very solid analysis that shows, inter alia, shares of country 
exports to other African countries – shares that range from 71.7% in Mali to 1.8% in 
Seychelles – and a table showing aggregate protection levels both imposed by and faced by 
each individual African country. These protection levels show significant differences, and it is 
the differences in these two factors of intra-African trade and protection levels that will strongly 
influence the outcome of computer modelling as this is largely determined by barriers and initial 
trade levels. The notion that tariff barriers are becoming less important than non-tariff 
constraints is backed up by Fundira (forthcoming) in his analysis of African tariff barriers. 
 
The most comprehensive analytical paper on African integration in recent times is by Mevel and 
Karingi (2012). They update and extend the African Union Commission and Economic 
Commission for Africa (2012) paper on the trade and tariff profile for African traders, both 
ihw  
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within Africa (intra-African trade) and externally. We will not duplicate that analysis other 
than to state that in general Africa imposes relatively high tariffs to the rest of the world but 
enjoys significant preferential access to global markets. This relatively high tariff generalisation 
is also applicable to intra-African trade despite there being several regional trading preferential 
arrangements. And, as we saw above, intra-African trade is low, but note that we are using 
trade data as contained in the GTAP database for the 2011 year. By using the Version 9.2 
database we are able to use this 2011 trade foundation and, in addition, the Version 9 database 
contains new countries such as Kenya and Botswana that are now modelled in their own right. 
This, along with differences between the Mirage and GTAP models and a different sector 
aggregation that places more emphasis on agriculture, will make these results difficult to 
compare with our GTAP results. Moreover, our analysis does not extend to a common 
external tariff for Africa and we probably take NTBs and related barrier reductions further 
than Mevel and Karingi although we use similar databases for the infrastructural costs of time 
in transport. 
 
The Mevel and Karingi results suggest that the FTAs would lead to a stimulation of intra- 
African trade of 35.7%, while the incorporation of a single Africa-wide FTA would lift this to an 
increase of 52.3% (or $23.6 billion and $34.6 billion respectively). Most of the increase is in 
manufacturing products ($27.9 billion) with most of the rest in agriculture. Expressed 
another way, these changes would see intra-African trade rise from 10.2% to 15.5% in 2022 – an 
impressive increase but still below the targets set by the African policy goals. 
 
Welfare gains from the Continental FTA (Africa-wide), as expressed in real income rather than 
GTAP equivalent variation (EV) welfare, are somewhat muted overall. While these overall 
gains are positive, not all African countries unambiguously gain due to tariff revenue losses, 
term of trade losses and net food balance changes. In particular, real income losses are reported 
by Mevel and Karingi for the Angola-DRC aggregation, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, 
Zambia, Zimbabwe, Botswana and Nigeria, with tariff revenue losses being a factor in most of 
these countries. In addition, real wages in all categories of African workers increase overall but 
there is no consistency in these results as wages decline in some countries. 
 
Our analysis: the scenarios 
 
Our base simulation is to examine the trade and welfare effects of a full and comprehensive 
tariff liberalisation that sets all intra-African bilateral tariffs to zero. From that point we extend 
the analysis in subsequent chapters to simulate a reduction in NTMs (or interchangeably NTBs) 
in the first alternative run and then extending the analysis further by examining the gains to be 
made by trade facilitation. For the latter two simulations we use the NTB estimates and those 
generated by the World Bank (Balistreri 2014a and 2104b) and the ‘cost of time’ estimates 
generated by Peter Minor (2013). Thus, we have a series of three separate simulations that 
we shall write up sequentially as separate chapters. 
 
For the base run these chapters are: 
• Chapter 2: Africa-wide, all intra-African tariffs going to zero 
• Chapter 3: Africa-wide, a 50% reduction in NTMs 
• Chapter 4: Africa-wide, tariffs to zero and a 50% reduction in NTMs combined. 
 
In addition, we run a series of simulations for selected African countries rather than a simulation 
for a comprehensive continent-wide integration. While our base model is for full African 
integration and the political goals are firmly based upon this objective we are conscious that 
there  
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there are major differences in African countries with respect to their economic and political 
regimes. It is well known that there is a problem with overlapping memberships in the region 
and furthermore we contend that several countries in the tripartite region are patently not ready 
for further integration. Jensen and Sandrey (2013) attempted to overcome this latter criticism by 
modelling only ‘willing participants’ in the integration. They identified the five SACU members 
(South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland) as being in the ‘willing participants’ 
group, along with the EAC members (Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda and Rwanda) and, finally, 
Egypt. Furthermore, our economic realism is enhanced by the latest GTAP country 
aggregations which now split Namibia off from ‘rest of SACU’ as a country in its own right, 
and similarly in east Africa, Kenya and Rwanda now join Tanzania and Uganda as countries in 
their own right in our model.2 We use this earlier eastern African aggregation of Kenya, 
Tanzania, Uganda and Rwanda as well as the additional countries of Malawi and Zambia in 
east Africa, Nigeria and Ghana in western Africa and Morocco and Tunisia in northern Africa. 
We believe this juxtaposition of political economy realism and modelling advances adds realism 
to our results. We do, however, acknowledge the assumption that we treat the EAC grouping 
as a fully operational FTA in our modelling work, and while that is valid for SACU it is not 
necessarily the current case for the EAC. 
 
In this context our additional three chapters are: 
a) Chapter 5: an integration of the ‘willing participants’ only, again with comprehensive tariff 
elimination between these parties 
b) Chapter 6: a reduction in NTBs between these ‘willing participants’ only 
c) Chapter 7: the ‘willing participants’, tariffs to zero and a 50% reduction in NTMs combined. 
 
We will conclude with: 
• Chapter 8: an examination of the implication of the results of reducing the costs in transit for 
African goods 
• Chapter 9: summary, key points and policy implications. 
 
The GTAP simulations
3
 
 
The analysis undertaken here is based upon a variant of the GTAP model to simulate the 
impact of possible multilateral market access reforms resulting from FTAs involving Africa (the 
one is Africa-wide and the other involves selected economies only). Regional production is 
generated by a constant return to scale technology in a perfectly competitive environment, and 
the private demand system is represented by a non-homothetic demand system (Constant 
Difference Elasticity function).4  The foreign trade structure is characterised by the Armington 
assumption implying imperfect substitutability between domestic and foreign goods. The 
macroeconomic closure is a neoclassical closure where investments are endogenous and adjust 
to accommodate any changes in savings. This approach is adopted at the global level, and 
investments are then allocated across regions so that all expected regional rates of return change  
                                                          
2
  We apologise to Burundi as GTAP does not have this country as a separate entity in the model but rather 
aggregated into a group called ‘rest of East Africa’. 
 
3
  See Hertelet al. (2007) for a discussion of the usefulness of the GTAP in modelling FTAs. 
 
4
  Hence, the present analysis abstracts from features such as imperfect competition and increasing returns to 
scale, which may be important in certain sectors. We are therefore using what can be thought of as a base 
GTAP structure. 
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by the same percentage. Although global investments and savings must be equal, this does not 
apply at the regional level, where the trade balance is endogenously determined as the 
difference between regional savings and regional investments. This is valid as the regional 
savings enter the regional utility function. The quantity of endowments (land and natural 
resources) in each region is fixed exogenously within the model, while the extent to which 
labour is employed is endogenously determined. The capital closure adopted in the model is 
based on the theory that changes in investment levels in each country/region become available 
on-line instantly, updating the capital stocks endogenously in the model simulation.5 Finally, the 
numeraire used in the model is a price index of the global primary factor index. 
 
The applied ad valorem equivalent (AVE) tariff data found in the pre-release GTAP Version 9 
database originates from the Market Access Maps (MacMap) database and contains bilateral 
applied tariff rates (both specific and ad valorem) at the 6-digit Harmonised Systems (HS6) 
level. These are then aggregated to GTAP concordance using trade weights. 
 
Before simulating the trade policy (FTA) scenario, a baseline scenario implementing trade 
policy commitments was constructed and projected to the year 2025. 
 
The baseline scenario updates the standard database with a projection of the world economy 
from 2011 to 2025, applying suitable shocks to Gross Domestic Product (GDP), population, 
labour and capital, as well as incorporating important developments, realised or planned, since 
2011. These developments include our interpretation of the final outcomes of the Economic 
Partnership Agreements (EPAs) between all African countries and the EU that are currently 
being implemented. 
 
Shocks are applied to GDP, population, labour force and natural resource extraction to project 
the world’s economy to the baseline year of 2025. After updating the GTAP database to the year 
2025 the scenarios are implemented using the updated GTAP database as the base for these 
simulations. More precisely, the first three modelled scenarios assume that: 
 
• all ad valorem tariffs and ad valorem equivalents of specific tariffs between all African 
countries are abolished 
• NTBs based upon estimates barriers obtained from the World Bank are reduced in 
isolation from tariff reductions 
• a combination of tariff elimination and NTB reduction is simulated. 
 
Differences between the baseline and the primary scenario as measured by the gains in 2025 in 
2011 real US dollars are therefore the results of implementation of the sequential FTAs. 
 
The GTAP database/model 
 
The standard GTAP model6 is a comparative static general equilibrium model: while it examines 
all aspects of an economy it does not specifically incorporate dynamics such as improved 
                                                          
5
  This is the so-called Baldwin closure as documented in Francois et al. (1997). 
 
6
  See Hertel and Tsigas (1997) for an explanation of the structure of the GTAP model, Hertel et al. (2007) for a 
discussion of its usefulness in policy making, and Valenzuela et al. (2008) for its sensitivity to modelling 
assumptions. 
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technology and economies of scale over time. The economic agents (consumers, producers 
and government) are modelled according to neoclassical economic assumptions, with both 
producers and consumers maximising profits and welfare respectively: markets are perfectly 
competitive and all regions and activities are linked. Results are measured as a change in welfare 
arising from the reallocation of resources and the resulting change in allocative efficiency; as 
terms of trade effects; as capital accumulation; and as changes in employment. This change 
in welfare is based upon a representative household, so unless this is modified it is not 
possible to examine the distributional aspects other than through the skilled/unskilled labour 
market closures. The standard GTAP model also does not address the time path of benefits and 
capital flows. These changes are important as they allow consumers to borrow, which in turn 
allows consumption patterns to vary over time. The database is the pre-release Version 
9.2GTAP database (Badri et al., 2012) with the base year 2011.7 The main labour market 
closure of the model has been changed so that the supply of labour is endogenously determined 
by the labour supply elasticity. 
 
The GTAP model expresses the welfare implications of a modelled change in a country’s 
policy as the EV in income. This measures the annual change in a country’s income (gains or 
losses) from having implemented, for example, an FTA. The EV in this case is simply defined 
as the difference between the initial pre-FTA scenario income and the post-FTA scenario 
income, with all prices set as fixed at pre-FTA levels. If a country’s EV in income increases 
due to a policy change, the country can increase its consumption of goods equal to the increase 
in income and thereby improve the national welfare in the country. Total welfare gains/losses 
can be decomposed into contributions from improvements in allocative efficiency, capital 
accumulation, changes in the employment rate of the labour force, and terms of trade (Huff 
and Hertel, 2000). 
 
Gains from allocative efficiency arise from improved reallocation of resources from less to 
more productive uses. For instance, when import tariffs are abolished, resources shift from 
previously protected industries towards sectors where the country has a comparative advantage, 
producing an increase in real GDP and economic welfare. 
 
Terms of trade effects are the consequence of changing export and import prices facing a 
country. So, when a country experiences an increase in its export price relative to its import 
price (e.g. due to improved market access), it may finance a larger quantity of imports with 
the same quantity of exports, thus expanding the supply of products available to the country’s 
consumers. While allocative efficiency contributes to increases in global welfare, the terms of 
trade affect the distribution of welfare gains across countries; essentially, one country’s terms of 
trade gain is another country’s terms of trade loss. The global total must therefore add up to 
zero, and if a large proportion of the benefit to a country from an FTA is derived from terms of 
trade effects, this implies transfers to that country from the rest of the world. Note, however, 
that in our EV we are including a value for the changes in the price and levels of investments 
and savings (terms of trade on capital) in our terms of trade (ToT) values. This can be a 
significant portion of the total ToT values. 
 
Capital accumulation summarises the long-run welfare consequences of changes in the stock of 
capital due to changes in net investment. A policy shock affects the global supply of savings for  
                                                          
7
  The documentation of the Version 8 database can be found on 
http://www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu/databases/v8/v8_doco.asp. 
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investment as well as the regional distribution of investments. If a trade agreement has a positive 
effect on income through improvements in efficiency and/or ToT, a part of that extra income 
will be saved by households, making possible an expansion in the capital stock. At the same 
time, rising income will increase demand for produced goods, pushing up factor returns and 
thus attracting more investments. Generally, economies with the highest growth will be prepared 
to pay the largest rate of return to capital, and will obtain most of the new investments. 
Therefore long-run welfare gains from capital accumulation tend to reinforce the short-term 
welfare gains deriving from allocative efficiency and ToT. 
 
The welfare effects of changed employment rates are the consequence of changes in the 
employment of the labour force due to changes in the real wage (see also Liu et al., 1998, for a 
technical discussion). In a situation where the demand for labour and thereby the real wage 
increases, the amount of labour employed increases, reducing the relative increase in the real 
wage, thereby increasing the competitiveness of the country’s industries. 
 
The GTAP simulations 
 
The countries and regional aggregations used in the model are shown in Table 4a along with 
their GTAP codes. We have used most of the available African countries in their own right 
and used the GTAP aggregations for the remainder. Outside Africa we have used the EU27 
(minus the United Kingdom which is represented as GBR in its own right), the United States of 
America (US), the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China) and the rest of the 
world (RoW). 
 
Table 4a: GTAP country/region used and the associated GTAP codes 
 
zaf South Africa  moz Mozambique 
bwa Botswana zmb Zambia 
nam Namibia zwe Zimbabwe 
xsc Swaziland-Lesotho gha Ghana 
ken Kenya tun Tunisia 
tza Tanzania sen Senegal 
uga Uganda RAfrica Rest of Africa 
rwa Rwanda EU EU27 
egy Egypt GBR United Kingdom 
mar Morocco usa US 
xec Rest east Africa chn China 
nga Nigeria ind India 
xac Angola-DRC bra Brazil 
eth Ethiopia rus Russia 
mdg Madagascar   
mwi Malawi row Rest of world 
mus Mauritius   
Source: GTAP database 
 
For the GTAP sectors we have aggregated the agricultural sectors into primary agriculture and 
secondary agriculture along with processed sugar that would normally be in the secondary 
agriculture as the processed output from cane. We used this approach because an analysis of 
the  
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the results of the simulations from Sandrey et al. (2011) showed that, for agricultural products, 
sugar was the only sector that resulted in significant gains to South Africa and in a significant 
loss for Kenya. Manufacturing has retained its full suite of 16 sectors while natural resources 
and services are merged into their respective aggregated sectors. The focus of this report is on 
manufacturing, although only those sectors where there is any meaningful change will be 
reported on in most cases. These GTAP sectors and their associated codes used in this 
publication are shown in Table 4b. 
 
Table 4b: GTAP sectors and their associated codes 
 
GTAP Sector Code 
Primary agriculture PAgr 
Secondary agriculture SAgr 
Sugar  
Natural resource nat 
Textiles tex 
Clothing wap 
Leather goods lea 
Lumber lum 
Paper products ppp 
Petroleum, gas p c 
Chemical plastic rubber crp 
Non-metal mineral nmm 
Iron steel I s 
Non ferrous nfm 
Fabricated metal fmp 
Vehicles mvh 
Other Transport otn 
Electrical ele 
Other machinery ome 
Other manufacturing omf 
Services serv 
Source: GTAP model 
 
As always, we apply shocks to GDP, population, labour force, and natural resource extraction to 
project the world’s economy to the baseline year of 2025 – a year in which we assume that an 
FTA could be fully implemented. The projection of the world economy uses the exogenous 
assumptions listed in Table 5, and this is important in shaping the baseline scenario. The general 
sources for the assumptions in Table 5 are provided in a footnote to the table, and these 
assumptions represent the best estimates of the possible future path of the data. Note in 
particular from Table 5 the projections for real GDP through to 2025, where the relatively strong 
growth rates for Africa are a feature. They are consistently higher than the low rates projected 
for the US and the rest of the world and, in particular, those projected for Europe. Indeed, in 
some cases they are close to or even above the strong growth projections for India and China. 
 
Also note from Table 5 that the population projections for Africa are consistently higher than for 
non-African projections, and this has the effect of mitigating GDP per head in the medium-term  
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future. These GDP projections affect the baseline for our computer simulation results for the 
FTA, as these FTA results are measured as deviations from the baseline that has been driven 
in part by these GDP projections. 
 
Table 5: GDP assumptions 
 
GDP: Yearly percentage growth  Projections   Changes % 
 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 2023 2025 total yearly 
South Africa 2.5 1.4 2.8 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 42 2.5 
Botswana 4.3 4.4 4.0 4.1 4.0 4.0 3.9 77 4.2 
Namibia 5.0 4.3 4.6 4.6 4.6 4.6 4.6 88 4.6 
Swazi-Lesotho 1.9 2.1 2.1 1.7 1.8 1.7 1.7 30 1.9 
Kenya 4.6 5.3 6.4 6.6 6.6 6.6 6.6 131 6.1 
Tanzania 6.9 7.2 7.1 6.9 6.9 6.9 6.9 156 7.0 
Uganda 2.8 5.9 6.5 6.9 6.9 6.9 6.9 137 6.4 
Rwanda 8.8 6.0 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 165 7.2 
Egypt 2.2 2.2 3.8 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 63 3.6 
Morocco 2.7 3.5 5.0 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.4 95 4.9 
Rest of east Africa -1.9 3.1 4.5 5.2 5.2 5.2 5.2 78 4.2 
Nigeria 4.3 7.0 7.2 6.9 6.9 6.9 6.9 146 6.7 
Angola-Congo 5.5 4.8 6.5 6.7 6.5 6.4 6.4 135 6.3 
Ethiopia 8.8 8.2 8.5 8.0 7.9 7.8 7.8 199 8.1 
Madagascar 2.5 3.0 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 75 4.1 
Malawi 1.9 5.7 5.5 5.0 5.1 5.1 5.1 98 5.0 
Mauritius 7.0 6.8 6.7 5.7 8.5 8.6 8.8 192 8.0 
Mozambique 7.2 8.3 8.2 8.0 7.8 7.8 7.8 187 7.8 
Zambia 6.8 6.5 7.7 6.5 6.7 6.6 6.6 149 6.7 
Zimbabwe 10.6 3.1 3.9 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.4 86 4.5 
Ghana 8.8 4.5 7.2 5.8 5.1 4.7 4.5 108 5.4 
Tunisia 3.7 2.8 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 76 4.1 
Senegal 3.4 4.5 5.1 5.1 5.2 5.2 5.2 94 4.8 
Rest of Africa 2.2 2.7 2.9 2.5 2.6 2.6 2.6 43 2.6 
Total Africa 3.2 3.6 4.6 4.6 4.6 4.7 4.8 82 4.4 
EU27 -0.4 1.0 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 22 1.4 
UK 0.3 3.2 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 37 2.3 
US 2.3 2.2 3.0 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 44 2.7 
China 7.7 7.4 6.8 6.4 6.5 6.4 6.4 150 6.8 
India 4.7 5.6 6.5 6.7 6.7 6.7 6.7 136 6.3 
Brazil 1.0 0.3 2.2 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 39 2.4 
Russia 3.4 0.2 1.5 2.0 1.9 2.0 2.0 27 1.7 
Rest of world 5.5 4.3 5.0 5.1 4.9 4.7 4.6 95 4.9 
Total world 3.3 3.3 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 69 3.8 
Sources: International Monetary Fund; World Economic Outlook Database (October 2014); BASELINE 
database MaGE model data and projections 1980-2050; Fouré (2012); own assumptions 
 
The GTAP model then determines changes in output through both an expansionary and a 
substitution effect in each country/region of the model. The expansionary effect represents the 
effects of growth in domestic and foreign demand shaped by income and population growth and 
the assumed income elasticities. The substitution effect reflects the changes in competitiveness 
in each country/region shaped by changes in relative total factor productivity, cost of 
production, and any policy changes. The GTAP model uses this set of macroeconomic 
projections to generate the ‘best estimate’ of global production and trade data for 2025. The 
relative growth rates of each country/region for GDP, population, labour, capital and total factor 
pr  
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productivity play an important role in determining the relative growth in output of the 
commodities when projecting the world economy from 2011 to 2025. We can now take the 
resulting data set from this baseline simulation as the new base for our FTA scenario. A 
simulation scenario measures the difference between our baseline model’s output in 2025 in the 
absence of, for example, the FTA, against the likely output if an FTA were concluded. The 
model results shown in this chapter therefore present the isolated effect of a possible FTA or 
another simulated scenario in the year 2025. 
 
Table 6: Baseline 2011 to 2025: yearly percentage change 
 
Yearly % growth 2011-2027 Labour Unskilled Skilled Natural  Total Factor 
 GDP Pop Force labour labour resource Capital Productivity 
South Africa 2.51 0.45 0.87 0.77 2.00 0.96 2.93 0.15 
Botswana 4.18 0.84 1.18 1.07 3.37 0.96 4.65 0.45 
Namibia 4.60 1.11 0.00 -0.04 0.32 0.96 5.42 0.73 
Swaziland & 
Lesotho 
1.90 0.98 1.54 1.44 5.12 0.96 1.74 -0.18 
Kenya 6.15 2.53 2.87 2.73 6.05 0.96 6.94 0.53 
Tanzania 6.95 3.10 3.20 3.19 5.52 0.96 8.26 0.92 
Uganda 6.37 3.02 3.59 3.53 5.07 0.96 7.23 0.61 
Rwanda 7.22 2.65 2.84 2.75 6.75 0.96 9.50 1.24 
Egypt 3.57 1.45 2.16 1.45 5.78 0.96 3.18 0.09 
Morocco 4.91 0.86 1.34 0.80 4.72 0.96 5.27 0.55 
 Rest of east Africa 4.22 2.14 2.60 2.47 6.44 0.96 4.03 0.12 
Nigeria 6.65 2.51 2.67 2.58 5.10 0.96 7.54 1.83 
Angola & Congo 6.31 2.51 3.33 3.24 5.96 0.96 6.62 0.75 
Ethiopia 8.14 1.88 2.72 2.63 5.42 0.96 9.40 1.57 
Madagascar 4.07 2.76 3.27 3.18 5.83 0.96 3.34 0.36 
Malawi 4.99 3.29 3.33 3.32 5.52 0.96 5.12 0.46 
Mauritius 7.95 0.40 0.24 0.21 1.24 0.96 10.26 1.48 
Mozambique 7.82 2.20 2.78 2.73 8.13 0.96 9.21 0.88 
Zambia 6.74 3.21 3.21 3.18 5.18 0.96 7.17 0.66 
Zimbabwe 4.52 0.77 1.42 1.38 2.63 0.96 5.61 0.53 
Ghana 5.36 2.10 2.57 2.57 2.75 0.96 6.92 0.83 
Tunisia 4.10 0.85 0.89 0.39 4.04 0.96 4.42 0.44 
Senegal 4.84 2.46 3.04 2.93 5.48 0.96 5.04 0.27 
Rest of Africa 2.58 2.26 2.56 2.41 5.13 0.96 2.24 -0.04 
Total Africa 4.37 - - - - - - - 
EU27 1.44 0.11 -0.46 -1.10 1.63 0.96 1.74 0.19 
UK 2.30 0.57 0.33 -1.23 3.30 0.96 2.60 0.18 
US 2.66 0.79 0.49 -0.33 1.15 0.96 3.87 0.59 
China 6.75 0.25 0.08 -0.20 2.94 0.96 7.80 0.98 
India 6.32 1.16 1.75 1.51 4.78 0.96 7.39 0.85 
Brazil 2.41 0.68 0.90 0.54 4.20 0.96 2.39 0.01 
Russia 1.75 -0.19 -0.73 -1.25 -0.35 0.96 2.36 0.34 
Rest of world 4.89 0.98 1.20 0.83 2.88 0.96 5.62 0.60 
Total world 3.84 - - - - - - - 
Source: International Monetary Fund; World Economic Outlook Database (October 2014); own 
assumptions. 
 
Note: Capital and TFP are endogenously determined by the GTAP model and Version 9 database 
given the exogenous GDP, population, unskilled, skilled labour and natural resource projections 
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After updating the GTAP database to the year 2025 the Africa FTA is implemented using the 
updated GTAP database as the base for this simulation. This enables the gains achieved by 
implementing the FTA to be put into perspective. Differences between the baseline and the 
primary scenario as measured by the changes in 2025 as expressed in 2011 real US dollars 
are therefore the results of implementation of the African FTA. 
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Annex Table 1: GTAP macroeconomic assumptions made (full data) 
 
GDP: Yearly percentage growth        Projection       Changes % 
 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 total yearly 
South Africa 2.5 1.9 1.4 2.3 2.8 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 42 2.5 
Botswana 4.3 5.9 4.4 4.2 4.0 4.1 4.1 3.8 4.0 4.0 3.9 4.0 3.9 3.9 77 4.2 
Namibia 5.0 4.3 4.3 4.5 4.6 4.7 4.6 4.7 4.6 4.6 4.6 4.6 4.6 4.6 88 4.6 
Swaziland & Lesotho 1.9 2.8 2.1 2.0 2.1 1.8 1.7 1.7 1.8 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 30 1.9 
Kenya 4.6 4.6 5.3 6.2 6.4 6.5 6.6 6.6 6.6 6.6 6.6 6.6 6.6 6.6 131 6.1 
Tanzania 6.9 7.0 7.2 7.0 7.1 7.0 6.9 6.9 6.9 6.9 6.9 6.9 6.9 6.9 156 7.0 
Uganda 2.8 5.8 5.9 6.3 6.5 6.7 6.9 7.0 6.9 6.9 6.9 6.9 6.9 6.9 137 6.4 
Rwanda 8.8 4.7 6.0 6.7 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 165 7.2 
Egypt 2.2 2.1 2.2 3.5 3.8 3.9 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 63 3.6 
Morocco 2.7 4.4 3.5 4.7 5.0 5.3 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.4 95 4.9 
Rest of eastern Africa -1.9 3.3 3.1 3.7 4.5 5.0 5.2 5.3 5.2 5.2 5.2 5.2 5.2 5.2 78 4.2 
Nigeria 4.3 5.4 7.0 7.3 7.2 7.1 6.9 6.8 6.9 6.9 6.9 6.9 6.9 6.9 146 6.7 
Angola & Congo 5.5 7.1 4.8 6.4 6.5 6.7 6.7 6.1 6.5 6.4 6.3 6.4 6.4 6.4 135 6.3 
Ethiopia 8.8 9.7 8.2 8.5 8.5 8.0 8.0 7.5 7.9 7.8 7.7 7.8 7.8 7.8 199 8.1 
Madagascar 2.5 2.4 3.0 4.0 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 75 4.1 
Malawi 1.9 5.2 5.7 6.0 5.5 5.2 5.0 5.0 5.1 5.0 5.1 5.1 5.1 5.1 98 5.0 
Mauritius 7.0 6.7 6.8 6.8 6.7 8.9 5.7 10.7 8.5 8.3 9.2 8.6 8.7 8.8 192 8.0 
Mozambique 7.2 7.1 8.3 8.2 8.2 7.9 8.0 7.7 7.8 7.8 7.8 7.8 7.8 7.8 187 7.8 
Zambia 6.8 6.7 6.5 7.2 7.7 7.0 6.5 6.5 6.7 6.6 6.6 6.6 6.6 6.6 149 6.7 
Zimbabwe 10.6 3.3 3.1 3.2 3.9 4.3 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.4 86 4.5 
Ghana 8.8 7.1 4.5 4.7 7.2 6.3 5.8 3.1 5.1 4.6 4.3 4.7 4.5 4.5 108 5.4 
Tunisia 3.7 2.3 2.8 3.7 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 76 4.1 
Senegal 3.4 3.5 4.5 4.6 5.1 5.1 5.1 5.3 5.2 5.2 5.2 5.2 5.2 5.2 94 4.8 
Rest of Africa 2.2 2.3 2.7 2.9 2.9 2.7 2.5 2.5 2.6 2.5 2.5 2.6 2.6 2.6 43 2.6 
Total Africa 3.2 3.6 3.6 4.3 4.6 4.6 4.6 4.5 4.6 4.6 4.7 4.7 4.7 4.8 82 4.4 
EU27 -0.4 -0.1 1.0 1.5 1.8 1.9 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 22 1.4 
United Kingdom 0.3 1.7 3.2 2.7 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 37 2.3 
US 2.3 2.2 2.2 3.1 3.0 3.0 2.7 2.6 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 44 2.7 
China 7.7 7.7 7.4 7.1 6.8 6.6 6.4 6.3 6.5 6.4 6.4 6.4 6.4 6.4 150 6.8 
India 4.7 5.0 5.6 6.4 6.5 6.6 6.7 6.7 6.7 6.7 6.7 6.7 6.7 6.7 136 6.3 
Brazil 1.0 2.5 0.3 1.4 2.2 2.7 2.9 3.1 2.9 3.0 3.0 2.9 2.9 2.9 39 2.4 
Russia 3.4 1.3 0.2 0.5 1.5 1.8 2.0 2.0 1.9 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 27 1.7 
Rest of world 5.5 4.9 4.3 4.7 5.0 5.0 5.1 5.2 4.9 4.9 4.8 4.7 4.7 4.6 95 4.9 
Total world 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.8 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 69 3.8 
Source: IMF and others; own assumption 
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Annex Table 2: Baseline 2011 to 2025: yearly percentage change (full data) 
 
Yearly % growth 2011-2027
  
Labour Unskilled Skilled Natural 
 
Total Factor 
 GDP Population force labour labour resources Capital Productivity 
South Africa 2.51 0.45 0.87 0.77 2.00 0.96 2.93 0.15 
Botswana 4.18 0.84 1.18 1.07 3.37 0.96 4.65 0.45 
Namibia 4.60 1.11 0.00 -0.04 0.32 0.96 5.42 0.73 
Swaziland & Lesotho 1.90 0.98 1.54 1.44 5.12 0.96 1.74 -0.18 
Kenya 6.15 2.53 2.87 2.73 6.05 0.96 6.94 0.53 
Tanzania 6.95 3.10 3.20 3.19 5.52 0.96 8.26 0.92 
Uganda 6.37 3.02 3.59 3.53 5.07 0.96 7.23 0.61 
Rwanda 7.22 2.65 2.84 2.75 6.75 0.96 9.50 1.24 
Egypt 3.57 1.45 2.16 1.45 5.78 0.96 3.18 0.09 
Morocco 4.91 0.86 1.34 0.80 4.72 0.96 5.27 0.55 
Rest of eastern Africa 4.22 2.14 2.60 2.47 6.44 0.96 4.03 0.12 
Nigeria 6.65 2.51 2.67 2.58 5.10 0.96 7.54 1.83 
Angola & Congo 6.31 2.51 3.33 3.24 5.96 0.96 6.62 0.75 
Ethiopia 8.14 1.88 2.72 2.63 5.42 0.96 9.40 1.57 
Madagascar 4.07 2.76 3.27 3.18 5.83 0.96 3.34 0.36 
Malawi 4.99 3.29 3.33 3.32 5.52 0.96 5.12 0.46 
Mauritius 7.95 0.40 0.24 0.21 1.24 0.96 10.26 1.48 
Mozambique 7.82 2.20 2.78 2.73 8.13 0.96 9.21 0.88 
Zambia 6.74 3.21 3.21 3.18 5.18 0.96 7.17 0.66 
Zimbabwe 4.52 0.77 1.42 1.38 2.63 0.96 5.61 0.53 
Ghana 5.36 2.10 2.57 2.57 2.75 0.96 6.92 0.83 
Tunisia 4.10 0.85 0.89 0.39 4.04 0.96 4.42 0.44 
Senegal 4.84 2.46 3.04 2.93 5.48 0.96 5.04 0.27 
Rest of Africa 2.58 2.26 2.56 2.41 5.13 0.96 2.24 -0.04 
Total Africa 4.37 - - - - - - - 
EU27 1.44 0.11 -0.46 -1.10 1.63 0.96 1.74 0.19 
United Kingdom 2.30 0.57 0.33 -1.23 3.30 0.96 2.60 0.18 
US 2.66 0.79 0.49 -0.33 1.15 0.96 3.87 0.59 
China 6.75 0.25 0.08 -0.20 2.94 0.96 7.80 0.98 
India 6.32 1.16 1.75 1.51 4.78 0.96 7.39 0.85 
Brazil 2.41 0.68 0.90 0.54 4.20 0.96 2.39 0.01 
Russia 1.75 -0.19 -0.73 -1.25 -0.35 0.96 2.36 0.34 
Rest of world 4.89 0.98 1.20 0.83 2.88 0.96 5.62 0.60 
Total world 3.84 - - - - - - - 
Sources for BASELINE database: Fouré et al. (2012); own assumptions 
Note: Capital and TFP are endogenously determined by the GTAP model and Version 9 database given the exogenous 
GDP, population, unskilled  and skilled labour, and natural resource projections 
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Chapter 2 
 
The Africa-wide results: 
hundred percent tariff reduction 
 
Summary and key points 
 
In this chapter we introduce our base scenario simulation whereby we reduce all tariff 
between all African countries to zero. We show the total gains and then the four components: 
allocative efficiency, labour, capital, and terms of trade (ToT). 
 
For South Africa, these gains are some $5.74 billion in real terms, and this outcome 
dominates the results. Kenya is another big gainer ($1,289million), while Uganda gains $683 
million. Tanzania’s gains are more modest, while the Rwandan gain of $301 million is 
beneficial. A feature is the very large loss of $1,486 million to Zimbabwe, while in the 
Angola-Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) aggregation earlier Global Trade Analysis 
Project (GTAP) losses are turned into gains of $1,168 million. Zambia gains by a   significant 
$454 million, the gains to Malawi, Mauritius and Mozambique are modest, and those to 
Madagascar minuscule. Ethiopia reports gains of one-quarter of a billion dollars, while 
Egypt’s and Morocco’s gains of $518million and $572million each are very similar. Nigeria 
gains over two billion dollars, while Ghana and Senegal also report large gains of around one 
billion dollars each; the ‘rest of Africa’1 shows gains of two billion dollars. Overall, the 
African Free Trade Agreement (FTA) is globally welfare-enhancing by $7.3 billion. This is 
an impressive result. 
 
The cells in a bilateral matrix show where each country is making gains or losses. This 
highlights that many countries gain from their own liberalisation as greater efficiencies flow 
through their economies. These countries include Kenya (which reforms and compacts its 
own inefficient sugar sector) and Nigeria, for example, while Zimbabwe loses heavily from 
its own liberalisation. South Africa is a major gainer in secondary agriculture, as are 
Namibia, Morocco and Senegal. The rest of Africa gains in both primary and secondary 
agriculture. 
 
Of interest are the combined textile, clothing and footwear (TCF) sectors; this is because 
many African countries benefit through improved access into continent-wide markets as 
tariffs go to zero in the TCF sectors. There are, however, some major losers, including non- 
African exporters of textiles and leather. However, other global apparel producers actually 
gain even though they face trade diversion. Virtually all countries and regions gain from 
duty-free access for vehicles and their parts across Africa, with, as expected, South Africa as 
the largest African gainer. 
 
Except for Zambia’s small decline of less than one percent in both exports and imports and 
Zimbabwe’s decline in imports, both exports and imports increase across the continent for 
all 
 
 
1 
The ‘rest of Africa’ includes Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Ivory Coast, Guinea, Togo and the rest of north, 
central and west Africa. 
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all parties. Some of these changes are very large (Rwanda), while others are much smaller 
(Egypt). 
 
The demand for both skilled and unskilled labour in most of the countries shows increases, 
with South Africa and Senegal displaying the most significant increases (more than 0.57%). 
 
Tariff revenue for the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) actually increases while at 
the other extreme tariff revenues into Zimbabwe decline by over one billion dollars. Several 
other countries have tariff revenue losses of nearly half a billion dollars or even more, but for 
several larger countries (Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia and Senegal) tariff losses are not an issue. 
 
There are three aspects of the simulation that we examine. The main one is Zimbabwe where 
a major loss is forecast. Tariffs against all African imports decline to zero, reduce 
Zimbabwe’s tariff revenues by over one billion dollars, and set a mechanism in place that 
results in a welfare loss of $1,471 million. Unfortunately, Zimbabwe has limited abilities to 
take the opportunities for extra exports in compensation, but the real issue is in the capital 
market as capital leaves. The Angola-DRC aggregation has changed from a small loss in the 
Tripartite FTA (TFTA) to a significant gain of $1,168 million as the aggregation is becoming 
more integrated into Africa. The welfare increases are driven by improved access to Africa, 
and although the aggregation is a major resource exporter there have been increases in the 
exports of some manufacturing products. There are, however, some possible questions about 
the trade data. It is very unusual for a country like Russia, which is excluded from an FTA, to 
make the reported gains from that FTA: we find that Russia is gaining in terms of trade, in 
the energy sectors in particular. This gain attracts some additional capital and marginally 
increases employment; this is enough to more than compensate for the usual trade 
displacement in other exporting sectors. 
 
Introduction and the welfare gains 
 
In this chapter we introduce our base scenario simulation whereby we reduce all tariff 
between all African countries to zero. Table 1 shows the changes in welfare from the FTAs 
assuming the scenario of a 100% reduction in merchandise tariffs; the data is expressed in US 
dollars (millions) as one-off increases in annual welfare at the assessed end point of 2025. 
This data is presented for all the countries/regions used in the model, and shows, firstly, the 
total gains and then the four components (allocative efficiency, labour, capital and ToT) 
discussed in Chapter 1. 
 
For South Africa, these gains are some $5.74 billion in real terms, and, as is usually the case, 
this outcome completely dominates the results for both Africa and the total world-wide gain 
of $7.3 billion. These gains for South Africa derive from increased investment which expands 
the capital stock ($2,261million), allocative efficiency gains of $1,449million as resources are 
better employed in the economy, gains from increased labour employment ($904million), and 
ToT improvement ($1,127million) resulting from a favourable change in relative prices 
between South African exports and imports. 
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Within SACU, both Botswana and Namibia gain (by $68 and $463 million respectively), 
while the Swaziland-Lesotho aggregation gains by some $100 million (with the gains spread 
across most of the factors). Kenya is another big gainer ($1,289million), while Uganda shows 
a surprisingly large gain of $683 million. Gains for Tanzania are more modest compared with 
those for Uganda, while the Rwandan gain of $301 million is impressive. 
 
Looking at other countries in east Africa the main feature is the very large loss of $1,486 
million to Zimbabwe, a loss that we will examine in more detail later. In contrast to earlier 
GTAP analysis the Angola-DRC aggregation gains by $1,168 million. We will also examine 
this swing from a loss to an impressive gain. Zambia gains by a significant $454 million, 
while the gains to Malawi, Mauritius and Mozambique are modest. Madagascar reports a 
minuscule loss that means virtually no change. Ethiopia, straddling north and east Africa, 
reports solid gains of one-quarter of a billion dollars. 
 
Egypt’s and Morocco’s gains of $518million and $572million respectively are very similar, 
while their fellow north African country of Tunisia gains by a smaller $357million. Nigeria is 
a big gainer of over two billion dollars, while Ghana and Senegal also report large gains of 
just under and just over one billion dollars each. Finally, in Africa, the 'rest of Africa’2 shows 
gains of two billion dollars split between the members.  Those outside Africa, as is usually the 
case, lose as their trade is reduced in favour of intra-African trade. The EU (and the UK), 
China, India, and the 'rest of the world’ are big losers overall but perhaps not in the context of 
the size of their economies. The US is a relatively modest loser, although its initial presence 
in Africa has not been as visible as that of the Europeans. Surprisingly, Russia gains by over 
half a billion dollars, and we discuss this result below. Overall, the African FTA is globally 
welfare-enhancing by $7.3 billion – an impressive result. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
The ‘rest of Africa’ includes Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Ivory Coast, Guinea, Togo and the rest of north, 
central and west Africa. 
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Table 1: Complete intra-African tariff elimination, welfare gains at 2025, $ (millions) 
 
Country Total Efficiency Labour Capital ToT 
South Africa 5,742 1,449 904 2,261 1,127 
Botswana 68 11 20 44 -7 
Namibia 463 23 50 286 104 
Swazi-Lesotho 100 17 18 50 16 
Kenya 1,289 264 84 959 -18 
Tanzania 377 204 26 132 15 
Uganda 683 147 40 403 93 
Rwanda 301 78 15 133 75 
Egypt 518 100 37 257 124 
Morocco 572 105 56 195 216 
Rest of east Africa 15 68 -19 6 -40 
Nigeria 2,031 506 445 933 148 
Angola-DRC 1,168 323 40 815 -9 
Ethiopia 255 79 20 180 -24 
Madagascar -1 1 0 -1 -2 
Malawi 41 20 2 26 -8 
Mauritius 76 12 4 40 20 
Mozambique 14 7 6 36 -35 
Zambia 454 123 65 129 137 
Zimbabwe -1,486 -203 -49 -480 -755 
Ghana 813 264 47 257 245 
Tunisia 357 99 25 146 87 
Senegal 1,211 332 47 618 213 
Rest of Africa 2,012 1,249 142 779 -159 
EU -2,386 -720 -121 -830 -715 
UK -364 -136 -25 -93 -111 
US -726 -149 -145 -206 -226 
China -2,351 -310 -138 -1,233 -670 
India -1,539 -336 -28 -723 -452 
Brazil -188 -58 -30 -98 -3 
Russia 553 111 6 167 269 
Rest of world -2,771 -943 -241 -1,876 289 
Total world 7,299 2,738 1,304 3,311 -54 
Source: GTAP 
 
The unilateral and bilateral gains and losses 
 
In Table 2 we highlight from where the main bilateral gains derive from for the major 
African countries as measured by the welfare gains in Table 1. The data is shown in a matrix 
of the full range of countries in the rows but only selected countries in the columns. The cells 
are to be read as follows: in the column headed South Africa (zaf) there is a small loss from 
unilateral liberalisation ($-74 million), but that is much more than compensated for by large 
gains from reforms in Kenya (ken) of $732 million, Angola and the DRC aggregation 
(xac) of $572 million and Zimbabwe (zwe) of $1,027 million. Kenya is interesting in that it 
ma 
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makes large gains ($480 million) from its own liberalisation, while Ghana ($743million) and 
the rest of Africa ($756million) gain from liberalisation in Nigeria. Similarly, Nigeria makes 
large gains from access into Ghana. Further down the table Zimbabwe loses heavily 
($1,472million) from its own liberalisation, and its problem is that it has no compensatory 
gains coming from trade access into any other country. This is likely to be because (a) most 
of its exports are already duty-free to South Africa and (b) because it has little productive 
capacity to take advantage of better access into other countries where there were previously 
tariff barriers. Other interesting cells include the gains to Uganda from access into rest of 
Africa ($558million from a total of $683million) and, similarly, Senegal’s gains are 
concentrated in the rest of Africa ($1,066million from a total of $1,211million). Also, 
countries such as Egypt and to a lesser extent Morocco (mar) ‘spread their wings’ and trade 
much more actively to countries right across Africa. Finally, note that (a) the rows will not 
add up as the minor countries have been omitted, and (b) that ‘outside’ refers to those 
countries/regions outside Africa. This latter column shows the impacts that liberalisation in 
each African country has upon the ‘outside’ world via direct trade and production changes, 
second and subsequent effects and the effects on capital as the corollary of an increase in 
African capital flows that must be balanced by both marginally reduced capital stocks 
‘outside’ the FTA. 
 
Table 2: Contribution to welfare by country, $ (millions) 
 
Code zaf nam ken uga egy mar nga xac zmb zwe gha sen Rafrica Outside 
zaf -74 -1 63 13 133 35 16 0 1 -1 3 4 10 -421 
bwa -1 0 2 0 1 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 -9 
nam -1 1 1 0 2 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 -5 
xsc -2 0 1 0 3 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 4 -13 
ken 732 -1 480 -2 -65 5 23 1 -2 -7 0 -1 32 -517 
tza 466 1 -91 -9 91 3 7 26 8 -5 1 0 4 -504 
uga 150 0 -55 107 -10 3 7 1 -2 -1 1 0 14 -42 
rwa 25 0 -10 -8 -1 0 -1 0 -2 0 0 0 19 -9 
egy 51 0 0 0 21 0 19 4 -1 0 2 0 43 -107 
mar 17 0 3 0 6 -22 40 18 0 0 8 1 35 -37 
xec 225 92 9 11 12 4 183 3 -1 5 2 1 20 -257 
nga 372 10 33 2 114 42 19 162 -1 -2 743 32 756 -2,740 
xac 572 275 4 1 19 54 83 217 -3 15 5 19 257 -1,350 
eth 35 0 110 3 67 -1 0 0 -1 0 0 4 0 -522 
mdg 4 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -11 
mwi 164 1 -31 0 0 0 5 1 -6 -6 0 0 6 -3 
mus 20 0 -1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 -11 
moz 136 -2 22 1 13 0 2 1 1 -5 0 0 2 -194 
zmb 37 1 -2 0 -1 0 6 0 9 -2 1 0 14 -30 
zwe 1,027 10 -30 -1 2 3 50 24 -20 -1472 3 1 45 4,479 
gha 252 1 29 3 76 33 438 42 -2 -2 -146 60 412 -690 
tun 15 0 9 3 -1 0 16 6 0 0 4 0 37 -71 
sen 35 1 1 0 22 51 26 2 0 0 8 24 53 -239 
Rafrica 1,485 75 741 558 15 358 1,086 659 473 -3 181 1,066 248 -6,470 
Total 5,742 463 1,289 683 518 572 2,031 1,168 453 -1486 813 1,211 2,012 -9,773 
Source: GTAP output 
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The GTAP sectors 
 
Table 3 shows the matrix of GTAP sectors in the rows and contributions that changes in 
each of these sectors make in the cells for the major African countries. The ‘outside’ losses 
are indicated in the right-hand column. 
 
South Africa does particularly well from agricultural reforms across the continent, especially 
from secondary agriculture. Sugar has been listed as a separate sector in this analysis to re- 
examine the outcomes from earlier tralac research that shows that South Africa is also doing 
very well in this sector – especially with better access into Kenya and, to a lesser degree, 
Uganda. The Swaziland-Lesotho aggregation is not shown. While we would expect them to 
do well in increased sugar exports this is not the case: this is so because South Africa 
dominates. Note that Kenya and, to a lesser extent, Uganda also makes significant gains in 
the sugar sector: the reason is that both reduce their sugar production significantly as shown 
in Table 5.This enables them to transfer resources out of a sector which has been heavily 
protected but is technically inefficient. Here is a classic example of how regional integration 
can benefit a country through efficiency gains, as the overall welfare results for these two 
countries clearly show that reforming the sugar sector is beneficial to them. Other major 
gainers in secondary agriculture are Namibia, Morocco and Senegal, while the rest of Africa 
gains in both primary and secondary agriculture. Note in particular that secondary agriculture 
in Zimbabwe takes a large hit, and we would hypothesise that imports from South 
Africa in particular into a heavily protected sector are impacting on Zimbabwe’s secondary 
(but not primary) agriculture. 
 
Before examining the other sectors we would like to note that the contribution from natural 
resources shows little change. Trade, both exports and imports, in this sector concentrates on 
coal, oil and gas products, and forestry. In general, tariffs are very low or zero across the 
continent on imports and hence there are very limited welfare gains from improved access. 
 
We will just comment on two other commodities. One is the combined textile, apparel and 
footwear sectors (as represented by tex, wap and lea in GTAP) and the other is motor 
vehicles and their parts (mvh). Both of these are at the heart of African industrialisation. 
Many African countries benefit through improved access into continent-wide markets as 
tariffs go to zero in the TCF sectors. These include South Africa and Kenya across the three 
sectors, Egypt in apparel, Nigeria in leather and the rest of Africa (probably the cotton 
producers of west Africa) in textiles. There are, however, some major losers, and in 
particular Zimbabwe loses across all sectors and the rest of Africa in leather. For ‘outside’, it 
is interesting that while textiles and leather (footwear) producers lose significantly the 
‘outside’ apparel producers actually gain even though they face trade diversion. 
 
All countries and regions shown, including ‘outside’ (but again with the exception of 
Zimbabwe) gain from duty-free access for vehicles and their parts across Africa. As 
expected, South Africa as the major producer is the largest African gainer, while many gain 
from presumably better access for both vehicles and parts. Again, Zimbabwe’s vehicle sector 
suffers a massive loss. 
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Table 3: Contribution to welfare by commodity, $ (millions) 
 
 zaf nam ken uga egy mar nga xac zwe gha sen Rafrica Outside 
PAgri 329 3 44 17 11 12 21 36 9 64 12 353 -797 
SAgri 1,032 238 130 51 47 273 59 -52 -474 28 405 229 -1,323 
Sugar 591 -2 558 103 -18 -1 11 37 -8 0 10 -10 -866 
nat 15 20 5 1 4 4 48 29 12 12 6 33 -210 
tex 209 31 94 39 70 17 59 71 -178 67 22 152 -410 
wap 42 4 19 -2 123 25 2 23 -146 -15 5 22 132 
lea 73 5 140 47 0 -1 494 -12 -58 39 2 -178 -501 
lum 95 42 32 43 8 5 25 34 -81 6 21 50 51 
ppp 173 1 12 3 32 49 7 21 -55 8 18 3 -192 
p_c 244 0 1 1 24 2 30 147 1 13 7 155 -644 
crp 631 24 96 35 61 19 340 3 26 209 110 206 -2,018 
nmm 95 8 33 103 4 5 52 -2 -12 25 390 164 -1,190 
i_s 162 0 31 77 6 0 34 17 13 29 47 108 -535 
nfm 60 0 19 0 -2 1 107 5 10 24 14 -6 -261 
fmp 441 20 19 24 61 21 67 146 -65 17 11 43 -279 
mvh 573 29 11 86 15 9 63 48 -308 6 22 130 403 
otn 56 7 4 11 2 1 135 210 -9 2 5 183 -183 
ele 125 17 16 12 3 8 154 19 -20 29 5 17 -77 
ome 672 12 14 19 63 102 301 387 -73 155 82 332 -649 
omf 121 3 12 13 2 21 21 2 -71 96 19 28 -222 
Total 5,742 463 1,289 683 518 572 2,031 1,168 -1486 813 1,211 2,012 -9,773 
Source: GTAP output 
 
Changes in African trade 
 
Table 4 turns to the expected changes in aggregate trade as measured by the percentage 
changes in the quantities of both exports and imports and changes to the overall trade 
balance as measured in dollars (millions). Note that the trade balance in the right-hand 
column is a macroeconomic closure in the GTAP model. It is heavily influenced by the 
difference on one side of an equation that measures savings and investment and which has to 
balance with exports minus imports on the other side of the classic macroeconomic equation. 
It is therefore not a trade balance as could be expected as it reflects changes in investment 
(capital) rather than actual changes in trade values. 
 
The terms of trade as shown in Table 1 reflect the changes in the relative prices of exports 
and imports and their contribution to total welfare changes in each country. The export and 
import changes shown here in Table 4 are percentage changes to quantities traded and the 
change in the value of the trade balance. 
 
Except for Zambia’s small decline of less than one percent in both exports and imports and 
Zimbabwe’s decline in imports, both exports and imports increase across the continent for 
all parties. Some of these changes are very large, with Rwanda the best example, while 
changes in other countries such as Egypt are much smaller. Note, however, that these are 
percentage changes and there are large differences in the original trade bases. 
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Table 4: Percentage changes in trade for the partners 
 
 Exports % Imports % Balance $m 
South Africa 2.7 3.5 -7 
Botswana 1.1 1.8 46 
Namibia 2.6 5.0 135 
Swazi-Lesotho 2.4 3.6 25 
Kenya 5.7 4.5 -450 
Tanzania 3.7 3.2 -166 
Uganda 4.3 6.4 -125 
Rwanda 10.1 13.8 -45 
Egypt 0.3 0.4 -110 
Morocco 0.8 1.1 -216 
Rest of east Africa 2.0 1.4 11 
Nigeria 1.7 2.0 -28 
Angola-DRC 2.1 3.1 -5 
Ethiopia 3.6 2.5 -69 
Madagascar 0.2 0.2 0 
Malawi 4.2 3.5 -8 
Mauritius 0.9 0.9 -28 
Mozambique 1.0 0.7 -18 
Zambia -0.7 -0.9 209 
Zimbabwe 32.7 -2.4 1,036 
Ghana 9.1 7.0 -422 
Tunisia 1.0 1.2 -38 
Senegal 8.2 9.4 -440 
Rest of Africa 2.8 2.8 -407 
EU -0.017 -0.031 21 
UK -0.010 -0.024 57 
US -0.007 -0.016 214 
China -0.021 -0.073 155 
India -0.044 -0.123 242 
Brazil -0.022 -0.032 1 
Russia 0.000 0.048 67 
Rest of world -0.013 -0.017 366 
Source: GTAP output 
 
At the bottom of Table 4 we have included the trade effects on the ‘outside’ countries and 
regions. We have shown these changes at three decimal places as they are marginal. Only 
Indian imports reduce by more than 0.1% as more African trade is diverted to intra-African 
trade. They are, however, based upon large initial trade flows, so the values shown reflect 
more importance when this is taken into account. We commented earlier on the Russian 
reaction to African integration and noted from Table 1 the welfare gains to Russia and the 
role that better terms of trade were playing in this outcome. 
 
Production outcomes 
 
Changes to production in the partner countries are shown in Table 5 (again expressed as 
changes from the non-FTA base) and, as expected, these changes largely reflect the sector 
contributions to welfare changes as shown in Table 3. The top two rows show that the 
demand for both skilled and unskilled labour in most of the countries shown increases. South 
Africa and Senegal display the most significant increases (more than 0.57%). This will make 
a 
26 
Chapter 2: The Africa-wide results: hundred percent tariff reduction 
 
 
 
 
a significant change to the unemployment rate in both countries. Again, Zimbabwe loses one 
percent of its workforce. 
 
In the agricultural commodities, secondary agriculture and sugar are again the standout 
sectors across the FTA. For secondary agriculture there are some impressive increases in 
production from South Africa, Kenya, Uganda and Senegal. The declines in Zimbabwe are 
again highlighted. We have discussed the sugar sector, and the production increases in South 
Africa, and declines in Kenya and Uganda are large. 
 
Changes to the trade in TCF and vehicles were shown in Table 3 and discussed at that point. 
The changes in production in Table 5 largely reflect these trade flows but, as reported earlier, 
these changes may be off small initial bases. As a generalisation, most of the countries 
shown increase production in most but not all sectors and, interestingly, production in 
Zimbabwe does not collapse in all sectors. Although we are not modelling changes to service 
barriers, it should be noted that there are increases for most countries in their service sectors, 
and these are likely to involve, at least in part, trade-related services such as transport. 
 
Table 5: Increases in factors of production and actual production, % 
 
 zaf ken uga nga xac zwe sen Rafrica 
Unskilled labour 0.57 0.29 0.32 0.15 0.09 -0.93 0.64 0.08 
Skilled labour 0.57 0.38 0.35 0.21 0.10 -0.97 0.68 0.07 
Capital 1.39 3.79 4.04 0.86 1.04 -9.42 6.42 0.78 
Primary agriculture 0.39 0.60 0.31 0.07 -0.15 1.51 -0.04 0.22 
Secondary agriculture 2.96 3.43 2.77 -0.18 -0.63 -14.67 6.29 0.09 
Sugar 26.38 -32.78 -21.43 -0.52 12.60 6.81 3.13 -1.32 
Natural resource -0.35 0.31 -0.48 0.01 -0.02 2.54 0.55 0.09 
Textiles 3.77 6.54 8.33 2.66 2.28 -20.28 2.81 3.24 
Clothing 1.11 2.32 -1.63 0.03 1.60 -23.90 3.44 0.78 
Leather goods 1.79 17.37 -3.15 13.60 -3.88 -38.05 -0.31 -10.23 
Lumber 3.20 4.37 11.50 0.87 1.32 -10.94 5.63 0.53 
Paper products 1.93 1.81 0.94 0.28 1.27 -4.43 2.99 -0.28 
Petroleum, gas 4.15 2.98 0.90 0.51 -2.91 3.52 7.20 1.53 
Chemical, plastic, rubber 1.58 6.57 3.61 8.76 0.28 26.77 0.97 1.61 
Nonmetal mineral 1.82 2.98 12.50 11.70 0.08 -12.46 31.95 -2.64 
Iron, steel 0.65 11.39 35.41 7.23 1.31 33.05 9.24 1.35 
Nonferrous -5.96 6.74 -0.46 4.07 1.19 38.42 -9.04 1.30 
Fabricated metal 4.99 4.77 10.96 1.98 4.54 -8.11 3.10 -0.38 
Vehicles 2.43 2.10 10.89 0.19 1.32 -5.69 23.97 2.34 
Transport 0.86 2.84 0.85 1.25 4.22 1.16 0.91 9.44 
Electrical 1.08 3.08 6.45 0.56 1.28 6.07 0.84 0.53 
Other machinery 0.69 1.91 2.23 0.94 6.22 15.65 22.33 2.24 
Other manufacture 0.97 2.98 86.43 1.41 0.11 -17.99 4.85 0.78 
Services 1.17 2.45 2.40 0.39 0.77 -5.48 4.85 0.46 
Source: GTAP output 
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Some technical economic results 
 
Table 6 shows some more technical outcomes relating to the simulation. In effect, it shows 
that the changes are mostly increasing real Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Most ToT 
improve as relative export prices rise more than import prices, and this mostly increases the 
returns from factor income such as the standard land, labour and capital. Table 1 shows the 
contributions to welfare from ToT expressed in dollar values, while Table 6 shows the same 
changes expressed as a ratio. The very important result of increases in real GDP are shown 
here, and some of these are large – the EAC countries and Senegal in particular. At the risk of 
becoming repetitive we point out that Zimbabwe drops 4.55% of its real GDP as the Africa- 
wide tariff elimination impacts massively on the economy. 
 
The contributions from skilled and unskilled labour are often large, but we emphasise that 
these changes are not the same as those shown in Table 5 above, which reflect the changes in 
employment levels. The data shown below is the contribution that changes in the total wage 
bill makes to total factor income. In this version of the model we use a ‘closure’ or 
assumption that the wage bill is split between increased wages for those in work and new 
employment, with this based upon the unemployment rate in each country. In earlier tralac 
work we have shown that for South Africa the total welfare benefits are increased 
significantly if the wage bill is directed into increasing employment rather than into increased 
wages. This is a powerful policy outcome from GTAP. 
 
Table 6: Changes in ToT, real GDP and total factor income along with contributions to 
factor income by % 
 
 ToT Real Total factor  Contributions from  
  GDP income land unskilled skilled capital resource 
zaf 0.85 1.01 2.19 0.11 0.51 0.65 0.97 -0.05 
bwa 0.23 0.36 1.13 0.07 0.40 0.17 0.61 -0.13 
nam 2.18 2.11 5.08 0.28 1.32 0.57 2.84 0.07 
xsc 0.76 1.30 2.47 0.26 0.59 0.55 1.18 -0.11 
ken -0.03 1.99 2.72 -0.06 0.75 0.43 1.52 0.09 
tza 0.15 0.62 0.90 0.03 0.33 0.23 0.30 0.01 
uga 1.42 2.15 3.96 0.26 1.11 0.64 2.03 -0.08 
rwa 3.01 1.54 8.06 1.70 3.26 1.12 2.27 -0.29 
egy 0.11 0.12 0.30 0.00 0.05 0.09 0.15 0.01 
mar 0.36 0.26 0.76 0.04 0.25 0.22 0.25 -0.02 
xec -0.08 0.05 -0.14 0.01 -0.07 -0.09 -0.06 0.07 
nga 0.11 0.32 0.69 0.10 0.21 0.18 0.18 0.02 
xac -0.05 0.54 0.70 0.00 0.12 0.15 0.43 -0.01 
eth -0.08 0.36 0.44 0.09 0.11 0.03 0.18 0.03 
mdg -0.04 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 
mwi -0.20 0.52 0.90 0.26 0.21 0.16 0.26 0.03 
mus 0.21 0.25 0.57 0.04 0.15 0.09 0.28 0.01 
moz -0.24 0.18 0.28 0.04 0.07 0.04 0.11 0.03 
zmb 1.07 0.96 2.76 0.32 0.98 0.68 0.87 -0.09 
zwe -5.97 -4.55 -12.66 0.45 -3.95 -3.11 -6.61 0.55 
gha 0.97 0.82 2.27 0.10 0.67 0.92 0.64 -0.06 
tun 0.28 0.40 0.81 0.03 0.18 0.20 0.37 0.03 
sen 2.15 4.16 7.42 0.46 1.69 0.83 4.11 0.33 
Rafrica -0.07 0.45 0.57 0.09 0.14 0.10 0.15 0.08 
Source: GTAP output 
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Tariff revenues 
 
In our final table (Table 7) we show the changes to tariff revenues by country. Three cells or 
sets of cells are important. In the second row we see that tariff revenue for SACU actually 
increases. This is because (a) imports into SACU from the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC) are already duty-free, (b) trade with other African countries is either 
limited or duty-free as with oil imports from Angola, and (c) South Africa imports more 
goods from ‘outside’ as its economy in particular grows. Next we see that tariff revenues into 
Zimbabwe decline by over one billion dollars, and this is because Zimbabwe has very high 
initial tariffs and surcharges against African imports despite being a member of the SADC 
FTA. Finally, for several other countries there are tariff revenue losses of nearly half a billion 
dollars or even more. We would, however, also note that for many larger countries (Egypt, 
Morocco, Tunisia and Senegal) tariff losses are not an issue. 
 
Table 7: Changes to tariff revenues 
 
Country Change revenue $ (million) 
SACU 167 
Kenya -416 
Tanzania -445 
Uganda -85 
Rwanda -3 
Egypt -25 
Morocco -16 
Rest of east Africa -273 
Nigeria -681 
Angola-DRC -602 
Ethiopia -165 
Madagascar -3 
Malawi -101 
Mauritius -6 
Mozambique -88 
Zambia -20 
Zimbabwe -1,123 
Ghana -382 
Tunisia -20 
Senegal -29 
Rest of Africa -2,573 
Source: GTAP output 
 
Zimbabwe, Angola and DRC, and Russia 
Zimbabwe 
In earlier tralac research assessing the welfare gains of the TFTA Jensen and Sandrey (2011) 
showed that there was a small loss of $10 million to Zimbabwe from their simulation using 
Version 8 of the GTAP database. This loss was not alone in the region as several of the 
potential TFTA members similarly registered small losses. The Version 8 database used as its 
foundation 2007 trade and 2004 tariffs, and the assumption was made that the SADC FTA 
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was fully operational, meaning that goods from SADC were entering Zimbabwe duty-free. 
This is patently not the case now. 
 
Data from Version 8 showed that Zimbabwe was importing goods to the value of some $3.4 
billion from all sources in 2007, while according to the Version 9 database Zimbabwe was 
importing some $9.2 billion in 2011with over 50% of these imports from Africa. Therefore 
between the two GTAP versions Zimbabwe’s trade had picked up significantly. However, 
more importantly, in recent times Zimbabwe has been implementing import tariff surcharges 
from all sources, including South Africa. Until recently the bilateral South Africa-Zimbabwe 
trade was the largest bilateral flow in Africa, but this has just been overtaken by the South 
Africa-Mozambique bilateral. Thus, according to the most recent data Zimbabwe has duty- 
free access into South Africa but heavy duties/surcharges on South African imports. At the 
same time, Zimbabwe is becoming less engaged with Africa for exports but remains at about 
the same level of engagement for imports. 
 
When the tariffs against all African imports (and South African imports in particular) decline 
to zero this reduces Zimbabwe’s tariff revenues by over one billion dollars. This in turn is a 
factor in setting a mechanism in place that will result in a welfare loss to Zimbabwe of $1,471 
million. Unfortunately, Zimbabwe has limited abilities to take the opportunities for extra 
exports to Africa in compensation; this is due to the fact that exports to the dominant market 
of SACU were already duty-free. There are only compensatory export-driven gains of $47 
million. Examining the GTAP output we see that secondary agricultural imports from South 
Africa alone increases by some $396 million as the tariff on these imports fall from 28% to 
zero while, similarly, motor vehicle imports from South Africa increase by $273 million as 
duties in this sector fall from 32% to zero. 
 
Meanwhile the real action is taking place in the capital market. This is as much a function of 
the GTAP model as it is of the real world facing Zimbabwe. What normally occurs in an FTA 
as welfare increases is that more capital is attracted from outside as a booming economy 
increases returns to capital employed in the economy. This capital flow contributes 
significantly to the welfare gains for all of the African countries except Zimbabwe (as shown 
in Table 1 of Chapter 2). However, for Zimbabwe, the reverse takes place (declining GDP); 
capital leaves the country and this contributes around $480million to  Zimbabwe’s  loss  of 
$1.48 billion. In addition, given the GTAP model structure for the terms of trade data shown 
earlier as expressed as Equivalent Variation (EV) in Table 1 we find that investment and 
savings changes contribute some $475 million to the $755 million terms of trade loss for 
Zimbabwe. 
 
Angola and the DRC (xac) 
 
This aggregation has changed from making a small loss in the Jensen and Sandrey (2011) 
outcome from the TFTA to a significant gain of $1,168 million in the current Africa-wide 
simulation. The background to this change is in some ways the opposite of the Zimbabwe 
scenario, as this aggregation is becoming more integrated into Africa. In the 2007 Version 8 
of the GTAP database only 4% of the combined exports were to Africa, but in using Version 
9 2011 data this had increased to 11%.Similarly,xacshowed an increase from 5% to 18% in 
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intra-African imports. Importantly, this GTAP ‘country’ is in fact an aggregation of two 
economies: Angola and the DRC. This situation complicates the disentanglement of the 
GTAP results. Also note from Chapter 1 that xac is one of the African economies with 
projected growth rates through to 2025 that rival the dynamic Asian growth projections. 
Indeed, Angola itself has been one of the fastest growing economies in recent years. These 
growth rates dramatically change the patterns and profiles of emerging economies. 
 
The welfare increase of $1,168 million, one of the highest from Table 1, comprises a 
contribution of $217 million from the aggregation’s own liberalisation and $1,170 of 
improved access to other African countries/regions, minus a balancing figure of $219 million 
from intra-African competition. By GTAP country/region these African gains derive mostly 
from liberalisation in Nigeria, itself (the Angola-DRC aggregation), and the rest of Africa. 
Conversely, countries that gained from liberalisation in the xac concentrated on South Africa, 
Namibia, rest of Africa, itself, and Nigeria plus, rather surprisingly, Morocco. 
 
Although the aggregation is a major resource exporter, with few tariffs associated with these 
exports, there have been increases in the exports of other manufacturing products (ome) to a 
range of diverse African markets that include Nigeria, the rest of Africa, Ghana, Mozambique 
and Tanzania that benefit from tariff elimination. Other exports in manufacturing are 
concentrated in the other transport (otn) sector. Here the GTAP database suggests that this is 
an internal export –from Angola to the DRC. However, analysis of the ITC database suggests 
that these exports are from Angola to Congo, not the DRC, but as there are no tariffs involved 
it becomes a little academic. Similarly, the other GTAP manufacturing export is fabricated 
metal products (fmp) to itself or between Angola and the DRC. 
 
In summary, despite some possible questions about the trade data it is clear that the 
aggregation has become more integrated into Africa and consequently there is a much more 
solid base to use for enhanced gains from African trade liberalisation. 
 
Russia 
 
It is very unusual for a country excluded from an FTA to make the reported gains from that 
FTA as are shown by Russia. It behoves us to understand why this is happening against the 
odds. Russia is gaining in ToT, and in the energy sectors in particular. This then attracts some 
additional capital and marginally increases employment. Overall, this is enough to more than 
compensate for the usual trade displacement in other exporting sectors. Aggregate exports 
remain the same (as do imports), and the Russian GDP actually increases by a small 0.013% 
of GDP at a time when others outside Africa are declining. The positive effects are second 
and subsequent round impacts, and in Russia’s case a key driver is the changes in Zimbabwe 
and, to a lesser extent, the rest of Africa. 
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Chapter 3 
 
The Africa-wide results: 
fifty percent reduction in non-tariff barriers 
 
Summary and key points 
 
Trade liberalisation increasingly focuses on non-tariff barriers (NTBs). In earlier tralac 
research we modelled the impacts of these NTBs where we simulated changes in NTBs as an 
across-the-board reduction of two percentage points in the ad valorem (AV) tariff rate. These 
exercises have shown that reducing NTBs makes a significant contribution to economic 
welfare. In this chapter we will not change actual tariffs but rather reduce NTBs by 50%. 
Crucially, we are becoming much more sophisticated by changing our earlier ‘blanket’ (or 
common two percentage points) estimate to using the ad valorem equivalents (AVEs)  for 
both agricultural goods and manufacturing goods as provided by the World Bank. This new 
database provides tariff equivalents for most Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) 
countries, and, importantly, these estimates vary (often widely) by country and between 
agriculture and manufacturing within a country. The use of this database therefore enables a 
much more accurate estimate of the costs of these barriers than our earlier two percentage 
points estimates. 
 
The World Bank has decomposed trade costs into three categories, namely costs that can be 
lowered by (1) trade facilitation, (2) non-tariff barriers, and (3) the costs of business 
services. Trade facilitation addresses costs such as delays at border crossings, roadblocks for 
trucks, and the necessity to pay bribes. For non-tariff barriers the focus is on licences, quotas 
and bans; price control measures; competition restrictions; and technical barriers to trade (and 
do not include customs delays). Poor business services relate to improvements in business 
associated with trade costs. We examine only NTBs here and leave trade facilitation costs to 
Chapter 8. 
 
The results in the form of welfare gains show that South Africa’s gains of $2,690 million are 
only 47% of the full tariff elimination; but then the NTB levels are relatively low and 
especially so for agriculture in South Africa. Conversely, the gains for Tanzania are 271% of 
the initial tariff elimination gains, as the NTBs for Tanzania are extremely high. Gains to 
South Africa are still the highest individual country gains, but both Kenya and the Angola- 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) aggregation are now very close behind at around $2 
billion each. Several countries gained more from NTB reduction than from tariff elimination. 
Indeed, Zimbabwe turned a major loss from intra-African tariff elimination into a gain with 
NTB reductions. Overall, our results have significant policy implications by adding further 
evidence to the belief that NTBs together with trade facilitation are a bigger problem in 
Africa than are tariffs! 
 
Our findings also emphasise that in many cases the totals representing ‘own’ gains are often 
very large. The policy implications are clear here; this is because these ‘own’ NTB reductions 
are directly under the control of the home government. Coordinated efforts to reduce NTBs 
are the best option but a great deal can be gained in those countries with high barriers in 
unilateral actions. By GTAP sectors, there is an emphasis on gains in agriculture for most but 
not 
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not all countries, as almost all of the NTBs used are higher for agriculture than they are for 
manufacturing. There are several countries where exports are higher with NTB reforms than 
they were with tariff elimination, and the same applies to imports. As the NTBs focus on the 
agricultural sectors for most countries, we find that there are often significant gains to 
agricultural production. 
 
The loss of tariff revenues can be a problem for many countries that rely on these tariffs as a 
significant portion of their revenues. In this scenario we are not altering any tariff rates, and 
consequently all major parties except Tanzania actually increase their tariff revenues as their 
economies gain overall. 
 
Introduction and a new data set 
 
As global tariffs reduce through either unilateral liberalisation or bilateral, regional and 
multilateral liberalisation, the focus is increasingly on NTBs or their generally 
interchangeable non-tariff measures (NTMs). Jensen and Sandrey (2013) have modelled the 
impacts of these NTBs on selected countries only in a Tripartite Free Trade Agreement 
(TFTA) liberalisation where they simulated changes in NTBs as an across-the-board 
reduction of two percentage points in the ad valorem tariff rate. For Southern African 
Customs Union (SACU) countries in that earlier work, the gains from reducing these NTBs 
were some 15% to 20% of the full liberalisation that included the 2% NTB reductions 
Much more diverse were the results for the East African Community (EAC) countries: both 
Kenya and Rwanda effectively show little improvement in welfare but Tanzania shows 
welfare gains that were 89% off the base level. Egypt was close to the SACU results with 
an outcome that was 15% off the base. Jensen and Sandrey concluded that a reduction in 
NTBs among the FTA partners would be important for both South Africa and Tanzania, of 
modest benefit to Swaziland and Lesotho, Uganda and Egypt within the FTA, and all at 
the cost of (or ‘funded’ by, for the want of an analogy) those countries outside Africa. 
 
In this project we used as our base scenario the simulation whereby we reduced all tariff 
between all African countries to zero. In this current scenario we will not change actual tariffs 
but rather reduce NTBs by 50%. Here we are becoming much more sophisticated in our NTB 
estimates by changing our earlier ‘blanket’ (or common two percentage points) estimate to 
using the ad valorem equivalents for both agricultural goods and manufacturing goods as 
provided by Balistreri et al. (2014).1 This new database provides tariff equivalents for most 
GTAP countries and, crucially, these estimates vary (often widely) which therefore enables a 
much more accurate estimate of the costs of these barriers than our earlier two percentage 
points estimates. These new estimates for countries of interest for this study on agricultural 
goods range from 0.0% in Rwanda to 42.5% in Kenya, while for manufacturing goods they 
range from Zambia’s 0.0% (and South Africa’s 0.3%) to Tanzania’s 47.4%. These are 
significant differences, and the complete range for our GTAP countries is shown in Table 1. 
Note that estimates for Mozambique, Madagascar, Zimbabwe, Tunisia and the Swaziland- 
Lesotho aggregation are not provided, and here we have estimated a proxy from the 
aggregates provided by Balistreri et al. We have also included the Equivalent Variation (EV) 
welfare gains from reducing these NTBs in the right-hand column for countries in our GTAP 
 
 
 
 
1 
These are World Bank estimates which in turn are based on data from Kee et al. (2009: 172-199). These are 
based on estimates for 105 countries at the HS 6digit level. 
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model. This data is directly relevant to the next table (Table 2) where we discuss these EV 
gains and their linkages back to Table 1. Not all the countries given in Table 1 are 
represented directly in our GTAP model, so there are some gaps on the right-hand side of the 
table. 
 
Table 1: Ad valorem equivalents for NTMs by agriculture & manufacturing for 
countries in the model 
 
Code Country/Region Agriculture Manufacturing 
EV $ 
(millions) 
bra Brazil 20,8% 11,6% -261 
chn China 6,1% 5,1% -2,767 
civ Côte d'Ivoire 27,8% 18,8%  
cmr Cameroon 5,8% 1,1%  
egy Egypt 29,9% 23,7% 1,422 
eth Ethiopia 0,0% 1,1% 91 
gha Ghana 10,9% 1,1% 485 
ind India 26,2% 4,8% -1,395 
ken Kenya 14,6% 0,3% 2,117 
mar Morocco 39,3% 3,8% 489 
mus Mauritius 26,6% 3,3% 223 
mwi Malawi 21,5% 1,4% 100 
nga Nigeria 42,5% 22,2% 1,399 
rus Russia 16,9% 9,2% 188 
rwa Rwanda 0,0% 4,8% 66 
sen Senegal 33,9% 33,4% 703 
tza Tanzania 22,2% 47,4% 1,024 
uga Uganda 3,9% 0,0% 471 
usa US 14,8% 3,3% -1,037 
zaf South Africa 4,8% 0,3% 2,690 
zmb Zambia 5,1% 0,0% 232 
xnf Rest North Africa 36,4% 20,7%  
xwf Rest West Africa 2,8% 0,4%  
xcf Central Africa 0,0% 0,1%  
eu Europe Union 27 2.3 -2,666 
Source: Balistreri et al. (2014) 
 
In a later chapter (Chapter 8) we simulate the benefits to Africa from reducing the trade 
facilitation costs, again using data from Minor (2013) and comparing our results with 
Balistreri et al. (2014a and 2014b). A question arose in undertaking this work as to whether 
or not we were in effect double counting here in that the trade facilitation (time costs) we use 
in the next chapter are a subset of the NTBs. Personal communication with the authors 
of Balistreri et al. advised that they had decomposed trade costs into three categories, 
namely costs that can be lowered by (1) trade facilitation, (2) non-tariff barriers, and (3) 
the costs of business services. Trade facilitation addresses costs such as delays at border 
crossings, roadblocks for trucks, and the necessity to pay bribes. For non-tariff barriers the 
focus is on licences, quotas and bans; price control measures; competition restrictions; and
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technical barriers to trade and do not include customs delays. Poor business services for trade 
are also a problem, and improvements in a wide range of business services such as banking, 
insurance, communication and professional services (including legal, auditing, engineering 
and computer services) would also lower trade costs. 
 
Balistreri et al. (2014) use a model focusing on Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda and Rwanda to 
assess the impacts of reducing trade costs in the EAC. They use the three categories of 1) 
trade facilitation, 2) non-tariff barriers, and 3) costs of doing business as outlined above. 
Overall, their aggregate results for Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda and Rwanda show that all four 
countries gain from this integration, with gains ranging from a low of 0.9% of consumption2 
in the case of Tanzania to a high of 1.4% of consumption in the case of Rwanda. 
 
In this chapter we are interested only in the NTB results, and we introduce a discussion on 
their results for the other costs in the appropriate chapters. Note that Balistreri et al. reduced 
these barriers by 20% only, whereas we reduce the NTBs within Africa by 50%. 
 
Technical note 
 
In this simulation we are reducing the NTBs by 50%. We are doing this in two separate ways. 
First, we recalibrate the initial GTAP Version 9 database to represent half of the World 
Bank’s AVE estimates of NTBs as tariff equivalent in the GTAP database base generating 
tariff revenues. In the NTB scenario we then reduce these NTB tariff by 50%. Secondly, we 
have chosen to represent the remaining 25%reduction in the AVE of the World Bank’s NTB 
estimate as an increase in efficiency by augmenting technical change in the respective 
countries. 
 
The EV shown in this chapter (Table 2) represents the combined effects of reducing the AVE 
NTB tariff calibrated into the database and the efficiency augmenting technical change. The 
contribution from the efficiency gain is responsible for 48% of the increased EV income in 
South Africa. That is not shown directly in Table 2 but can be calculated from the output. The 
direct NBT efficiency gain is only $12 million but this increased efficiency reduces import 
price which contributes to changes in terms of trade (ToT), consumption patterns, firm 
production cost and ultimately changes allocative efficiencies and the amount of capital and 
labour force employed in South Africa. Thereby the direct efficiency gain of $12 million has 
multiple second-round effects 
 
The results 
 
Assuming the scenario of a 50% reduction in NTBs (with no reductions in applied duties 
at the border), Table 2 shows the FTAs’ changes in welfare. The data is expressed in US 
dollars (millions) as one-off increases in annual welfare at the assessed end point of 2025. 
The data on the left-hand side is the output from this simulation in welfare gains/losses. 
On the right-hand column of Table 2 we show the percentage that the current simulation 
results of a 50% reduction of NTBs only represent of the full tariff 100% elimination 
scenario. 
 
 
 
2  
Note that this measure of welfare change of consumption is not the same as our measure of EV. The 
important comparison in the Balistreri research will be the relative contributions of trade facilitation, NTBs and 
costs of doing business. This work does not examine tariff changes as the EAC is a largely tariff-free union 
whereas we are benchmarking tariff changes across Africa. 
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The results in Table 2 need to be read in conjunction with Table 1 (that shows the levels of 
initial NTBs). For example, South Africa’s gains of $2,690 million are only 47% of the full 
tariff elimination, but if we look at South Africa from Table 1 above we can see that the NTB 
levels are relatively low and especially so for agriculture. Conversely, the gains for Tanzania 
of $1,024 are 271% of the initial tariff elimination gains, and if we look at Table 1 above we 
see that the NTBs for Tanzania are extremely high. Overall, the gains to the world are worth 
$5,285 million, a figure that comprises 72% of the Africa-wide FTA tariff elimination result. 
 
Table 2: GTAP outcome of NTB reductions, welfare expressed as EV $ (millions) 
 
 Total Efficiency Labour Capital ToT NTB eff. % base 
Total Africa 18,060 3,935 1,468 7,346 2,120 3,190 105.8% 
South Africa 2,690 711 425 1,028 514 12 47% 
Botswana 12 2 4 6 -3 3 18% 
Namibia 188 11 22 118 34 3 41% 
Swazi-Lesotho 61 11 11 29 8 2 61% 
Kenya 2,117 272 174 1,057 560 54 164% 
Tanzania 1,024 137 65 517 -177 483 271% 
Uganda 471 100 34 241 92 5 69% 
Rwanda 66 17 4 33 5 8 22% 
Egypt 1,422 200 95 700 238 188 275% 
Morocco 489 59 42 165 137 86 86% 
Rest of east 
Africa 
 
59 
 
-18 
 
2 
 
18 
 
-29 
 
86 
 
397% 
Nigeria 1,399 265 110 547 43 434 69% 
Angola-DRC 1,917 367 46 1,088 65 352 164% 
Ethiopia 91 17 22 20 29 3 36% 
Madagascar 22 -10 0 9 -14 37 large 
Malawi 100 16 5 13 41 25 246% 
Mauritius 223 28 10 120 31 34 295% 
Mozambique 44 8 8 12 -2 18 312% 
Zambia 232 37 37 61 89 7 51% 
Zimbabwe 174 43 -1 38 -154 247 -12% 
Ghana 485 136 27 101 189 32 60% 
Tunisia 755 157 53 297 160 88 211% 
Senegal 703 170 23 372 38 100 58% 
Rest of Africa 3,316 1,199 251 758 225 883 165% 
EU -2,667 -755 -119 -1,147 -646 0 112% 
UK -306 -110 -21 -93 -82 0 84% 
US -1,037 -214 -150 -422 -250 0 143% 
China -2,767 -344 -124 -1,590 -708 0 118% 
India -1,395 -315 -25 -684 -372 0 91% 
Brazil -261 -70 -24 -154 -12 0 139% 
Russia 188 51 2 -12 146 0 34% 
Rest of world -4,529 -1,108 -262 -2,949 -210 0 163% 
Total world 5,285 1,070 744 295 -14 3,190 72% 
Source: GTAP output 
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Gains to South Africa are still the highest in individual country gains, but both Kenya and the 
Angola-DRC aggregation are now very close behind at around $2 billion each. 
Countries/unions with a lower percentage of gains from NTB reduction than from tariff 
elimination are SACU, Uganda, Rwanda, Morocco, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Zambia, Ghana and 
Senegal. Note that there is a major turnaround for Zimbabwe as it now shows a positive gain 
from NTB reductions. This is a significant policy result. Again, all of those outside Africa 
lose except Russia where the earlier gains are mitigated. Interestingly, the losses to the rest of 
the world are actually higher in most cases than in the African FTA where tariffs were 
eliminated. 
 
We next turn to Table 3 where the gains by country for the major partners only are shown. 
There are several striking points shown here. The first is that in many cases the cells on the 
diagonal representing ‘own’ gains are often very large. The policy implications are clear, as it 
is these ‘own’ NTB reductions that are directly under the control of the home government 
and these cells do not require any reciprocal cooperation with others. In a country where the 
main sport is soccer an ‘own goal’ is a serious mistake, but here an ‘own goal’ is to be lauded! 
Examples include Tanzania where some $892 out of a total of $1,024 involve ‘own’ changes, 
and Angola and DRC (xac) – albeit an aggregation – where $1,365 are own gains. 
Conversely, South Africa gains very little from gains inside SACU but major gains elsewhere 
in countries such as Tanzania that show large NTBs in Table 1. Coordinated efforts to reduce 
NTBs are the best option but a lot can be gained in those countries with high barriers in 
unilateral actions. That is an important policy conclusion. 
 
Table 3: Change in welfare due to the FTAs at 2025, expressed in 2007 $ (millions) 
 zaf ken tza uga egy mar nga xac zwe gha tun sen Rafrica 
zaf 19 2 0 0 6 0 2 -2 15 0 0 0 0 
bwa 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
nam 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
xsc 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
ken 29 55 10 19 22 1 2 0 2 0 0 0 4 
tza 733 1,302 892 247 60 4 80 114 0 12 -1 1 -19 
uga 1 18 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
rwa 2 12 3 14 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
egy 78 318 20 2 257 39 40 3 0 6 60 3 126 
mar 3 5 1 1 141 -12 18 8 0 2 77 6 54 
xec 30 130 9 53 141 3 11 1 0 0 2 0 6 
nga 406 36 7 3 101 45 693 216 -2 347 28 29 826 
xac 332 2 9 1 15 36 44 1,365 4 4 7 12 64 
eth 1 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 
mdg 66 10 3 0 8 2 0 0 -1 0 1 1 0 
mwi 17 21 3 0 1 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 -1 
mus 62 27 0 1 6 3 0 -1 2 0 0 2 2 
moz 39 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 4 0 0 0 0 
zmb 8 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 1 
zwe 275 6 0 1 4 0 9 4 143 0 0 0 3 
gha 21 3 0 0 5 10 22 3 0 23 1 8 52 
tun 1 3 1 2 160 69 4 3 0 1 113 2 117 
sen 44 2 10 1 22 64 65 5 0 7 31 210 231 
Rafr 501 157 55 121 472 224 407 196 1 82 433 430 1,849 
total 2,690 2,117 1,024 471 1,422 489 1,399 1,917 174 485 755 703 3,316 
Source: GTAP result 
 
Table 4 introduces the gains to the main partners by GTAP sectors. Again, before examining 
the Table 4 results it is useful to review Table 1 which shows the NTB level by agriculture 
38 
Chapter 3: The Africa-wide results: fifty percent reduction in non-tariff barriers 
 
 
 
 
and manufacturing. As discussed earlier, these are aggregations which will hide a great deal 
of the details at the disaggregated level, but they are a significant move forwards from the 
earlier values which tralac used. In particular, almost all of the NTBs shown are more 
significant for agriculture than they are for manufacturing. Only Ethiopia and Rwanda have 
agricultural NTB values where manufacturing is marginally higher while Tanzania’s 
manufacturing NTBs are significantly higher. Most agricultural contributions are very high, 
with only Tanzania (as mentioned) having a low value. We will not discuss the individual 
manufacturing cells in detail, as the NTB levels here are generic to the sector by country but, 
of course, vary significantly between countries. 
 
Table 4: Contribution to welfare by sector, $ (millions) 
 
 zaf ken tza uga egy mar nga xac zwe gha tun sen Rafrica 
PAgri 169 221 27 24 131 18 155 102 101 66 74 49 461 
SAgri 412 567 29 38 235 178 141 88 -42 69 271 203 875 
sugar 70 44 13 8 46 2 5 11 5 2 8 6 85 
 24% 39% 7% 15% 29% 40% 22% 10% 37% 28% 47% 37% 43% 
tex 42 157 8 57 67 12 26 9 3 26 16 9 59 
wap 12 26 -9 10 17 5 -1 2 -3 0 2 0 1 
lea 10 128 -14 57 2 5 62 1 -4 32 4 -5 40 
lum 18 25 11 7 12 2 7 15 -8 7 6 3 63 
ppp 70 54 54 8 40 26 7 24 -31 2 39 16 23 
p_c 133 6 96 1 107 14 29 103 16 4 61 18 215 
crp 372 341 129 61 156 60 158 41 86 100 122 104 341 
nmm 22 63 9 28 69 3 21 3 6 5 20 94 174 
i_s 140 50 66 28 51 25 32 26 18 7 20 33 121 
nfm 72 22 99 2 161 22 39 5 18 21 8 24 15 
fmp 133 66 29 7 144 15 25 73 -1 10 21 7 52 
mvh 214 50 92 23 12 19 56 34 4 2 14 22 90 
otn 123 3 24 6 2 0 73 942 -3 2 1 10 89 
ele 84 97 21 6 15 4 91 21 -5 10 5 4 15 
ome 569 179 338 100 154 76 453 417 18 85 57 103 581 
omf 26 19 2 2 2 2 21 2 -4 34 5 3 15 
Total 2,690 2,117 1,024 471 1,422 489 1,399 1,917 174 485 755 703 3,316 
Source: GTAP output 
 
Changes to the exports and imports are shown in Table 5, with the NTB changes on the left- 
hand side. For comparative purposes, the changes from tariff elimination are shown on the 
right-hand side. 
 
The export and import changes shown in Table 5 are changes to quantities traded by value, 
and they represent changes to both trade prices and quantities. Changes relating to our 
current scenario of NTB reductions on the left-hand side can be compared with the tariff 
elimination scenario on the right-hand side. There are several countries (Tanzania, Egypt, 
Morocco, Madagascar, Mauritius and Tunisia) whose exports are higher with NTB reforms 
than they are with tariff elimination. Increases in imports are greater for the NTB reductions 
than the base scenario of tariff elimination for Kenya, Tanzania, Egypt, Madagascar, 
Mauritius, and Tunisia. Of special interest are both Zambia and Zimbabwe. In the base 
simulations both of these countries reduced imports and Zambia reduced exports, but here 
they 
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they both increased their exports and imports to ensure that all African parties improved 
their trade profiles. 
 
Table 5: Percentage changes in trade for the partner 
 
NTB reductions Base tariff to zero 
 Exports % Imports% Exports % Imports% 
South Africa 1.3 1.6 2.7 3.5 
Botswana 0.3 0.4 1.1 1.8 
Namibia 1.2 2.2 2.6 5.0 
Swazi-Lesotho 1.6 2.3 2.4 3.6 
Kenya 3.9 6.2 5.7 4.5 
Tanzania 4.9 4.6 3.7 3.2 
Uganda 2.3 3.9 4.3 6.4 
Rwanda 2.3 2.4 10.1 13.8 
Egypt 1.2 1.3 0.3 0.4 
Morocco 1.1 1.1 0.8 1.1 
Rest of east Africa 1.1 0.7 2.0 1.4 
Nigeria 0.8 0.9 1.7 2.0 
Angola-DRC 1.6 2.2 2.1 3.1 
Ethiopia 0.5 0.5 3.6 2.5 
Madagascar 3.3 2.6 0.2 0.2 
Malawi 1.2 2.3 4.2 3.5 
Mauritius 2.1 2.1 0.9 0.9 
Mozambique 0.4 0.3 1.0 0.7 
Zambia 0.2 0.4 -0.7 -0.9 
Zimbabwe 7.3 1.4 32.7 -2.4 
Ghana 2.5 2.4 9.1 7.0 
Tunisia 1.7 2.1 1.0 1.2 
Senegal 6.2 5.5 8.2 9.4 
Rest of Africa 1.6 1.7 2.8 2.8 
Source: GTAP output 
 
Changes to factors of production are shown in Table 6, and here we see some meaningful 
gains to employment, as shown in the top two rows, and increases in capital in the third row. 
Again, as expected from the emphasis on NTBs in the agricultural sectors for most countries, 
we see that there are often very significant gains to agricultural production for many 
countries. Note that many of these gains derive from unilateral liberalisation that is directly 
under the control of the home government! Kenya in particular is showing impressive gains 
in many manufacturing sectors. 
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Table 6: Increases in factors of production & actual production, % 
 
 zaf ken uga nga xac eth zmb zwe sen Rafrica 
Unskilled 0.27 0.64 0.28 0.03 0.10 0.07 0.21 -0.02 0.31 0.14 
Skilled 0.27 0.68 0.28 0.07 0.11 0.04 0.20 -0.02 0.34 0.14 
capital 0.63 4.18 2.42 0.50 1.39 0.10 0.67 0.75 3.86 0.76 
PAgr 0.31 0.25 0.16 -0.03 -0.06 0.09 0.42 0.12 -0.14 0.14 
SAgr 1.25 3.29 1.52 -0.22 0.00 0.21 0.51 -5.49 3.84 0.46 
sugar 3.37 -3.78 0.33 -0.28 0.94 0.05 6.38 0.83 3.00 0.61 
nat -0.17 0.39 -0.48 0.03 -0.01 0.00 -0.20 0.40 0.28 -0.01 
tex 0.47 4.86 14.53 0.62 0.95 -0.70 -0.96 0.74 1.51 0.46 
wap 0.20 -0.16 3.40 0.06 0.77 -0.04 0.16 1.77 2.12 0.31 
lea -0.14 5.03 2.03 1.55 -1.23 -0.56 0.46 1.02 -2.68 -0.34 
lum 0.36 3.26 3.29 0.33 0.42 -0.03 0.48 -0.45 -4.59 0.73 
ppp 0.93 1.47 2.84 -0.37 1.96 -0.19 0.54 -1.30 1.36 -0.10 
p_c 2.26 3.39 -0.69 0.23 -0.21 -0.30 0.67 1.47 4.24 1.76 
crp 1.02 8.32 4.29 3.41 1.08 0.93 8.97 0.89 1.23 0.79 
nmm 0.56 3.06 3.61 1.16 0.58 0.06 4.14 -3.60 8.72 -0.40 
i_s 0.88 17.84 11.03 3.81 1.19 -0.24 7.88 3.42 8.01 0.79 
nfm -2.88 -1.08 -0.98 1.77 0.40 -1.11 -1.94 1.58 1.17 -0.10 
fmp 1.65 11.73 2.58 1.09 2.24 -0.02 1.28 -2.04 1.80 -0.42 
mvh 0.83 26.40 2.74 0.25 0.54 -0.06 2.79 1.76 11.15 0.98 
otn 10.63 0.47 -1.26 1.26 5.41 -0.51 -0.61 1.09 1.85 0.92 
ele 1.40 5.61 3.83 0.99 1.56 4.80 -2.31 1.39 2.74 -0.14 
ome 1.47 16.81 15.25 1.54 5.97 0.59 14.88 -0.38 17.83 5.12 
omf 0.30 0.09 9.98 -0.79 0.57 0.18 -1.01 0.38 3.03 0.43 
serv 0.54 2.65 1.40 0.28 1.05 0.04 0.33 0.87 3.01 0.56 
Source: GTAP output 
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Contributions to total factor income are shown in Table 7 by country. In the first example, 
South Africa, there is an increase of 1.02% in the factors that make up production. A minor 
0.05%derives from land increases as agricultural prices increase, and another 0.24% and 
0.30% show the percentage increases in the contribution from unskilled and skilled labour 
respectively. The final 0.45%derives from changes to the capital stock, while there is a very 
minor decrease from resource to the economy. The welfare increases for South Africa 
represent an increase of 0.48% in real Gross Domestic Product (GDP), a significant 
contribution. Kenya is an interesting study, as here the real GDP increases by 2.34% and 
there are meaningful improvements in the labour markets. Zimbabwe in a turnaround from 
our tariff elimination scenario gains an increase of 1.84% in real GDP. 
 
Table 7: Changes in ToT, real GDP and total factor income along with contributions to 
factor income by % 
 Terms Real Total factor Contributions from 
 Trade GDP income land unskilled skilled capital resource 
zaf 0.39 0.48 1.02 0.05 0.24 0.30 0.45 -0.02 
bwa 0.01 0.07 0.23 0.03 0.08 0.03 0.11 -0.02 
nam 0.78 0.90 2.10 0.22 0.57 0.24 1.18 -0.10 
xsc 0.42 0.80 1.47 0.15 0.35 0.33 0.70 -0.07 
ken 2.32 2.34 5.75 0.62 1.70 0.77 2.50 0.15 
tza -0.42 2.09 2.41 0.24 0.82 0.57 0.76 0.02 
uga 1.39 1.37 3.27 0.37 0.96 0.52 1.52 -0.09 
rwa 0.21 0.41 1.92 0.52 0.76 0.23 0.48 -0.06 
egy 0.22 0.37 0.76 0.04 0.14 0.21 0.37 0.00 
mar 0.22 0.25 0.55 -0.01 0.18 0.18 0.20 -0.01 
xec -0.08 0.08 0.09 0.05 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.02 
nga 0.01 0.23 0.18 -0.01 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.03 
xac 0.03 0.84 0.84 0.02 0.14 0.17 0.49 0.01 
eth 0.21 0.08 0.40 0.14 0.15 0.01 0.07 0.03 
mdg -0.35 0.22 0.04 -0.02 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.04 
mwi 1.21 0.60 2.33 0.93 0.56 0.38 0.51 -0.05 
mus 0.24 0.85 1.34 -0.07 0.37 0.25 0.77 0.01 
moz -0.01 0.15 0.28 0.04 0.10 0.05 0.08 0.01 
zmb 0.66 0.43 1.77 0.42 0.56 0.37 0.47 -0.05 
zwe -1.28 1.84 -0.34 0.06 -0.12 -0.08 -0.31 0.10 
gha 0.75 0.42 1.30 0.10 0.40 0.51 0.33 -0.04 
tun 0.51 0.87 1.80 0.27 0.45 0.37 0.73 -0.01 
sen 0.47 2.75 3.58 0.16 0.80 0.41 2.06 0.15 
Rafrica 0.14 0.62 0.82 0.09 0.24 0.19 0.29 0.01 
Source: GTAP output 
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Chapter 4 
 
The Africa-wide results of tariff elimination 
and reductions in non-tariff barriers 
 
Summary and key points 
 
In Chapter 2 we simulated a tariff elimination for all intra-African trade and followed this up 
in Chapter 3 by reducing all intra-African non-tariff barriers (NTBs) by 50%. In this 
chapter we combine an elimination of intra-African import tariffs with the 50% NTB 
reductions in Africa. The tariff elimination gains are largely confined to African participants 
but the reduction in NTBs will spread the gains to other countries as efficiency is improved. 
In general, we found that the results from Chapters 2 and 3 are additive in the sense that 
combining them outside the model gives a similar result to the scenario where we combine 
tariff elimination and reductions in non-tariff barriers within the model. They may not be an 
exact match as the results may be path-dependent (that is, the order in which tariff 
elimination and reduction in NTB stake place may make a difference). Consequently, we 
spend less time discussing the results but rather concentrate upon presenting them. The 
reason is that they tend to follow the results from Chapters 2and 3, and the technical 
discussion on NTBs is contained in Chapter 3. 
 
Again, South Africa dominates the African welfare gains although it is not the largest African 
economy as measured in the usual Gross Domestic Product (GDP) terms. Nigeria has taken 
the honour, but South African dominates because it is Africa’s leading manufacturing and 
agricultural products trader – this in contrast to the dominance of Nigerian exports in the 
lightly protected resource sectors. Many of the combined tariff and NTB reductions result in 
welfare outcomes that are around double the tariff elimination results (although this is not 
always the case). 
 
Again, the generalisations can be made that for some countries many of the gains derive from 
unilateral liberalisation and for others there are other examples where individual country 
gains are concentrated in one or two specific countries. For example, Kenya’s gains are 
concentrated on Tanzania and the rest of Africa, Ghana’s are heavily concentrated on Nigeria, 
and gains to the rest of Africa are concentrated in Nigeria and the rest of Africa. Conversely, 
there are bilateral results that show a zero or close to it for the two respective partners. 
Only for South Africa is there a spread of countries where significant gains are made. 
Unfortunately, the ‘rest of Africa’ aggregation hides some potentially important individual 
country information due to the fact that this aggregation makes big gains. 
 
South Africa does particularly well from agricultural reforms across the continent. It gains 
especially from secondary agriculture and sugar as it enjoys better access into Kenya and, to 
a lesser degree, Uganda for this sugar. In turn, both of these countries gain by reducing 
production in their own heavily protected and inefficient sugar sectors. There are some rather 
large gains for individual countries in many manufacturing sectors and, especially for 
Africa’s industrial giant, South Africa. 
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The combined tariff elimination and NTB reductions result in increased exports and imports 
across the continent for all parties except Zimbabwe when measured against the pure tariff 
elimination scenario. Some of these changes are very large, with Rwanda the best example. 
For others (Egypt and Mozambique), the changes are much smaller. 
 
Consequently, the demand for both skilled and unskilled labour in most countries increases, 
with South Africa, Kenya and Senegal displaying the most significant increases. As a 
generalisation, most of the countries in the model increase production in most but not all 
manufacturing sectors. Interestingly, production in Zimbabwe does not collapse in all 
sectors. For the technical outcomes, the simulations generally result in increasing real GDP 
everywhere except in Zimbabwe while the terms of trade (ToT) outcomes vary by country. 
Factor income in the standard land, labour and capital contributions usually increase, and in 
particular the contributions from labour are encouraging. While there remain some 
significant tariff revenue losses across Africa (Tanzania, Nigeria, Zimbabwe and the rest of 
Africa) for many countries, including some larger ones, tariff losses are not an issue. 
 
Introduction 
 
In Chapter 2 we simulated a tariff elimination for all intra-African trade whereby we reduced 
all tariffs between African countries to zero. We then followed this up by reducing all intra- 
African NTBs by 50%. In this chapter we combine an elimination of intra-African import 
tariffs with the 50% NTB reductions in Africa. The tariff elimination gains are largely 
confined to African participants but the reduction in NTBs will spread the gains to other 
countries. Efficiency also improves. 
 
We note that results here may not be an exact match to adding gains from the previous two 
simulations of (a) tariff elimination for all intra-African trade and (b) reducing all intra- 
African NTBs by 50% as the results here may be path-dependent. However, we would expect 
this path dependency to be relatively minor. 
 
We will present the results in this chapter and leave the reader to seek the technical details of 
our analysis and background on the data sources in Chapters 1, 2 and 3. Similarly, our 
discussions will be somewhat muted as they are otherwise likely to become repetitive. 
 
The results 
 
We will firstly reproduce the technical note from Chapter 3 that outlined how we reduced the 
NTBs by 50% in two separate ways. First of all we recalibrate the initial GTAP Version 9 
database to represent half of the World Bank’s ad valorem equivalent (AVE) estimates of 
NTBs as tariff equivalent in our TAP database base generating tariff revenues. In the NTB 
scenario we then reduce these NTB tariffs by 50%. Secondly, we have chosen to represent 
the remaining 25% reduction in the AVE of the World Bank’s NTB estimate as an increase in 
efficiency by augmenting technical change in the respective countries. 
 
The direct Equivalent Variation (EV) results for NTB reductions as shown in both Chapter 3 
and this chapter (Table 2) represent the combined effects of reducing the AVE NTB tariff 
calibrated into the database and the efficiency augmenting technical change. The contribution 
from the efficiency gain was responsible for 48% of the increased EV income in South Africa 
in the Chapter 3 results. The direct NBT efficiency gain is only $13 million in Table 2. 
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However, this increased efficient reduces import price which contributes to changes in ToT, 
consumption patterns, and firm production cost. It ultimately changes allocative efficiencies 
and the amount of capital and the size of the labour force employed in South Africa. Thereby 
the direct efficiency gain of $13 million has multiple second-round effects. In addition, in this 
chapter we are effectively adding these NTB gains from Chapter 3 to the tariff elimination 
gains from Chapter 2 although, as noted, they do not exactly equate. 
 
Again, South Africa dominates the African welfare gains. In passing we would note that 
while South Africa consistently dominates the welfare gains it is not the largest African 
economy as measured in the usual GDP terms. Nigeria has recently taken that honour 
following the revaluation of the Nigerian GDP. Note, however, that this re-evaluation has 
taken place since 2011 and is therefore not fully reflected in the GTAP database. The reason 
for the South African dominance is instead associated with the dominance of South Africa as 
Africa’s leading manufacturing and agricultural products trader. This is in contrast to the 
dominance of Nigerian exports in the resource sectors, sectors which are generally lightly 
protected and therefore have less to gain from reductions in protection. 
 
In Chapter 3 Table 2 we presented and discussed the NTB results in more depth by country, 
and specifically how there was a wide variation between the gains from tariff elimination and 
the gains from NTB reductions by country. We will not reproduce that discussion here. 
Among the major African economies NTB reductions are relatively more important  than 
tariff elimination for Kenya, Tanzania, Egypt, Angola-DRC, Tunisia and the ‘rest of Africa’. 
 
In Table 3 we again highlight where the main bilateral gains for the major African countries 
derive from as measured by the welfare gains in Table 2. The data is shown in a matrix of 
the full range of countries in the rows but selected countries only in the columns. Some 
interesting observations can be gleaned from this table, and many have been discussed 
previously. The first is the generalisation that for some countries many of the gains derive 
from unilateral liberalisation as shown in the ‘own’ diagonal cells. This is especially the case 
for Tanzania, Angola-DRC and Zimbabwe (losses), but not the case for South Africa, 
Morocco, Nigeria, Zambia (losses), Ghana, or the rest of Africa. The next observation is that 
there are other examples where individual country gains are concentrated in one specific 
partner country. For example, Kenya’s gains are concentrated on Tanzania and the rest of 
Africa, Ghana’s are heavily concentrated on Nigeria, and gains to the rest of Africa are 
concentrated on Nigeria and the rest of Africa itself. Conversely, many cells in the table 
show a zero or close to it, and only for South Africa is there a spread of countries where 
significant gains are made. Finally, the rest of Africa hides some potentially important 
individual country information within its aggregation due to the fact that many countries 
make big gains from this aggregation (and it is equally likely that some of the ‘rest of Africa’ 
countries themselves make big gains). 
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Table 1: Tariff elimination& NTB reduction, welfare gains at 2025, $ (millions) 
 
Country total efficiency labour capital ToT 
NTB 
efficiency 
Base 
Total Africa 38,690 8,876 3,898 17,919 4,226 3,770 17,072 
South Africa 9,920 2,517 1,549 3,880 1,960 13 5,742 
Botswana 87 14 27 55 -12 3 68 
Namibia 758 39 82 473 161 3 463 
Swazi-Lesotho 190 33 33 93 29 2 100 
Kenya 3,451 532 258 2,061 537 63 1,289 
Tanzania 1,459 266 103 752 -203 541 377 
Uganda 1,222 253 77 684 204 5 683 
Rwanda 391 99 20 177 88 8 301 
Egypt 2,028 294 140 1,019 380 195 518 
Morocco 1,292 192 121 439 448 91 572 
Rest of east 
Africa 
68 33 -16 30 -75 96 15 
Nigeria 3,453 347 529 1,835 155 587 2,031 
Angola-DRC 3,428 667 105 2,231 24 401 1,168 
Ethiopia 403 106 52 224 18 3 255 
Madagascar 20 -9 0 8 -17 38 -1 
Malawi 138 32 8 40 31 28 41 
Mauritius 315 41 15 169 56 34 76 
Mozambique 56 17 16 45 -40 18 14 
Zambia 808 189 119 221 272 7 454 
Zimbabwe -1,405 -211 -52 -430 -983 271 -1,486 
Ghana 1,793 513 104 476 660 40 813 
Tunisia 1,120 242 79 460 244 95 357 
Senegal 2,137 501 79 1,166 267 124 1,211 
Rest of Africa 5,558 2,170 451 1,812 21 1,104 2,012 
EU -5,919 -1,721 -277 -2,397 -1,524 0 -2,386 
UK -754 -278 -52 -216 -208 0 -364 
US -2,143 -446 -347 -809 -542 0 -726 
China -6,185 -797 -307 -3,467 -1,614 0 -2,351 
India -3,373 -735 -61 -1,641 -937 0 -1,539 
Brazil -536 -152 -61 -311 -12 0 -188 
Russia 793 176 8 142 468 0 553 
Rest of world -9,117 -2,499 -598 -6,046 26 0 -2,771 
Total world 11,456 2,423 2,204 3,175 -117 3,770 7,299 
Source: GTAP output 
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Table 2: Contribution to welfare by country, $ (millions) 
 
 zaf ken tza uga egy mar nga xac zwe gha tun sen Rafrica 
zaf -56 64 0 13 142 35 18 -1 13 3 29 4 10 
bwa 4 2 0 0 1 0 4 0 1 0 0 0 0 
nam 9 1 0 0 2 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 1 
xsc 2 1 0 0 3 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 4 
ken 797 581 0 13 -58 6 25 -1 -6 0 1 -2 39 
tza 1,564 1,018 889 196 189 9 89 166 -3 13 1 2 -4 
uga 154 -38 -2 115 -11 3 7 1 -1 1 0 -1 14 
rwa 29 1 -1 5 0 0 -2 0 0 0 10 0 20 
egy 171 313 29 3 248 39 80 10 -1 9 60 4 200 
mar 27 9 1 1 152 -59 65 27 0 15 77 7 105 
xec 292 135 10 62 152 8 221 4 5 2 6 2 31 
nga 1,052 95 14 8 301 129 245 493 -4 1,560 65 91 2,163 
xac 1,082 8 48 2 41 113 149 1,502 26 10 27 36 355 
eth 37 108 0 3 70 0 1 0 0 0 196 4 1 
mdg 71 10 3 0 8 9 0 0 -1 0 5 0 0 
mwi 188 -15 36 0 1 0 6 1 -5 0 1 0 6 
mus 86 27 0 1 6 4 0 1 2 0 1 2 2 
moz 176 21 0 1 13 0 3 2 -1 0 5 0 2 
zmb 46 3 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 1 0 0 16 
zwe 1,282 -27 17 0 4 3 60 29 -1,426 3 4 1 50 
gha 293 36 3 3 86 47 491 46 -2 -160 11 76 491 
tun 28 18 1 6 157 67 32 13 0 8 77 2 177 
sen 112 4 18 1 66 165 125 10 -1 20 97 190 333 
Rafrica 2,474 1,078 393 789 455 714 1,825 1,123 -2 309 443 1,717 1,544 
Total 9,920 3,451 1,459 1,222 2,028 1,292 3,453 3,428 -1,405 1,793 1,120 2,137 5,558 
Source: GTAP output 
 
Table 3 shows the matrix of GTAP sectors in the rows and contributions that changes in 
each of these sectors make in the cells for the major African countries. Again, South Africa 
does particularly well from agricultural reforms across the continent, and especially from 
secondary agriculture. A similar outcome is indicated for the rest of Africa. Sugar has been 
listed as a separate sector in this analysis to re-examine the outcomes from earlier tralac 
research that shows that South Africa is also doing very well in this sector – especially with 
better access into Kenya and, to a lesser degree, into Uganda. Again, Kenya and, to a lesser 
extent, Uganda makes significant gains in the sugar sector as they both reduce their sugar 
production significantly (as shown in Table 5). Secondary agriculture in Zimbabwe again 
takes a large hit, and possibly from South Africa in particular because it is exporting into 
heavily protected secondary (but not primary) agriculture sectors. 
 
We have commented on the manufacturing cells earlier and again highlight some rather large 
gains for some countries in many sectors. Outside South Africa and the rest of Africa the cell 
containing the largest number is that reported for other transportation (otn) for Angola-DRC. 
We have already commented that this seems to be a statistical or at least a definitional error 
in the reporting of the export or more likely the re-export of oil-drilling equipment such as 
large rigs from Angola. This may be erroneously reported as DRC and not the (possibly 
erroneous) report from the International Trade Centre (ITC) which is an export to the Congo 
and not the DRC. 
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Table 3: Contribution to welfare by commodity, $ (millions) 
 
 zaf ken tza uga egy mar nga xac zmb zwe gha tun sen Rafr 
PAgri 599 259 43 40 143 27 106 131 4 104 184 61 62 897 
SAgri 1,796 725 51 106 281 577 18 -62 39 -510 139 305 721 1,105 
sugar 687 672 -72 112 13 0 15 61 91 -4 0 6 20 29 
nat 16 4 2 1 5 4 49 29 0 12 11 5 5 33 
tex 317 254 48 97 153 42 75 113 1 -189 139 108 31 240 
wap 77 46 -16 6 160 34 -8 32 0 -150 -16 18 4 17 
lea 99 263 2 98 1 3 592 -17 -3 -59 95 10 -9 -157 
lum 133 60 29 61 22 10 38 52 1 -91 17 -2 30 119 
ppp 268 55 84 10 79 84 6 52 -1 -82 10 85 33 20 
p_c 419 7 107 2 130 17 64 256 -1 13 18 61 25 386 
crp 1,146 425 291 98 232 86 527 40 89 101 423 173 224 556 
nmm 132 95 22 140 77 11 70 -2 25 -7 32 29 513 365 
i_s 347 83 83 120 57 24 70 47 11 31 41 20 92 239 
nfm 152 46 167 2 153 24 173 12 84 29 70 11 49 6 
fmp 699 74 32 36 224 45 97 251 4 -68 40 30 18 86 
mvh 906 59 121 123 28 31 123 92 8 -340 9 23 50 252 
otn 208 9 26 20 5 3 271 1,311 0 -14 6 2 18 273 
ele 264 109 27 20 20 16 291 44 0 -32 56 8 11 30 
ome 1,465 178 414 112 242 228 853 983 440 -70 349 144 216 1,024 
omf 189 28 -1 17 4 26 23 3 17 -78 168 22 25 40 
Total 9,919 3,451 1,459 1,222 2,028 1,292 3,453 3,428 807 -1,405 1,793 1,120 2,137 5,559 
Source: GTAP output 
 
Table 4 returns to the expected changes in aggregate trade as measured by the percentage 
changes in both exports and imports and changes to the overall trade balance as measured in 
dollars (millions). The comparable data for the base tariff elimination scenario is shown 
on the right-hand side. Again, the trade balance is a macroeconomic closure in the GTAP 
model that is heavily influenced by the difference on one side of an equation that measures 
savings and investment and which has to balance with exports minus imports on the other 
side of the classic macroeconomic equation. It is therefore not an expected trade balance: 
it reflects changes in investment (capital) rather than actual changes in trade values. The 
terms of trade as shown in Table 2 reflect the changes in the relative prices of exports and 
imports while the export and import changes shown here are the percentage changes in the 
quantities traded. 
 
Except for Zambia’s small decline of less than one percent in both exports and imports and 
Zimbabwe’s small decline in imports, the combined tariff elimination and NTB reductions 
result in increased exports and imports across the continent for all parties when measured 
against the pure tariff elimination scenario. Some of these changes are very large, with 
Rwanda the best example, while others (Egypt and Mozambique) are much smaller. 
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Table 4: Percentage changes in trade for the partners 
 
Tariff & NTB reductions Base tariff only 
Exports 
% 
Imports 
% 
Balance $ 
(millions) 
 
Exports % 
 
Imports % 
South Africa 4.6 6.0 7 2.7 3.5 
Botswana 1.5 2.5 63 1.1 1.8 
Namibia 4.5 8.4 222 2.6 5 
Swazi-Lesotho 4.6 7.0 47 2.4 3.6 
Kenya 9.7 10.9 -1287 5.7 4.5 
Tanzania 10.6 9.5 -664 3.7 3.2 
Uganda 6.9 11.1 -212 4.3 6.4 
Rwanda 13.2 17.5 -55 10.1 13.8 
Egypt 1.6 1.8 -410 0.3 0.4 
Morocco 2.3 2.7 -488 0.8 1.1 
Rest of east 
Africa 
 
3.5 
 
2.5 
 
4 
 
2 
 
1.4 
Nigeria 3.2 3.8 -194 1.7 2 
Angola-DRC 4.7 6.6 93 2.1 3.1 
Ethiopia 4.4 3.3 -91 3.6 2.5 
Madagascar 3.6 2.8 -2 0.2 0.2 
Malawi 6.0 6.3 -18 4.2 3.5 
Mauritius 3.2 3.2 -115 0.9 0.9 
Mozambique 1.5 1.0 -24 1 0.7 
Zambia -0.7 -0.7 415 -0.7 -0.9 
Zimbabwe 43.0 -0.6 1117 32.7 -2.4 
Ghana 15.4 12.8 -837 9.1 7 
Tunisia 3.0 3.6 -118 1 1.2 
Senegal 18.6 18.2 -773 8.2 9.4 
Rest of Africa 5.4 5.6 -788 2.8 2.8 
Source: GTAP output 
 
Changes to production in the partner countries are shown in Table 5 (again expressed as 
changes from the non-FTA base) and, as expected, these changes largely reflect the sector 
contributions to welfare changes as shown in Table 3. As indicated in the top two rows, the 
demand for both skilled and unskilled labour in most countries (but not Zimbabwe) 
increases, with South Africa, Kenya and Senegal displaying the most significant increases. 
Secondary agriculture and sugar are again the standout sectors across the FTA, with 
impressive increases in production from South Africa, Kenya, Uganda and Senegal. The 
usual sugar-sector production increases in South Africa and consequential declines in Kenya 
and Uganda are highlighted. 
 
Changes to the production in textile, clothing and footwear (TCF) and vehicles are 
sometimes large, but these changes may be off small initial bases. As a generalisation, most 
of the countries shown increase production in most but not all sectors and, interestingly, 
production in Zimbabwe does not collapse in all sectors. Although we are not modelling 
changes to service barriers, note that there are increases for most countries in the service 
sec 
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sectors. These increases are likely to derive at least in part from trade-related services such 
as transport. 
 
Table 5: Increases in factors of production & actual production, % 
 
 zaf ken uga nga xac zmb zwe sen Rafrica 
Unskilled 0.97 0.92 0.63 0.16 0.23 0.66 -0.98 1.04 0.26 
Skilled 0.97 1.04 0.66 0.28 0.25 0.64 -1.02 1.11 0.24 
capital 2.39 8.17 6.86 1.70 2.84 2.44 -8.43 12.13 1.81 
PAgri 0.92 0.85 0.47 0.01 -0.27 -0.36 1.84 -0.17 0.49 
SAgri 5.11 6.94 4.77 -0.61 -0.96 3.91 -18.54 12.41 0.93 
sugar 31.25 -36.63 -18.77 -0.90 19.07 35.54 7.99 7.61 -1.21 
nat -0.63 0.69 -1.03 0.06 -0.06 -0.66 2.99 1.03 0.09 
tex 5.20 11.60 21.32 4.34 4.34 -0.96 -20.50 4.52 4.77 
wap 1.61 2.21 0.85 -0.06 2.94 0.88 -23.16 6.36 1.15 
lea 1.84 22.04 -3.69 18.00 -6.53 -6.11 -37.77 -5.60 -11.06 
lum 4.14 7.64 17.04 1.64 1.86 5.51 -11.42 2.16 1.42 
ppp 3.17 2.62 3.14 0.03 3.98 1.52 -5.57 3.92 -0.36 
p_c 7.19 6.46 0.06 0.86 -3.38 0.88 5.27 12.98 3.60 
crp 2.87 14.65 7.62 14.99 1.41 40.46 33.14 2.69 2.83 
nmm 2.64 5.95 16.87 14.24 0.60 25.11 -15.51 43.98 -2.59 
i_s 1.71 29.30 52.10 13.24 2.60 45.82 40.35 20.53 2.36 
nfm -10.07 6.50 -1.64 7.78 1.36 -11.45 45.63 -6.73 1.39 
fmp 7.94 14.60 15.67 4.32 8.23 9.95 -9.28 4.57 -1.02 
mvh 3.71 26.81 15.06 0.64 2.27 -0.62 -4.99 40.35 4.48 
otn 12.10 3.58 0.11 3.70 13.88 -4.67 1.98 3.42 11.54 
ele 3.30 8.38 11.48 1.74 3.20 -6.91 7.16 5.97 0.33 
ome 2.42 16.71 15.38 3.23 15.25 94.20 17.47 49.06 9.67 
omf 1.60 2.82 119.64 1.10 0.59 13.22 -18.40 9.11 1.22 
serv 2.00 5.20 4.04 0.73 2.12 1.27 -4.66 9.15 1.14 
Source: GTAP output 
 
Table 6 shows some more technical outcomes relating to the simulation. In effect, it shows 
that the changes are for increasing real GDP everywhere (some rather large) except 
Zimbabwe and ToT outcomes on relative export and import prices varying by country. Factor 
income in the standard land, labour and capital contributions usually increase, and in 
particular the contributions from labour are encouraging. The contributions from skilled and 
unskilled labour are not the same as those shown in Table 5 above which were the changes in 
employment levels. This data is the contribution that changes in the total wage bill make to 
total factor income. 
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Table 6: Changes in ToT, real GDP and total factor income along with contributions to 
factor income by % 
 
 Terms 
of 
Real 
Total 
factor 
 
Contributions from 
 
 trade GDP income land unskilled skilled capital resource 
zaf 1.46 1.75 3.80 0.21 0.89 1.12 1.67 -0.09 
bwa 0.25 0.48 1.51 0.11 0.53 0.23 0.81 -0.18 
nam 3.42 3.50 8.43 0.59 2.21 0.94 4.74 -0.05 
xsc 1.42 2.47 4.68 0.48 1.12 1.05 2.24 -0.22 
ken 2.22 4.40 8.68 0.59 2.50 1.23 4.12 0.24 
tza -0.39 2.90 3.75 0.27 1.29 0.91 1.24 0.04 
uga 3.05 3.69 7.86 0.71 2.25 1.25 3.83 -0.18 
rwa 3.51 2.05 10.87 2.45 4.37 1.46 2.96 -0.37 
egy 0.34 0.51 1.12 0.04 0.20 0.32 0.56 0.00 
mar 0.73 0.61 1.63 0.06 0.55 0.50 0.56 -0.04 
xec -0.17 0.13 -0.01 0.09 -0.05 -0.08 -0.05 0.09 
nga 0.06 0.57 0.87 0.06 0.23 0.24 0.27 0.07 
xac -0.06 1.55 1.88 0.02 0.34 0.40 1.14 -0.02 
eth 0.22 0.49 1.03 0.26 0.32 0.05 0.31 0.08 
mdg -0.41 0.22 0.06 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.05 
mwi 0.92 1.12 3.31 1.19 0.78 0.56 0.80 -0.02 
mus 0.50 1.15 2.05 -0.02 0.56 0.37 1.12 0.02 
moz -0.26 0.33 0.66 0.13 0.20 0.10 0.19 0.04 
zmb 2.09 1.62 5.40 0.91 1.82 1.24 1.59 -0.16 
zwe -7.29 -2.80 -12.96 0.73 -4.15 -3.27 -6.97 0.70 
gha 2.52 1.63 5.11 0.33 1.55 2.02 1.37 -0.16 
tun 0.77 1.29 2.65 0.28 0.64 0.59 1.13 0.02 
sen 2.74 7.79 12.82 0.73 2.87 1.42 7.18 0.62 
Rafr 0.05 1.13 1.63 0.24 0.45 0.32 0.51 0.11 
Source: GTAP output 
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Chapter 5 
 
The African ‘willing’ results: 
a hundred percent tariff reduction 
 
Summary and key points 
 
In this chapter we simulate a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between those countries in Africa 
that we consider ‘willing and able’ to move forward on full integration. We employ a tariff- 
only FTA approach between these selected countries. We know that there are solid economic 
gains to almost all African economies from a comprehensive FTA, but there are also many 
political-economy type problems relating to full integration. This chapter therefore takes what 
can be described as the European Union (EU) approach of starting regional integration slowly 
from a base of those few countries that appear to be ready for comprehensive liberalisation. 
We assess the five countries in the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), four in the East 
African Community (EAC), Malawi, Zambia and Egypt in the Tripartite FTA region, Nigeria 
and Ghana in west Africa and Morocco and Tunisia in north Africa as being our foundation 
members of what we call ‘an FTA of the willing’. This selection represents 64.7% of the 
African Gross Domestic Product (GDP). 
 
The results are unimpressive. Our simulation of selected countries only is very much a 
second-best solution. In all African countries we grouped together the gains from countries 
Africa-wide are more – and often significantly more – than they are for the selected group 
only. The only bright spot is the now excluded countries which are effectively neutralised to 
this integration, albeit sometimes with a small loss. Only South Africa has gains above 
Ghana’s $694 million and for some countries such as Botswana, Namibia, Tanzania and 
especially Zambia the gains from the selected group are to be scorned! This integration has 
less than 10% of the global gains from an Africa-wide scenario. 
 
A different country aggregation may lead to better overall results, but on our evidence we do 
not have a strong economic case to make for an FTA integration based upon these selected 
countries only. That case could only be made as a second-best argument if progress towards 
full African integration seems to be irretrievably lost. 
 
There are, however, some features which remain the same. South Africa makes large gains 
from reforms in Kenya and Nigeria, while Kenya makes large gains from its own 
liberalisation. Ghana gains from liberalisation in Nigeria and, similarly, Nigeria mirrors this 
by making large gains from access into Ghana. Overall, we find that gains are almost 
identical between full and partial integration for the main countries on a bilateral basis, but 
now there are too many missing countries where large bilateral gains were made under 
Africa-wide integration. 
 
South Africa continues to do particularly well from agricultural reforms and especially in the 
sugar section. Again, the heavily protected and highly inefficient sugar sector in Kenya is a 
drag upon its own economy. Our arguments for reform in Kenyan sugar policies are 
reinforced as Kenya makes significant unilateral gains in the sugar sector as it both reduces 
sugar production significantly and transfers resources out of a sector which has been heavily 
pro 
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protected but technically inefficient. There are, however, few gains in agriculture outside 
South Africa or in the sugar sector in Kenya and Uganda. Both Egypt and Nigeria gain in the 
textile, clothing and footwear (TCF) sectors, while South Africa does well in the 
manufacturing sectors. Gains in the motor-vehicle sector are muted outside South Africa’s 
gains. 
 
Welfare changes mostly increase when expressed real GDP, with some of these increases 
around 1% of real GDP. The terms of trade (ToT) vary, with some improving and others 
declining. All countries except Rwanda attract more capital. 
 
In terms of the tariff revenues collected at the respective borders there is little difference in 
the lost revenue between an Africa-wide FTA and our ‘willing’ countries, with the main 
exception being SACU where revenues increase by $16 million in contrast to the surprisingly 
large $167 million increase from an Africa-wide integration. 
 
Introduction and background 
 
We used as our base scenario the simulation whereby we reduce all tariff between all African 
countries to zero, and reported the results of this scenario in Chapter 2. As outlined in our 
introduction in Chapter 1 we also intend to simulate an FTA between those countries in 
Africa that we consider ‘willing and able’ to move forward on full integration. In this chapter 
we will examine the tariff-only implications of the ‘FTA of the willing’ scenario. 
 
From a political-economy perspective we must acknowledge that while there were solid 
economic gains to almost all African economies from a comprehensive FTA there were also 
many problems relating to full integration. These were mainly from the political-economy 
perspective and include the problem of some failed or semi-failed states that are patently not 
candidates for regional integration. This chapter therefore takes what can be described as the 
EU approach of starting regional integration gradually from a base of those few countries that 
appear to be ready for comprehensive liberalisation. This EU approach started in 1960 with 
the original six members and slowly enlarged over the years to the current 27 – and counting. 
We believe that such an approach has potential for Africa. Consequently, we assess the five 
countries in SACU, four in the EAC1, Malawi, Zambia and Egypt in  the  TFTA region, 
Nigeria and Ghana in West Africa, and Morocco and Tunisia in North Africa as being our 
foundation members of what we call ‘an FTA of the willing’. 
 
This juxtaposition of political-economy realism and modelling advances adds realism to our 
results. 
 
The objective of this chapter is therefore to use the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) 
computer model to assess the economic implications of this approach to regional integration. 
The scenario is that all intra-‘willing’ FTA tariffs are eliminated but there is no reduction in 
either non-tariff barriers (NTBs) or tariffs in African countries other than our ‘willing’ 
selection. Table 1 lists these selected countries and shows their respective GDP values as 
reported by the World Bank. Nigeria has recently supplanted South Africa as Africa’s leading 
 
 
 
 
1 
Unfortunately we cannot include Burundi in this grouping as Burundi is aggregated into the rest of east Africa 
in GTAP. 
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economic power,2 with Egypt and Morocco following these two countries. We note in passing 
that the entire African GDP is just below the GDP of the United Kingdom (UK) but 
marginally above that of Brazil and Russia, and that our ‘willing’ countries represent 64.7% 
of African GDP. 
 
Table 1: The African economies in the ‘willing’ FTA, GDP values 
 
Economy $ (billions) % of Africa 
Nigeria 521,803 22.3% 
South Africa 350,630 15.0% 
Egypt 271,973 11.6% 
Morocco 104,374 4.5% 
Ghana 47,929 2.1% 
Tunisia 47,129 2.0% 
Kenya 44,101 1.9% 
Tanzania 33,225 1.4% 
Zambia 22,384 1.0% 
Uganda 21,483 0.9% 
Botswana 14,788 0.6% 
Namibia 12,580 0.5% 
Rwanda 7,452 0.3% 
Swaziland 3,791 0.2% 
Malawi 3,705 0.2% 
Burundi 2,718 0.1% 
Lesotho 2,230 0.1% 
Willing 1,512,295 64.7% 
Africa 2,335,970 Africa % world 3.1% 
World 74,909,811  
Source: World Bank 
 
Results 
 
Table 2 shows the changes in welfare from the FTAs assuming the scenario of a 100% 
reduction in merchandise tariffs, with the data expressed in US dollars (millions) as one-
off increases in annual welfare at the assessed end point of 2025. On the right-hand side we 
show the welfare gains by country from the Chapter 2 scenario of Africa-wide tariff 
elimination. The first point is very clear. Our scenario of selected countries is very much a 
second-best solution; the gains to Africa from Africa-wide integration ($20,488 million) are 
much higher than the gains to our selected countries ($4,705 million). In addition, there are 
marginal losses to those African countries not included. In all African countries included the 
gains are more – and often significantly more – than they are for those gains from our 
selected ‘willing’ group only. That is except for (a) the minuscule $1 million difference for 
Malawi and (b) the turnaround from a $1,486 million loss for Zimbabwe with inclusion in 
Africa-wide countries to a much more modest $34 loss from exclusion in the selected group. 
Only South Africa has gains above Ghana’s $694 million, and for some countries such as 
Bots  
 
 
2 
We note that the GTAP Version 9 database uses as its foundation the 2011 values, and the Nigerian GDP 
has been revised upwards since that date. This will have some follow-on effects on our results. 
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Botswana, Namibia, Tanzania and especially Zambia the gains from the selected group are 
to be scorned! While the selected FTA is still globally welfare enhancing, this global 
outcome is less than 10% of the global gains from an Africa-wide scenario (as shown in – 
literally and figuratively – the bottom line). 
 
Table 2: ‘Willing only’ tariff elimination, welfare gains at 2025, $ (millions) 
 
Country total efficiency labour capital ToT All Africa 
Total Africa 4,705 1,258 555 2,385 508 20,488 
South Africa 2,228 531 356 911 430 5,742 
Botswana 0 0 1 1 -3 68 
Namibia 8 1 1 -3 9 463 
Swazi-Lesotho 73 12 12 37 11 100 
Kenya 439 147 13 521 -242 4,705 
Tanzania 41 55 -3 58 -69 377 
Uganda 106 38 1 76 -9 683 
Rwanda 14 6 0 6 2 301 
Malawi 40 14 2 21 3 41 
Zambia 4 -1 2 4 -1 454 
Egypt 350 60 25 174 91 518 
Morocco 111 24 11 36 40 572 
Tunisia 68 21 5 31 11 357 
Nigeria 610 151 93 361 5 2,031 
Ghana 694 227 40 195 231 813 
Not included in the ‘willing’ 
Rest of east Africa 2 -4 -1 -1 8 15 
Angola-DRC -11 -5 0 -9 3 1,168 
Ethiopia 0 1 0 -1 0 255 
Madagascar -6 -1 0 -3 -2 -1 
Mauritius -7 -1 0 -3 -3 76 
Mozambique -15 -1 0 -7 -7 14 
Zimbabwe -34 -12 0 -11 -11 -1,486 
Senegal -3 -1 0 -2 -1 1,211 
Rest of Africa -6 -7 -2 -9 13 2,012 
EU -610 -160 -20 -321 -110 -2,386 
UK -119 -43 -6 -39 -31 -364 
US -336 -67 -36 -156 -78 -726 
China -891 -109 -39 -531 -212 -2,351 
India -557 -118 -10 -279 -150 -1,539 
Brazil -139 -36 -11 -76 -17 -188 
Russia 70 18 0 -5 57 553 
Rest of world -1,413 -388 -68 -986 29 -2,771 
Total world 710 356 365 -8 -3 7,299 
Source: GTAP output 
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Perhaps a different country aggregation may lead to better overall results. On our evidence, 
however, we do not have a strong economic case to make for an FTA integration based upon 
these selected countries only. A case for that could only be made as a second-best argument if 
progress towards full African integration seems to be irretrievably lost. Further analysis using 
a wider set of countries and only excluding some patently failed states may well, however, 
retrieve our policy position of a step-by-step approach based upon the EU history of gradual 
integration. In particular, note a significant different negotiating process for gradually 
extending from a base as distinct from a ‘big bang’ approach. This is because current EU 
enlargement allows for a series of processes to be enacted for membership over time. It is 
this negotiating process that may hold appeal. 
 
In Table 3 we highlight where the main bilateral gains derive from for the major African 
countries as measured by the welfare gains in Table 2. The data is shown in a matrix of the 
full range of countries in the rows but only selected countries in the columns. Again, the 
cells are to be read as follows. In the column headed South Africa (zaf) there is a small loss 
from unilateral liberalisation ($64), but that is much more than compensated for by large 
gains from reforms in Kenya (ken) of $727 million and Nigeria (nga) of $367 million. Kenya 
is an interesting case in that it makes large gains ($475million) from its own liberalisation, 
while Ghana gains ($765million) from liberalisation in Nigeria. Similarly, Nigeria makes 
large gains from access into Ghana. Referring back to the comparable table in Chapter 2 for 
Africa-wide liberalisation we find that these gains are almost identical between full and 
partial integration for the main countries on a bilateral basis – if those countries are in our 
‘willing’ configuration. The difference is that there are now too many missing countries 
where large bilateral gains were made under Africa-wide integration. For example, 
previously the gains to Uganda from access into rest of Africa ($558million from a total of 
$683million) no longer apply, and that decimates the gains to Uganda compared with 
countries Africa-wide. 
 
Table 3: Contribution to welfare by country, $ (millions) 
 
EV 
$m 
zaf xsc ken tza uga egy mar nga mwi gha tun 
zaf -64 0 64 0 15 132 35 15 2 3 28 
bwa -1 0 2 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 
nam -1 0 1 0 0 2 0 1 0 0 0 
xsc -2 1 1 0 0 3 1 1 1 0 0 
ken 727 25 475 -9 -2 -64 5 24 -12 0 1 
tza 472 24 -88 14 -8 92 3 7 55 1 0 
uga 151 6 -51 -2 101 -10 3 7 -2 1 0 
rwa 24 0 -5 -3 -5 -1 0 0 0 0 8 
mwi 167 0 -31 32 0 0 0 5 -3 0 1 
zmb 41 0 -2 0 0 0 0 6 0 1 0 
egy 50 0 0 5 0 -1 0 18 0 2 0 
nga 367 16 32 3 0 114 42 10 0 765 18 
gha 266 0 30 2 1 78 36 457 0 -90 7 
mar 15 0 3 0 0 6 -14 40 0 8 2 
tun 14 0 9 0 3 -1 0 15 0 4 1 
Total 2,228 73 439 41 106 350 111 610 40 694 68 
Chapter 5: The African ‘willing’ results: a hundred percent tariff reduction 
Source: GTAP output 
57 
 
 
 
 
Table 4 moves on to show the matrix of GTAP sectors in the rows and contributions that 
changes in each of these sectors make in the cells for the major African countries. South 
Africa again does particularly well from agricultural reforms across the continent, and 
especially from secondary agriculture. Sugar has been listed as a separate sector in this 
analysis; this is because the outcomes from earlier tralac research show that South Africa is 
doing very well in this sector, especially with better access into Kenya and, to a lesser 
degree, Uganda. A powerful policy statement from our research is that the heavily protected 
and highly inefficient sugar sector in Kenya is a drag upon the economy. But we fully 
appreciate the political pressure, if not the economic logic, to maintain that protection. And 
again, we would expect the Swaziland-Lesotho aggregation (xsc) to do well in increased 
sugar opportunities, but this is not the case as South Africa dominates their $13 million 
contribution from sugar. Our arguments for reform in Kenyan sugar policies are reinforced 
as Kenya makes significant unilateral gains in the sugar sector. But this is because both 
reduce their sugar production significantly as shown in Table 6. This enables them to 
transfer resources out of a sector which has been heavily protected but technically 
inefficient. This is a classic example of how regional integration can benefit a country 
through efficiency gains: the overall welfare results for Kenya and, to a lesser extent Uganda, 
clearly show that reforming the sugar sector is beneficial to them. 
 
Perhaps surprisingly, there are few gains in agriculture outside South Africa or the sugar 
sector in Kenya and Uganda. Note the losses in the sugar sector for Tanzania and Egypt. 
Both Egypt and Nigeria gain in the TCF, while South Africa does well in the manufacturing 
sectors. Gains in the motor vehicle (mvh) sector are muted outside South Africa’s gains. 
 
Table 4: Contribution to welfare by commodity, $ (millions) 
 
 zaf xsc ken tza uga egy mar nga mwi gha tun 
PAgr 132 0 37 19 14 6 2 13 12 63 -1 
SAgr 338 7 -93 -2 -4 27 52 5 -1 33 4 
sugar 536 13 547 -89 93 -18 -2 8 30 -1 -1 
nat 5 0 2 2 0 1 1 13 2 4 0 
tex 61 1 1 6 -3 26 3 4 -5 69 10 
wap -15 0 -1 -5 -4 118 17 -6 -2 -3 14 
lea 27 0 5 -1 -1 0 -7 167 -2 43 6 
lum 29 0 -4 1 -1 6 0 5 -4 6 2 
ppp 135 0 -34 19 0 18 18 2 -5 3 2 
p_c 27 0 1 11 1 1 1 5 8 4 0 
crp 229 48 -16 18 -3 34 7 83 5 166 6 
nmm 19 0 -4 2 0 22 0 28 3 2 4 
i_s 84 0 1 12 1 9 0 14 -1 10 0 
nfm 14 0 1 7 0 2 0 47 0 23 0 
fmp 124 0 1 1 -1 50 2 22 -5 8 5 
mvh 193 0 1 15 9 7 0 24 0 2 4 
otn 14 0 0 1 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 
ele 41 0 4 2 3 2 0 74 0 28 1 
ome 187 1 -1 22 1 39 1 127 3 137 8 
omf 49 1 -8 0 1 1 15 -28 2 95 3 
Total 2,228 73 439 41 106 350 111 610 40 694 68 
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Table 5 turns to the expected changes in aggregate trade as measured by the percentage 
changes in the quantity of both exports and imports and to the changes to the overall trade 
balance as measured in dollars (millions). Again, the trade balance is a macroeconomic 
closure in the GTAP model that is heavily influenced by the difference on one side of an 
equation that measures savings and investment which has to balance with exports minus 
imports on the other side of the classic macroeconomic equation. It is therefore not a trade 
balance as could be expected as it reflects changes in investment (capital) rather than actual 
changes in trade values. The terms of trade as shown in Table 2 reflect the changes in the 
relative prices of exports and imports while the export and import changes shown here are a 
combination of changes to both prices and volumes. 
 
The trade results from the Africa-wide comprehensive FTA are shown on the right-hand side 
of Table 5 for a comparison. For all partners, except Zambia which has reversed to a small 
decline (a marginal increase in exports in the ‘willing’ scenario), these current ‘willing only’ 
trade gains are less than they are for the full Africa wide FTA. Some are significantly less 
(Rwanda) while others show little difference. For imports, the pattern is almost exactly the 
same, with Zambia reversing a small decline but all others gaining significantly less. 
 
Table 5: Percentage changes in trade for the partners 
 
  Willing only  Africa-wide 
  
Exports % 
 
imports % 
Balance $ 
(millions) 
 
Exports % 
 
Imports % 
South Africa 1.0 1.3 -20 2.7 3.5 
Botswana 0.1 0.1 2 1.1 1.8 
Namibia 0.0 0.1 5 2.6 5.0 
Swazi- 
Lesotho 
 
1.7 
 
2.5 
 
18 
 
2.4 
 
3.6 
Kenya 4.4 2.1 -117 5.7 4.5 
Tanzania 2.8 2.0 -94 3.7 3.2 
Uganda 1.6 1.5 -19 4.3 6.4 
Rwanda 0.7 0.8 -1 10.1 13.8 
Malawi 3.5 3.3 -6 4.2 3.5 
Zambia 0.1 0.1 8 -0.7 -0.9 
Egypt 0.2 0.3 -76 0.3 0.4 
Nigeria 0.7 0.9 -47 1.7 2.0 
Ghana 7.1 5.5 -324 9.1 7.0 
Morocco 0.2 0.2 -41 0.8 1.1 
Tunisia 0.2 0.3 -9 1.0 1.2 
Source: GTAP output 
 
Changes to production in the partner countries are shown in Table 6 (again expressed as 
changes from the non-FTA base) and, as expected, these changes largely reflect the sector 
contributions to welfare changes as shown in Table 4. The top two rows show that the 
demand for both skilled and unskilled labour in many of the countries increases, although 
only in the rest of SACU, Swaziland and Lesotho (xsc), and South Africa (0.22%) are these 
gains meaningful. Secondary agriculture and sugar are again well-performing sectors across 
the partial FTA. For secondary agriculture there are some solid increases in production from 
South Africa, Swaziland-Lesotho and Kenya. We have discussed the sugar sector, and the 
pro 
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production increases in South Africa and declines in Kenya and Uganda are large. However, 
for the first time we are seeing an increase in sugar production of 10% in Swaziland- 
Lesotho, and the large percentage declines in production in Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda and 
Egypt in response to SACU competition are highlighted here. There are a few changes in the 
manufacturing sectors that really stand out, and note that some large percentage changes may 
be off low initial bases. 
 
Table 6: Increases in factors of production & actual production, % 
 
 zaf xsc ken tza uga egy mar nga zmb tun 
Unskilled 0.22 0.48 0.03 -0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.02 
Skilled 0.22 0.49 0.10 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.02 
capital 0.56 1.47 2.06 0.49 0.76 0.15 0.10 0.33 0.05 0.14 
PAgr -0.02 0.50 0.66 0.06 0.57 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.25 -0.03 
SAgr 0.99 2.08 1.91 -0.52 -0.05 0.11 0.37 -0.05 -0.26 0.02 
sugar 24.22 9.81 -32.91 -57.29 -28.09 -1.17 0.02 0.10 -1.40 -0.03 
nat -0.14 -0.22 0.11 0.11 0.03 -0.01 -0.03 0.01 0.01 0.00 
tex 0.85 -2.77 3.00 3.82 -0.72 0.09 -0.01 -0.13 -0.34 0.50 
wap 0.03 -3.91 2.08 -0.14 -1.89 0.41 0.23 -0.14 -0.23 0.37 
lea 0.61 -3.20 11.05 -0.01 2.59 -0.06 -0.50 5.10 -1.05 0.13 
lum 1.02 -0.19 0.84 -1.08 -0.17 0.16 0.01 -0.03 0.06 0.14 
ppp 1.50 0.71 -0.95 -6.32 -2.20 0.54 0.80 0.14 -0.03 0.22 
p_c 0.71 1.44 1.49 -0.64 0.94 0.06 0.06 0.17 -1.58 0.13 
crp 0.57 17.72 3.93 2.50 1.17 0.25 -0.01 2.07 0.32 0.11 
nmm 0.47 1.37 1.27 0.67 0.55 0.17 0.02 7.63 -1.79 1.56 
i_s 0.22 -0.07 1.05 1.96 1.34 0.18 -0.18 2.53 0.73 0.02 
nfm -2.47 -0.80 3.78 3.30 1.47 -0.39 -0.24 2.86 0.02 0.06 
fmp 1.43 0.43 1.68 -3.36 -0.51 0.50 0.00 0.98 0.86 0.24 
mvh 0.79 0.66 0.42 0.11 0.15 0.25 -0.06 0.02 -1.34 0.06 
otn -0.10 -1.52 1.98 1.97 0.90 0.10 -0.13 0.46 0.08 -0.14 
ele 0.25 -0.43 3.02 1.50 1.45 0.06 -0.12 -0.55 0.03 -0.10 
ome 0.10 -0.49 1.56 1.99 1.77 1.61 -0.19 0.75 0.30 0.05 
omf 0.35 -2.03 2.12 1.30 0.21 0.11 0.84 -5.53 2.90 0.80 
serv 0.48 0.88 1.40 0.29 0.51 0.07 0.05 0.13 0.02 0.08 
Source: GTAP output 
 
Table 7 shows some more technical outcomes relating to the simulation. In effect, it shows 
that the welfare changes are mostly increasing when expressed in real GDP, with some of 
these increases around one percent of real GDP. The terms of trade vary, with some 
improving and others declining and these changes are up to one percent either way (Kenya 
down and Ghana up). The returns from factor income such as the standard land, labour and 
capital mostly improve but the contributions from skilled and unskilled labour are seldom 
large although some useful contributions are made (Ghana, for example). Again we 
emphasise that these changes are not the same as those shown in Table 6 above, which 
indicated the changes in employment levels. The data shown below is the contribution that 
changes in the total wage bill make to total factor income. In this version of the model we use 
a ‘closure’ or assumption that the wage bill is split between increased wages for those in 
work and new employment. This is based upon the unemployment rate in each country. All 
countries except Rwanda attract more capital. 
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Table 7: Changes in ToT, real GDP and total factor income along with contributions to 
factor income by % 
 
 Terms 
of 
 
Real 
Total 
factor 
  
Contributions from 
 
 Trade GDP income land unskilled skilled capital resource 
zaf 0.32 0.40 0.86 0.05 0.20 0.25 0.39 -0.02 
bwa -0.03 0.01 0.07 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.04 -0.01 
nam 0.12 0.00 0.13 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.07 
xsc 0.55 0.95 1.80 0.23 0.41 0.38 0.87 -0.09 
ken -0.93 1.04 0.45 -0.23 0.07 0.11 0.48 0.02 
tza -0.35 0.20 -0.17 -0.15 -0.06 0.00 0.03 0.01 
uga -0.08 0.42 0.22 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.12 0.01 
rwa 0.09 0.08 -0.07 -0.02 -0.03 -0.01 -0.02 0.01 
mwi 0.14 0.40 0.99 0.42 0.22 0.13 0.20 0.02 
zmb -0.02 0.02 0.17 0.10 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.01 
egy 0.08 0.08 0.20 0.00 0.03 0.06 0.10 0.00 
nga -0.01 0.11 0.15 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.01 
gha 0.93 0.67 1.93 0.11 0.59 0.77 0.52 -0.06 
mar 0.07 0.05 0.14 0.01 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.00 
tun 0.04 0.08 0.14 0.00 0.03 0.04 0.07 0.00 
Source: GTAP output 
 
Tariff revenues 
 
Changes in the tariff revenues collected at the respective borders are shown in Table 8, where 
a comparison can be made between these ‘willing only’ revenues and the right-hand side that 
shows the declines in tariffs from the complete Africa-wide integration. For many of the 
countries involved there is little difference. The main exception is SACU where revenues 
increase by $16 million in contrast to the surprisingly large $167 million increase from an 
Africa-wide integration. 
 
Table 8: Changes to tariff revenues 
 
Revenue,US$ (millions) 
 Willing only Africa-wide 
SACU 16 167 
Kenya -448 -416 
Tanzania -452 -445 
Uganda -100 -85 
Rwanda -10 -3 
Malawi -96 -101 
Zambia -23 -20 
Egypt -8 -25 
Nigeria -478 -681 
Ghana -205 -382 
Morocco -14 -16 
Tunisia -14 -20 
Source: GTAP output 
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Chapter 6 
 
The African ‘willing’ countries’ results: 
reduction in non-tariff barriers 
 
Summary and key points 
 
This chapter examines the implications of a reduction in non-tariff barriers (NTBs) for our 
Free Trade Agreement (FTA) of the ‘willing’1 countries only. While our results confirmed 
that partial African integration was very much a second-best option, they nonetheless show 
that even piecemeal reforms across selected countries lead to some meaningful gains for the 
continent. It is still a second-best situation, however, and, furthermore, it does not make much 
sense to address NTBs within the context of an FTA made up of countries geographically so 
diverse. Even in the best of situations an FTA is not the optimal vehicle for NTB reductions, 
but at least our results underscore the potential benefits that can be captured from a reduction 
in NTB costs. 
 
Our results show that the ‘willing’ partners’ NTB reductions represent only 35% of the 
Africa-wide NTB reduction outcome. There is significant variation in this result, however, as 
Kenya, Tanzania, Malawi and Ghana all report gains that are 80% or more of the Africa-wide 
level. Since the overall result is still globally welfare-enhancing and there are large gains for 
some countries, this highlights that there is significant benefit to be had from reducing 
barriers to trade, albeit not comprehensively across Africa. 
 
Kenya and Tanzania, two of the big gainers, are the most interesting case studies. Most of 
the Kenyan gains derive from reforms in Tanzania while most of the Tanzanian gains derive 
from unilateral reforms in Tanzania itself. This result can be traced back to NTBs in 
Tanzania that are extremely high (22% for agriculture and 47.4% for manufacturing). A 
natural consequence is therefore that Kenya, a country with a high economic linkage to 
Tanzania, will gain from reforms there. 
 
South Africa and Kenya do particularly well from reductions in constraints to agricultural 
trade across the continent, and especially from secondary agriculture. Our tariff elimination 
results earlier show that there are significant potential gains to both parties from reforms in 
the sugar trading relationship between an efficient South African sugar sector on the one 
hand and an inefficient and highly protected Kenyan sugar sector on the other. While there is 
some evidence that these gains do occur with NTB reductions, they are not nearly as 
pronounced as when we were dealing with tariffs rather than with the more subtle NTBs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1  
These are countries in Africa that we considered to be ‘willing and able’ to move forward towards full 
integration. We assessed the five countries in the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), four in the East 
African Community (EAC), Malawi, Zambia and Egypt in the Tripartite FTA region, Nigeria and Ghana in west 
Africa and Morocco and Tunisia in north Africa as being our foundation members of what we call ‘an FTA of 
the willing’. 
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For trade, the emphasis is placed on big changes in the trade flows of both Kenya and 
Tanzania. From our results, these changes are likely to be increases in the bilateral trade 
flows. These increases have an impact on other Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) 
results. In particular, the outcome is that the demand for both skilled and unskilled labour in 
Kenya becomes significant. Significant also is the fact that both Kenya and Tanzania have 
increases in the real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of around two percentage points. These 
are significant gains and further highlight how NTBs are dragging particularly these two 
countries down. 
 
Introduction and background 
 
We used as our base scenario the simulation whereby we reduce all tariff between all African 
countries to zero, and reported the results of this scenario in Chapter 2. We then moved on to 
simulate a reduction in NTBs across Africa in Chapter 3 before combining both tariff 
elimination and NTB reductions across Africa in Chapter 4. As outlined in our introduction to 
Chapter 1 we also simulate an FTA between those countries in Africa that we consider to be 
‘willing and able’ to move forward towards full integration. This was undertaken in Chapter 
5. In this current chapter we will examine the implications of a reduction in NTBs for the 
‘FTA of the willing’. 
 
In Chapter 5 we outlined the background to our thinking on this potential integration and 
named the countries that we included. Our simulation results confirmed that partial African 
integration was very much a second-best option but nonetheless it still offered potential gains 
to those countries we included in our simulation. In this current chapter we will reproduce the 
simulation undertaken in Chapter 3 that reduced NTBs across Africa: the difference is that we 
are only including our ‘willing’ partners. 
 
At the outset we must stress that, again, we are looking at a second-best situation. This is 
because many of these NTBs are Africa-wide issues. Furthermore, as mentioned above, it 
does not make much sense to address NTBs within the context of an FTA made up of 
countries geographically so diverse. Even in the best of situations an FTA is not the optimal 
vehicle for NTB reductions. However, having said that we also consider that this chapter will 
at least underscore the potential benefits that can be gained from a reduction in NTB costs. 
 
All the background discussions and dataset analysis relating to this simulation are given in 
our main NTB work in Chapter 3. We will not repeat that discussion here but will rather just 
make reference to it. 
 
Results 
 
Table 1 shows the changes in welfare from the FTAs assuming the scenario of a 50% 
reduction in NTBs and NTBs only for the selected group of countries chosen for our so- 
called ‘willing’ group within Africa. The data relating to our results is expressed in US 
dollars (millions) as one-off increases in annual welfare at the assessed end point of 2025. 
The Equivalent Variation (EV) shown in Table 1 represents the combined effects of reducing 
the ad valorem equivalent (AVE) NTB tariff calibrated into the database and the efficiency 
augmenting technical change as discussed in Chapter 3. 
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The direct NBT efficiency gain for South Africa is only $8 million but this increased efficient 
reduces import price which contributes to changes in terms of trade (ToT), consumption 
patterns and firm production costs. It ultimately changes allocative efficiencies and the 
amount of capital and the labour force employed in South Africa. Thereby the direct 
efficiency gain of $8 million has multiple second-round effects 
 
The data on the left-hand side reflects the output from this simulation in welfare gains/losses. 
The data in the right-hand columns of Table 1 shows (a) the linkages between initial NTB 
levels and welfare gains from their reduction under the ‘NTB efficiency’ and (b) the 
percentage that our results in Table 1 show, namely how NTB gains to the selected ‘willing’ 
countries relate to the Africa-wide NTB reduction welfare outcome from Chapter 3. 
 
The main point is clear. There is a wide variation in the size of the welfare gains between the 
Africa-wide results and our selected partners. The selected countries represent a second-best 
solution with overall gains of only 35% of the Africa-wide total. Those African countries 
which do not belong to the ‘willing’ selection are effectively neutral in most instances, 
although there is some trade deflection in cases such as the Angola-DRC aggregation. While 
there is significant variation in this result for the ‘willing’ parties (with the Swaziland- 
Lesotho aggregation, Kenya, Tanzania, Malawi and Ghana all reporting gains of 80% or 
above those of the Africa-wide level), the overall result is that the selected NTB reduction is 
still globally welfare-enhancing. More importantly, these gains are large for some countries 
and this fact highlights that there are significant gains to be had from reducing barriers to 
trade, albeit not comprehensively, across Africa. 
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Table 1: ‘Willing’ countries, NTB reductions, welfare gains at 2025, $ (millions) 
 
  
total 
 
efficiency 
 
labour 
 
capital 
 
ToT 
NTB 
efficiency 
Africa- 
wide 
Total Africa 6,391 1,059 582 2,814 899 1,037 35% 
South Africa 1,354 370 220 518 239 8 50% 
Botswana 5 1 1 3 -3 3 41% 
Namibia 9 0 1 2 3 3 5% 
Swazi-Lesotho 52 9 9 25 7 2 85% 
Kenya 1,814 235 149 901 481 49 86% 
Tanzania 855 80 52 453 -186 456 83% 
Uganda 307 72 21 153 55 5 65% 
Rwanda 28 6 1 16 -3 7 42% 
Egypt 623 49 37 346 57 133 44% 
Morocco 142 2 10 48 19 62 29% 
Rest of east 
Africa 
 
-9 
 
4 
 
1 
 
-2 
 
-11 
 
0 
 
-15% 
Nigeria 541 110 20 194 -7 224 39% 
Angola-DRC -35 -9 -1 -24 0 0 -2% 
Ethiopia -4 -1 0 -2 -1 0 -5% 
Madagascar -1 0 0 0 0 0 -4% 
Malawi 80 11 4 10 32 23 80% 
Mauritius -5 -1 0 -3 -2 0 -2% 
Mozambique -12 -1 0 -6 -5 0 -27% 
Zambia 110 7 20 32 45 6 48% 
Zimbabwe -22 -4 0 -7 -10 0 -12% 
Ghana 394 113 23 81 164 14 81% 
Tunisia 203 25 15 87 33 42 27% 
Senegal -1 0 0 -1 0 0 0% 
Rest of Africa -37 -19 -1 -10 -8 0 -1% 
EU -1,084 -316 -44 -584 -140 0  
UK -154 -55 -9 -53 -37 0  
US -577 -127 -72 -290 -88 0  
China -1,406 -184 -57 -873 -292 0  
India -668 -170 -12 -339 -147 0  
Brazil -129 -34 -8 -89 2 0  
Russia -93 -13 -2 -87 10 0  
Rest of world -2,774 -615 -126 -1,818 -215 0  
Total world -494 -455 252 -1,321 -7 1,037  
Source: GTAP output 
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In Table 2 we highlight where the main bilateral gains for the selected African countries 
derive from as measured by the welfare gains in Table 1: the matrix contains the full range 
of countries in the rows but only selected countries in the columns. Kenya and Tanzania are 
the two most interesting case studies. Their gains are the first and third highest in Table 1. 
Table 2 highlights that most of the Kenyan gains derive from reforms in Tanzania while 
most of the Tanzanian gains derive from unilateral reforms in Tanzania itself. Reverting 
back to Table 1 in Chapter 3 we can see that the NTBs in Tanzania are extremely high (22% 
for agriculture and 47.4% for manufacturing).The natural consequence is that Kenya, a 
country with a high economic linkage to Tanzania, will gain from reforms there. Many of 
the cells contain low totals or even zero, indicating the low levels of intra-African trade 
linkages between many countries. However, the Nigerian-Ghana relationship shows some 
interesting outcomes – with Ghana (and Kenya) doing very well due to liberalisation in 
Nigeria while the converse does not hold. Similarly, the Egypt-Morocco relationship 
shows some mutual gains. 
 
Table 2: Contribution to welfare by country, $ (millions) 
 
 zaf xsc ken tza uga egy mar nga mwi zmb gha tun 
zaf 18 0 2 0 0 6 0 2 2 1 0 0 
bwa 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
nam 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
xsc 4 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
ken 29 0 50 10 20 22 1 2 12 1 0 0 
tza 760 29 1,337 813 262 62 4 88 21 22 12 -1 
uga 1 0 18 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
rwa 2 0 12 3 15 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
egy 76 0 321 20 2 125 40 38 18 79 6 61 
mar 2 0 5 0 1 142 -28 18 0 0 2 79 
nga 399 20 35 6 1 98 45 369 0 -1 360 24 
mwi 18 0 22 3 0 1 0 1 27 4 0 0 
zmb 9 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 0 
gha 23 0 3 0 0 5 11 22 0 0 12 1 
tun 0 0 2 0 2 161 69 2 0 0 1 38 
Total 1,354 52 1,814 855 307 623 142 541 80 110 394 203 
Source: GTAP output 
 
Table 3 shows the matrix of GTAP sectors in the rows and contributions that changes in 
each of these sectors make to the major African countries in the cells. South Africa and 
Kenya do particularly well from reductions in constraints to agricultural trade across the 
continent, especially from secondary agriculture. In the earlier analysis, the sugar trading 
relationship between an efficient South African sugar sector on the one hand and an 
inefficient and highly protected Kenyan sugar sector on the other shows large gains to both 
parties; this is because South African exports displaced inefficient production in Kenya. 
While there is some evidence that this displacement occurs here it is not nearly as 
pronounced as when we were dealing with tariffs rather than with the more subtle NTBs. 
Gains in manufacturing are spread across many cells. 
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Table 3: Contribution to welfare by commodity, $ (millions) 
 
 zaf ken tza uga egy mar nga mwi zmb gha tun 
PAgri 49 195 27 18 74 3 71 51 7 53 35 
SAgri 160 413 19 10 74 44 50 7 1 50 34 
sugar 15 44 12 4 22 1 2 6 0 1 -1 
tex 21 146 4 49 34 6 7 0 0 25 10 
wap 5 24 -10 10 10 2 -2 0 0 0 0 
lea 4 114 -16 46 1 3 5 0 0 34 2 
lum 7 21 8 1 6 0 2 1 0 6 1 
ppp 44 46 53 5 24 17 0 0 0 1 8 
p_c 66 5 96 1 2 2 13 3 0 2 2 
crp 211 296 105 41 71 14 50 4 2 78 51 
nmm 6 52 -1 3 32 0 4 1 0 1 5 
i_s 101 38 62 5 22 4 18 0 1 2 10 
nfm 58 17 88 1 116 14 18 -1 91 21 5 
fmp 69 59 23 3 40 7 11 0 0 7 6 
mvh 104 47 90 9 6 15 33 1 1 1 4 
otn 96 2 24 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
ele 38 94 20 4 11 0 40 0 0 10 3 
ome 285 183 249 94 78 9 205 5 8 71 27 
omf 14 17 1 1 0 1 14 0 0 34 1 
Total 1,354 1,814 855 307 623 142 541 80 110 394 203 
Source: GTAP output 
 
Table 4 turns to the expected changes in aggregate trade as measured by the percentage 
changes in the quantity of both exports and imports and also to changes to the overall trade 
balance, as measured in dollars (millions). Again the trade balance is a macroeconomic 
closure in the GTAP model that is heavily influenced by the difference on one side of an 
equation that measures savings and investment – an equation which has to balance with 
exports minus imports on the other side of the classic macroeconomic equation. It is 
therefore not a trade balance as could be expected; this is because it reflects changes in 
investment (capital) rather than actual changes in trade values. The ToT as shown in Table 1 
reflect the changes in the relative prices of exports and imports while the export and import 
changes shown here are a combination of changes to both prices and volumes. 
 
Again, the big changes are in the trade flows of both Kenya and Tanzania. Based on the 
evidence from Table 2 it is likely that these are increases in the bilateral trade flows. It also 
seems that there may be some spill over effects for both Uganda and Rwanda as well. 
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Table 4: Percentage changes in trade for the partners 
 
  
Exports % 
 
Imports % 
Balance $ 
(millions) 
South Africa 0.7 0.8 4 
Botswana 0.2 0.3 2 
Namibia 0.1 0.2 4 
Swazi-Lesotho 1.4 2.0 12 
Kenya 3.7 5.5 -684 
Tanzania 4.6 4.1 -335 
Uganda 1.6 2.5 -45 
Rwanda 1.0 0.8 -2 
Egypt 0.7 0.7 -120 
Morocco 0.6 0.5 -51 
Nigeria 0.3 0.3 -14 
Malawi 1.1 1.9 -7 
Zambia 0.4 0.7 64 
Ghana 2.1 2.0 -151 
Tunisia 0.7 0.8 -22 
Source: GTAP output 
 
Changes to production in the partner countries are shown in Table 5and, as expected, these 
changes largely reflect the sector contributions to welfare changes as shown in Table 3. The 
top two rows show that the demand for both skilled and unskilled labour in many of the 
countries is muted, although in Kenya it is more meaningful. In the secondary agriculture and 
sugar sectors, there are again glimpses of sugar relationship between South Africa and 
Kenya, but not nearly as pronounced as it is under tariff elimination that lays bare the 
Kenyan inefficiencies. There are few changes in the manufacturing sectors that really stand 
out, except perhaps for some changes in the profile of the East African Community 
(EAC) members. 
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Table 5: Increases in factors of production & actual production, % 
 
 zaf ken tza uga rwa egy mar nga mwi zmb gha tun 
Unskilled 0.1 0.6 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Skilled 0.1 0.6 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
capital 0.3 3.6 3.8 1.5 0.5 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.4 
PAgr 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.3 0.3 0.0 0.4 
SAgr 0.5 2.6 -0.3 0.5 0.2 0.4 0.3 -0.1 -0.7 -0.3 0.3 0.3 
sugar 1.1 -3.7 0.8 -3.7 0.2 2.5 0.2 -0.1 4.1 -1.0 3.7 -0.2 
nat -0.1 0.3 0.1 -0.3 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.2 -0.1 -0.3 0.0 
tex 0.3 4.8 -5.1 14.1 2.4 0.1 0.2 -0.4 -1.8 -0.5 9.1 -0.5 
wap 0.1 0.0 -0.9 3.5 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 -1.2 0.1 -0.5 -0.2 
lea -0.1 5.1 -9.4 3.6 -0.8 0.1 -0.1 0.1 -0.9 -0.3 8.6 -0.3 
lum 0.1 2.9 -2.5 1.5 1.1 0.4 0.0 0.0 4.3 0.1 1.4 0.2 
ppp 0.5 1.2 -3.3 1.5 -1.7 0.8 0.6 -0.2 1.7 0.2 -0.6 0.2 
p_c 1.1 2.8 -3.3 -0.5 -0.6 0.1 0.1 0.0 -2.1 0.2 1.0 0.1 
crp 0.6 7.4 0.9 3.1 -0.6 0.7 0.1 0.2 -1.9 -0.1 4.8 1.2 
nmm 0.2 2.6 0.4 0.9 -1.6 0.3 0.0 0.5 3.3 -0.3 -0.2 0.3 
i_s 0.7 14.3 -1.5 1.4 2.0 0.3 0.2 0.2 -1.3 2.8 -0.5 1.3 
nfm -1.5 -1.5 7.6 0.0 0.3 -1.6 0.6 0.8 0.4 0.3 -4.1 -0.1 
fmp 0.9 10.7 -13.4 0.9 13.4 0.5 0.3 0.4 0.1 -0.5 -0.4 0.3 
mvh 0.4 25.6 -1.7 1.0 0.1 0.5 1.3 -0.1 1.9 1.7 5.5 0.1 
otn 10.0 0.4 1.1 -1.5 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.4 -1.5 -0.7 -0.2 -0.3 
ele 0.6 5.7 -1.4 3.1 0.2 0.5 0.0 -0.2 -0.5 -1.3 94.9 -0.4 
ome 0.8 18.6 -1.3 15.7 4.2 4.2 0.0 1.4 9.0 -0.2 1.5 0.0 
omf 0.2 0.2 3.8 2.7 0.2 0.4 0.1 -2.3 0.3 -0.7 59.9 0.3 
serv 0.3 2.3 2.1 0.9 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.2 
Source: GTAP output 
 
Table 6 shows some more technical outcomes relating to the simulation. In effect, it shows 
that the welfare changes mostly increase when expressed real GDP with, again, Kenya and 
Tanzania showing increases in real GDP of around two percentage points. These are 
significant gains and further highlight how NTBs are dragging these two countries in 
particular down. Further across the table the same EAC cells stand out for their increases in 
total factor income, with Kenya as the star. Again, recall that these returns from factor 
income (such as the standard land, labour and capital) are not the same as those shown in 
Table 5 above for labour in particular. Table 5 shows the changes in employment levels. The 
data shown below is the contribution that changes in the total wage bill make to total factor 
income. 
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Table 6: Changes in ToT, real GDP and total factor income along with contributions to 
factor income by % 
 
 Terms 
of 
 
Real 
Total 
factor 
  
Contributions from 
 
 trade GDP income land unskilled skilled capital resource 
zaf 0.18 0.24 0.51 0.01 0.12 0.16 0.23 -0.01 
bwa -0.02 0.04 0.06 -0.01 0.03 0.01 0.04 -0.01 
nam 0.05 0.03 0.14 0.07 0.03 0.01 0.04 -0.01 
xsc 0.36 0.69 1.23 0.12 0.30 0.28 0.59 -0.07 
ken 1.99 2.01 4.89 0.53 1.45 0.66 2.12 0.12 
tza -0.55 1.81 1.92 0.15 0.65 0.46 0.63 0.02 
uga 0.83 0.91 2.06 0.23 0.61 0.33 0.96 -0.06 
rwa -0.14 0.21 0.68 0.21 0.26 0.07 0.15 -0.02 
egy 0.05 0.18 0.32 0.02 0.05 0.08 0.16 0.00 
mar 0.03 0.09 0.12 -0.02 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.00 
xec -0.04 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
nga -0.02 0.09 0.03 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 
xac 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 
eth 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
mdg -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
mwi 0.95 0.49 1.79 0.74 0.43 0.29 0.38 -0.04 
mus -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 
moz -0.04 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 
zmb 0.34 0.20 0.91 0.19 0.29 0.20 0.25 -0.02 
zwe -0.09 -0.07 -0.06 0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.04 0.00 
gha 0.65 0.33 1.10 0.09 0.34 0.43 0.27 -0.04 
tun 0.10 0.25 0.51 0.09 0.13 0.10 0.20 0.00 
sen 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
RAfr 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Source: GTAP output 
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Chapter 7 
 
The African ‘willing’ countries’ results: 
tariff elimination and reduction in non-tariff 
barriers 
 
Summary and key points 
 
In Chapter 5 we simulated a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between selected ‘willing’ African 
countries1 only, whereby we eliminated all bilateral tariffs. In Chapter 6 we followed this up 
by reducing non-tariff barriers (NTBs) between these countries and these countries only by 
50%. In this chapter we combine both tariff elimination and NTB reduction between these 
selected countries. 
 
This is a second-best situation in that (a) the partial African integration of selected countries 
is an option only if the road to full integration appears to be irretrievably blocked and (b) 
many of the NTBs are Africa-wide issues. It does not make much sense to address NTBs 
within the context of an FTA made up of countries geographically so diverse. 
 
The results still point to a welfare gain to Africa but the FTA is not globally welfare- 
enhancing. This confirms that trade diversion and less-than-optimal resource reallocations 
taking place are globally suboptimal. Five points can be deduced from the results: 
• South Africa shows gains in almost all of our selected countries. 
• There is a concentration of gains in the Tanzania-Kenya conglomeration’s own and 
bilateral cells. 
• Changes to the Ghana-Nigeria trading relationship throw up some large gains. 
• Along the Mediterranean coastline the changes result in some interesting unilateral 
and bilateral gains. 
• Some geographically diverse bilateral partners such as Egypt and Nigeria show 
comfortable bilateral gains. 
 
Again, South Africa does particularly well from agricultural reforms across the continent, and 
especially from secondary agriculture and the sugar sector (Kenya and Uganda). Apart from 
this there are agricultural gains to Egypt, Morocco and Ghana but not to others. Several but 
not all countries gain in the textile, clothing and footwear (TCF) sector, while South Africa, 
as always, does well in the manufacturing sectors. 
 
All ‘willing’ partners increase both exports and imports, with some of these changes being 
significant – up to and even above 10% (Ghana, followed by Tanzania and Kenya). Changes 
to production largely reflect the sector contributions to welfare; and the demand for both 
skilled and unskilled labour in many of the countries increases although capital shows gains 
th 
 
 
1  
We assessed the five countries in the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), four in the East African 
Community (EAC), Malawi, Zambia and Egypt in the Tripartite FTA region, Nigeria and Ghana in west Africa 
and Morocco and Tunisia in north Africa as being the foundation members of what we call ‘an FTA of the 
willing’. 
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that are in general much more meaningful. Secondary agriculture and sugar are again well- 
performing sectors while there are few significant changes in the manufacturing sectors. 
Welfare changes mostly increase when expressed in real Gross Domestic Product (GDP), 
with Kenya and Tanzania doing especially well. The terms of trade (ToT) vary, with some 
improving and others declining, and these changes are up to 1% either way (Ghana’s 
increase of 2.4% is large). 
 
Introduction and background 
 
In Chapter 5 we simulated an FTA between selected ‘willing’ African countries only. 
According to this configuration we eliminated all bilateral tariffs. In Chapter 6 we followed 
this up by reducing NTBs between these countries, and these countries only, by 50%. In this 
chapter we combine both tariff elimination and NTB reduction between these selected 
countries. A background as to how we modelled the potential gains from NTB reductions 
along with our data sources is given in Chapter 3, while the results of the ‘willing’ 
simulations to date are given in Chapters 5 and 6 for the tariff elimination and NTB 
reductions. 
 
The five countries in the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), four in the East African 
Community(EAC)2, Malawi, Zambia and Egypt in the Tripartite FTA region, Nigeria and 
Ghana in west Africa, and Morocco and Tunisia in north Africa are our foundation members 
of what we call ‘an FTA of the willing’. Note that this grouping contains around 65% of total 
African GDP. The grouping contains Nigeria which has recently supplanted the African 
manufacturing giant South Africa as Africa’s leading economic power,3 and Egypt, the third 
most important African country by GDP. 
 
Again we stress that we are looking at a second-best situation in that (a) the partial African 
integration of selected countries is an option only if the road to full integration appears to be 
irretrievably blocked and (b) many of the NTBs are Africa-wide issues. It does not make 
much sense to address NTBs within the context of an FTA made up of countries 
geographically so diverse. Even under the best of circumstances an FTA is not the optimal 
vehicle for NTB reductions, but we argue that our results will at least emphasise the potential 
benefits that can be captured from a reduction in NTB costs. And, again, the background 
discussions and dataset analysis relating to the NTB part of this simulation were given in 
Chapter 3 and our tariff elimination scenario for the selected countries was presented in 
Chapter 5. Also, Chapter 4 reported on the simulation results from combining tariff 
elimination and an NTB reduction across the whole continent. We will not repeat these 
discussions here. 
 
Results 
 
Table 1 shows the changes in welfare from the selected groupings’ FTA, assuming the 
scenario of a 100% reduction in merchandise tariffs and a 50% reduction in NTBs. The data 
is expressed in US dollars (millions) as one-off increases in annual welfare at the assessed end 
 
 
2 
Unfortunately, we cannot include Burundi in this grouping as Burundi is aggregated into the rest of east Africa 
in GTAP. 
 
3 
We note that the GTAP version 9 database uses as its foundation the 2011 values, and the Nigerian GDP 
has been revised upwards since that date. This will have some follow-on effects on our results. 
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point of 2025. In the right-hand column we are able to isolate the welfare gains (by country) 
that result from efficiency gains flowing from the one half of NTB reduction that we 
modelled to represent efficiency gains (the other half was modelled as economic rents and the 
benefits became merged with the overall tariff elimination results). 
 
Despite our selected countries representing a second-best solution to Africa-wide integration 
Table 1 still points to a welfare gain to Africa of just over $12 billion. Note, however, that the 
selected FTA is not globally welfare-enhancing; this confirms that the trade diversion and 
less-than-optimal resource reallocations that take place are globally suboptimal. 
 
By country, South Africa is again the big gainer from this simulation, followed by Kenya, 
Ghana and Egypt. An indication of the impact that NTBs may have on the combined outcome 
can be gleaned from Table 1 in Chapter 3 where the NTB barriers that we are using are given. 
Here the barriers in South Africa are very low, while those in Kenya are very high for 
agriculture and agriculture only, and those in Tanzania are extremely high for both. Chapter 6 
showed that large NTB gains for Kenya and Tanzania were concentrated in their unilateral 
and bilateral liberalisations, so it is natural that these effects will show up again in the form of 
significant gains in the combined simulation for these two countries in particular. As 
expected, all countries outside our selected group lose, albeit sometimes marginally and, in 
addition, note that a large share of the overall welfare gains results from capital market 
readjustments (for Kenya in particular). 
 
Perhaps a different country aggregation may lead to better overall results. But even by 
combining tariff eliminations and NTB reductions we still do not have a strong economic 
case to make for an FTA integration based upon these selected countries only. Such a case 
could only be made as a second-best argument if progress towards full African integration 
seems to be irretrievably lost. However, further analysis using a wider set of countries and 
only excluding some patently failed states may well retrieve our policy position of a step-by- 
step approach based upon the EU history of gradual integration. Therefore possible pointers 
would be to use a significantly different negotiating process than the proposed full 
integration. An approach of gradually extending from a selected base may be an option 
should political recalcitrant members block African progress. It is this negotiating process 
that may hold some appeal. Just perhaps. 
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Table 1: ‘Willing’ countries, tariff elimination & NTB reduction, welfare gains at 2025, 
$ (millions) 
 
  
Total 
 
Efficiency 
 
Labour 
 
Capital 
 
ToT 
NTB 
efficiency 
Total Africa 12,183 2,175 1,222 5,880 1,686 1,220 
South Africa 4,394 1,101 706 1,747 832 9 
Botswana 5 2 3 4 -7 3 
Namibia 18 1 2 -1 12 3 
Swazi-Lesotho 152 26 26 75 23 2 
Kenya 2,149 361 152 1,386 192 58 
Tanzania 885 28 54 601 -314 515 
Uganda 379 100 21 212 41 5 
Rwanda 40 11 1 22 -2 7 
Malawi 114 21 6 30 32 25 
Zambia 121 9 23 36 46 6 
Egypt 1,082 114 70 587 174 137 
Nigeria 900 -73 25 675 -48 322 
Ghana 1,607 475 94 395 625 18 
Morocco 289 27 25 98 74 65 
Tunisia 278 42 20 126 44 45 
Rest east Africa -7 -1 0 -4 -3 0 
Angola-DRC -54 -16 -2 -39 2 0 
Ethiopia -4 0 0 -3 0 0 
Madagascar -6 -1 0 -3 -2 0 
Mauritius -13 -2 0 -6 -4 0 
Mozambique -30 -1 0 -15 -14 0 
Zimbabwe -64 -19 -1 -20 -24 0 
Senegal -4 -1 0 -2 0 0 
Rest of Africa -46 -28 -3 -21 6 0 
EU -1,973 -553 -70 -1,066 -285 0 
UK -299 -107 -17 -102 -73 0 
US -1,095 -228 -123 -533 -211 0 
China -2,705 -343 -110 -1,655 -598 0 
India -1,447 -334 -26 -735 -352 0 
Brazil -298 -77 -20 -188 -13 0 
Russia -33 5 -2 -110 75 0 
Rest of world -4,965 -1,184 -221 -3,317 -243 0 
Total world -632 -646 634 -1,827 -14 1,220 
Source: GTAP output 
 
In Table 2 we highlight from where the main bilateral gains derive for the major African 
countries as measured by the welfare gains in Table 1. The data is shown in a matrix of the 
full range of countries in the rows but only selected countries in the columns. Four points 
should be made. One is that South Africa makes gains in almost all our selected countries 
(except within SACU, and that includes South Africa’s own liberalisation). The second is 
that there is a concentration of gains in the Tanzania-Kenya configuration’s own  and 
bilateral cells except that Tanzanian gains into Kenya are non-existent (this would result 
from the  Table  1  data  in  Chapter  3  that  shows  that  Kenyan  NTBs  are  concentrated in 
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agriculture and therefore gains will be in those sectors only). The third is that changes to the 
Ghana-Nigeria trading relationships throw up some large gains. The fourth shows that 
changes along the Mediterranean coastline result in some interesting unilateral and bilateral 
gains. Perhaps a fifth point could be that some geographically diverse bilateral partners such 
as Egypt and Nigeria show comfortable bilateral gains. 
 
Table 2: Contribution to welfare by country, $ (millions) 
 
 zaf xsc ken tza uga egy mar nga mwi zmb gha tun 
zaf -48 0 65 -1 15 141 36 18 4 2 3 29 
bwa 4 0 2 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 
nam 9 0 1 0 0 2 0 1 0 1 0 0 
xsc 3 3 1 0 0 3 1 1 1 0 0 0 
ken 792 25 565 0 14 -58 6 26 -4 -2 0 1 
tza 1,624 69 1,073 811 221 194 9 99 78 42 14 0 
uga 153 6 -34 -2 107 -10 3 7 -2 -2 1 1 
rwa 27 0 6 0 10 0 0 0 0 -1 0 10 
egy 169 1 324 28 2 108 39 75 17 78 9 60 
mar 23 0 9 1 1 153 -55 65 0 0 15 80 
nga 1,058 47 92 9 1 303 130 53 0 -3 1,656 56 
mwi 193 1 -15 37 0 1 0 6 19 -2 0 1 
zmb 50 0 4 0 0 0 0 5 0 10 1 0 
gha 314 0 38 2 1 89 51 513 0 -1 -100 8 
tun 24 0 17 1 7 158 68 29 1 0 8 30 
Total 4,394 152 2,149 885 379 1,082 289 900 114 121 1,607 278 
Source: GTAP output 
 
Table 3 shows the matrix of GTAP sectors in the rows and contributions that changes in 
each of these sectors make in the cells for the major African countries. Again, South Africa 
does particularly well from agricultural reforms across the continent, and especially from 
secondary agriculture. Sugar has been listed as a separate sector in this analysis. This is due 
to the fact that outcomes from earlier tralac research show that South Africa is doing very 
well in this sector, especially with better access into Kenya and, to a lesser degree, Uganda. 
A powerful policy statement is that the heavily protected and highly inefficient sugar sector 
in Kenya is a drag upon the economy. But we fully appreciate the political pressure if not the 
economic logic to maintain that protection. We would have expected the Swaziland-Lesotho 
aggregation to do well in increased sugar opportunities but this is not the case as South 
Africa dominates their $13 million contribution from sugar. Our arguments for reform in 
Kenyan sugar policies are reinforced as Kenya makes significant unilateral gains in the sugar 
sector; this is because both reduce their sugar production significantly as shown in Table 5. 
This enables them to transfer resources out of a sector which has been heavily protected but 
which is technically inefficient. This is a classic example of how regional integration can 
benefit a country through efficiency gains, as the overall welfare results for Kenya and, to a 
lesser extent Uganda, clearly show that reforming the sugar sector is beneficial to them. 
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Outside South Africa or the sugar sector in Kenya and Uganda, there are agricultural gains to 
Egypt, Morocco and Ghana but not to others. Several but not all countries gain in TCF, 
while South Africa, as always, does well in the manufacturing sectors. Gains in the important 
motor vehicle (mvh) sector are muted outside South Africa. 
 
Table 3: Contribution to welfare by commodity, $ (millions) 
 
 zaf xsc ken tza uga egy mar nga mwi zmb gha tun 
PAgr 230 3 234 42 32 82 3 36 63 10 172 31 
SAgr 663 15 277 8 5 105 131 -49 4 -3 130 39 
sugar 555 13 653 -73 96 -10 -1 8 31 -4 -1 -2 
nat 5 0 2 2 0 1 1 13 2 0 4 0 
tex 131 1 131 7 40 69 9 -13 -5 0 143 20 
wap 7 1 19 -25 3 148 20 -16 -2 -1 -3 15 
lea 47 0 111 -17 39 1 -6 165 -2 -1 112 8 
lum 46 0 13 10 0 13 1 7 -1 0 17 4 
ppp 199 0 -6 81 3 45 35 -2 -5 -1 4 10 
p_c 104 0 6 106 2 3 2 19 11 2 6 2 
crp 525 110 256 114 34 119 22 99 9 4 353 59 
nmm 33 0 44 -2 2 65 0 30 4 -1 3 12 
i_s 216 1 36 75 6 32 4 32 -1 1 14 10 
nfm 82 0 19 102 2 119 15 68 -1 91 70 5 
fmp 247 0 46 18 1 117 10 26 -5 0 25 12 
mvh 376 1 44 110 18 13 15 53 2 5 4 10 
otn 123 0 2 24 2 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
ele 108 1 94 23 7 15 1 117 0 0 56 4 
ome 602 5 163 285 86 144 11 357 8 14 330 35 
omf 95 1 6 -5 1 2 16 -50 2 6 169 4 
Total 4,394 152 2,149 885 379 1,082 289 900 114 121 1,607 278 
Source: GTAP output 
 
Table 4 turns to the expected changes in aggregate trade as measured by the percentage 
changes in the quantity of both exports and imports and changes to the overall trade balance 
as measured in dollars (millions). Again, the trade balance is a macroeconomic closure in the 
GTAP model that is heavily influenced by the difference on one side of an equation that 
measures savings and investment which has to balance with exports minus imports on the 
other side of the classic macroeconomic equation. It is therefore not a trade balance as could 
be expected as it reflects changes in investment (capital) rather than actual changes in trade 
values. The ToT as shown in Table 1 reflect the changes in the relative prices of exports and 
imports while the export and import changes shown here are a combination of changes to 
both prices and volumes. 
 
All ‘willing’ partners increase both exports and imports, with some of these changes being 
significant– up to and even above 10% (Ghana, followed by Tanzania and Kenya). 
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Table 4: Percentage changes in trade for the partners 
 
  
Exports % 
 
Imports % 
Balance $ 
(millions) 
South Africa 2.0 2.6 -15 
Botswana 0.2 0.3 6 
Namibia 0.1 0.4 10 
Swazi-Lesotho 3.7 5.6 37 
Kenya 7.9 7.3 -758 
Tanzania 9.2 7.6 -528 
Uganda 3.1 3.9 -59 
Rwanda 1.7 1.6 -3 
Egypt 1.0 1.0 -224 
Morocco 1.0 0.8 -107 
Rest of east Africa 0.0 0.0 3 
Nigeria 1.4 1.6 -148 
Angola-DRC -0.1 -0.1 2 
Ethiopia 0.0 0.0 1 
Madagascar -0.1 -0.1 0 
Malawi 5.1 5.5 -12 
Mauritius -0.1 -0.1 3 
Mozambique -0.2 -0.3 4 
Zambia 0.5 0.7 79 
Zimbabwe -0.4 -0.6 16 
Ghana 12.8 10.9 -704 
Tunisia 1.1 1.1 -33 
Senegal 0.0 0.0 1 
Rest of Africa 0.0 0.0 16 
Source: GTAP output 
 
Changes to production in the partner countries are shown in Table 5 (again expressed as 
changes from the non-FTA base) and, as expected, these changes largely reflect the sector 
contributions to welfare changes as shown in Table 3. Although the demand for both skilled 
and unskilled labour in many of the countries increases, capital shows gains that are in 
general much more meaningful. Secondary agriculture and sugar are again well-performing 
sectors across the partial FTA, with the sugar-sector production increases in South Africa 
and declines in Kenya and Uganda again featuring. There are few changes in the 
manufacturing sectors that really stand out, although the TCF sectors show both gainers and 
losers that point to some resource reallocations following liberalisation. 
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Table 5: Increases in factors of production & actual production, % 
 
 zaf xsc ken tza uga egy mar nga mwi zmb gha tun 
Unskilled 0.4 1.0 0.5 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.1 
Skilled 0.4 1.0 0.6 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.1 
capital 1.1 3.0 5.5 5.1 2.1 0.5 0.3 0.6 1.3 0.4 3.0 0.6 
Resource 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
PAgr 0.1 1.0 0.9 0.0 0.8 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.5 0.6 -0.1 0.4 
SAgr 2.0 3.8 4.5 -1.1 0.3 0.5 0.9 -0.3 -1.7 -0.6 0.5 0.4 
sugar 26.0 6.4 -36.8 -60.6 -31.8 0.1 0.2 0.2 29.6 -2.6 15.9 -0.3 
nat -0.3 -0.5 0.4 0.3 -0.2 0.0 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -1.1 0.0 
tex 2.0 -5.7 7.5 -1.8 11.4 0.2 0.1 -0.9 -4.8 -0.7 54.6 0.0 
wap 0.4 -7.5 1.9 -2.5 0.9 0.6 0.2 -0.4 -1.9 -0.2 -2.3 0.2 
lea 0.9 -3.5 16.2 -10.2 5.2 0.0 -0.7 6.5 -9.4 -1.4 22.7 -0.2 
lum 1.5 0.5 3.3 -5.2 1.1 0.6 0.0 0.0 3.2 0.2 4.1 0.4 
ppp 2.3 1.6 -0.6 -11.0 -1.4 1.4 1.5 0.0 -0.1 0.1 -6.0 0.5 
p_c 2.1 4.7 4.2 -4.3 0.5 0.2 0.2 0.2 -5.5 -1.4 3.6 0.3 
crp 1.4 41.8 11.3 4.0 4.1 1.1 0.0 2.7 0.8 1.2 23.0 1.4 
nmm 0.9 2.8 3.8 1.2 1.3 0.6 0.0 9.3 20.5 -1.7 -2.3 2.6 
i_s 1.1 -0.1 14.1 0.9 2.6 0.6 -0.1 3.4 -7.9 4.4 -1.8 1.3 
nfm -4.8 -1.6 2.5 13.6 1.6 -2.1 0.2 4.7 0.9 0.1 -15.4 0.0 
fmp 3.0 0.9 10.2 -20.3 0.2 1.3 0.3 2.0 -2.1 1.2 -2.3 0.5 
mvh 1.5 1.2 24.1 -1.7 1.0 0.8 1.2 -0.1 1.4 0.9 18.9 0.2 
otn 10.7 -3.2 2.4 4.5 -0.5 0.7 -0.2 1.4 1.6 -0.6 -10.1 -0.5 
ele 1.3 -2.3 8.8 0.2 4.4 0.6 -0.2 -1.5 1.1 -1.4 large -0.4 
ome 1.1 0.0 18.6 1.5 16.2 7.1 -0.3 2.6 12.2 0.7 9.1 0.1 
omf 0.7 -3.5 2.3 4.5 2.3 0.6 1.0 -10.4 39.4 6.1 large 1.3 
serv 0.9 1.9 3.6 2.7 1.3 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.7 0.2 1.6 0.3 
Source: GTAP output 
 
Table 6 shows some more technical outcomes relating to the simulation. In effect, it illustrates 
that the welfare changes are mostly increasing when expressed in real GDP, with Kenya 
and Tanzania doing especially well. The ToT for the partner countries vary, with some 
improving and others declining: these changes are up to 1% either way (with Ghana standing 
out with an increase of 2.41%). The returns from factor income such as the standard land, 
labour and capital improve for all the member partners, with some of these increases (Kenya 
and Ghana) being noteworthy. Similarly, there are some worthwhile contributions from 
skilled and unskilled labour (Kenya and Ghana). Again, we emphasise that these changes are 
not the same as those shown in Table 5 above which are the changes in employment levels. 
All partner countries attract more capital, although the contribution to some is minimal 
(Nigeria, Botswana and Namibia, for example). 
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Table 6: Changes in ToT, real GDP and total factor income along with contributions to 
factor income by % 
 
 Terms 
of 
 
Real 
 
Total factor 
  
Contributions from 
 
 trade GDP income land unskilled skilled capital resource 
zaf 0.63 0.78 1.69 0.08 0.40 0.51 0.75 -0.04 
bwa -0.07 0.05 0.15 0.00 0.06 0.03 0.09 -0.02 
nam 0.18 0.03 0.30 0.09 0.06 0.02 0.07 0.06 
xsc 1.12 1.98 3.71 0.40 0.88 0.82 1.79 -0.19 
ken 0.86 2.96 5.03 0.28 1.42 0.73 2.47 0.14 
 
tza 
 
-1.11 
 
2.12 
 
1.89 
- 
0.05 
 
0.63 
 
0.51 
 
0.75 
 
0.04 
uga 0.68 1.22 2.10 0.26 0.58 0.31 0.98 -0.04 
rwa -0.06 0.28 0.53 0.17 0.20 0.05 0.11 0.00 
egy 0.16 0.28 0.58 0.01 0.10 0.16 0.30 0.00 
 
mar 
 
0.12 
 
0.15 
 
0.32 
- 
0.01 
 
0.11 
 
0.11 
 
0.12 
 
-0.01 
xec -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
nga 
 
-0.09 
 
0.17 
 
0.07 
- 
0.03 
 
-0.01 
 
0.03 
 
0.04 
 
0.04 
xac 0.00 -0.03 -0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 0.01 
eth 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
mdg 
 
-0.06 
 
-0.02 
 
-0.08 
- 
0.02 
 
-0.03 
 
-0.01 
 
-0.02 
 
0.01 
mwi 0.99 0.85 2.70 1.14 0.62 0.40 0.55 -0.01 
mus -0.04 -0.04 -0.05 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03 0.00 
moz -0.11 -0.06 -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.02 0.00 
zmb 0.34 0.23 1.16 0.32 0.35 0.23 0.28 -0.02 
zwe -0.24 -0.24 -0.21 0.04 -0.07 -0.06 -0.12 0.01 
gha 2.41 1.41 4.59 0.33 1.41 1.81 1.20 -0.16 
tun 0.14 0.34 0.69 0.08 0.17 0.14 0.29 0.00 
sen 0.00 -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 
Rafr 0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 
Source: GTAP output 
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Chapter 8 
 
Reduction in the time costs of transit 
 
Summary and key points 
 
In this chapter we examine trade facilitation by addressing the trade facilitation or 
infrastructural costs as outlined earlier. Overall trade costs were divided into the three 
categories of (1) trade facilitation; (2) non-tariff barriers (NTBs); and (3) the costs of 
business services. Trade facilitation addresses costs such as delays at border crossings, 
roadblocks for trucks, and the necessity to pay bribes. In Chapter 3 we kept tariffs as they 
were but instead reduced NTBs by 50%. We emphasise that this chapter examines a 
distinctly different set of trade barriers. The gains from each may well be additive. 
 
African countries are well aware of these problems. Trade facilitation was the main outcome 
from the 2013 Bali World Trade Organisation (WTO) Ministerial Conference with an 
agreement to streamline customs procedures and minimise delays at borders, with Africa 
expected to be the main beneficiary. Minor (2013) developed a database of per day ad 
valorem costs to use in the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP), with these estimates 
providing ad valorem equivalents of the per day costs along with the number of days 
involved. In implementing the GTAP model we use the Singapore international best-practice 
benchmark of four days for imports and assess a reduction of 20% in the days over and above 
this benchmark for imports only: this is to avoid possible double counting. 
 
The data reinforces that transit delays and subsequent costs are largely an African issue. In 
taking a calculation of a 20% reduction in these costs we believe that our approach is 
conservative. There is still plenty of ‘slack’ in the African system, although there are 
countries in Africa that are very close to international benchmarks, thus proving that Africa 
has the potential to improve. 
 
The welfare gains to Africa are substantial. For South Africa, they are some $8,519 billion in 
real terms and, as is usually the case, this is the most significant result for both Africa and the 
total worldwide gain of $31,231 billion. Following close behind are the very large gains to 
Nigeria and the rest of Africa aggregation. In direct contrast to our tariff elimination scenarios 
there are gains to many of the large economies outside Africa: this is the result of their 
export prices rising in response to more efficient transit times in Africa. 
 
The striking feature taken from the results is that almost all of the gains to each country 
overwhelmingly accrue to that same country. This may in part be a function of the way in 
which we have modelled our reductions; this is because we only addressed changes in import 
times in transit whereby the benefits accrue to the importer. Notwithstanding these 
technical issues the facts remain that (a) these gains are substantial, (b) they mostly accrue to 
the liberaliser and (c) in only taking 20% of the costs of time over and above an international 
benchmark we are leaving plenty of room for improvement in most African countries. And 
the gains in welfare, although concentrated in Africa, are global in nature. 
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Introduction 
 
We used as our base scenario the simulation whereby we reduced all tariff between all 
African countries to zero. In Chapter 3 we kept tariffs as they were but instead reduced NTBs 
by 50%. In this chapter we extend our analysis to examine the issue of trade facilitation. 
Specifically, we address in isolation trade facilitation or infrastructural costs as outlined in 
Chapter 3. There we reported that Balistreri et al. (2014) advised that they decomposed trade 
costs into three categories: costs that can be lowered by (1) trade facilitation; (2) non-tariff 
barriers; and (3) the costs of business services. Trade facilitation addresses costs such as 
delays at border crossings, roadblocks for trucks, and the necessity to pay bribes. It is this 
aspect of trade costs that we are concentrating on in this chapter. The reference point for our 
data is Minor (2013), who in turn draws from Hummels and Schaur (2013) for his data. 
 
African countries are well aware of the problems,1 and indeed South Africa’s Adan 
Mohamed2 recently stated: ‘Inefficiency in most African seaports is to blame for the lacklustre 
economic performance of such countries’. He cited capacity constraints, undeveloped skills 
and security concerns as some of the impediments to development. Mohamed added that 
interagency collaboration at national levels as well as enhanced cross-border and subregional 
cooperation could lead to sustainable development and competitiveness. ‘The cost of doing 
business in Africa is directly determined by the state of infrastructure. Transport-system 
interconnectivity on the continent is still poor and this cannot improve unless governments 
integrate it in their investment plans,’ he added. 
 
Trade facilitation has been on the WTO agenda since 2004. The main outcome from the 2013 
Bali WTO Ministerial Conference was an agreement for trade facilitation measures to 
streamline customs procedures and to minimise delays at borders. Objectives included 
creating more transparency in import and exports transit traffic (Shayanowako, 2014). The 
Organisation for Economic and Cooperation Development (OECD)3 assesses the potential 
benefits of this package. This is done with the ‘limited’ implementation scenario that assumes 
that countries that are already implementing best practices will continue doing so, but that 
others will not (where implementation is discretionary and showing significant potential 
benefits). This package is, however, not without controversy: the African countries argue that 
this package lacks balance and is tilted heavily in favour of an agreement forced on the poor 
nations by the industrialised countries. Many developing countries, including the African 
countries, see the package as aimed at opening their markets to goods through enhanced 
merchandise access. They believe that, conversely, there is little to gain for developing- 
country exports to the developed world whose infrastructure is generally excellent. African 
countries have recently adopted it ‘provisionally’ – a move that has disconcerted the 
developed countries. 
 
Politics aside, there is no question that African countries have a problem with infrastructural 
delays and associated costs. Minor (2013), on whose research this chapter is based, 
emphasises 
 
 
1 
See United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (2013). 
 
2 
Industrialisation and Enterprise Development Cabinet Secretary, 18 Nov 2014. 
3 
See website: 
http://www.oecd.org/trade/tradedev/OECD_TAD_WTO_trade_facilitation_agreement_potential_impact_trade 
_costs_february_2014.pdf. 
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emphasises that although constraints such as tariffs, subsidies and quotas limit access, they 
are no longer assumed to be the most significant impediment to international goods trade. 
Rather, regulations and procedures such as customs administration, inspections, trade 
financing, security issues and infrastructure (including ports and roads that cause delays in 
shipping) are now greater trade barriers to goods trade. Many of these outcomes directly 
depend upon on ‘good governance’ (or the lack thereof) in areas such as the efficiency and 
transparency of processes, contract enforcement and administration. This reinforces the fact 
that the system can contain hidden costs that may be direct and/or indirect. Direct costs 
include bribes and unofficial fees, while indirect costs include time delays and uncertainties 
in delivery resulting from poor administration and infrastructure. 
 
Tafirenyika (2014) sums up this problem by stating that ‘among Africa’s policy wonks4, 
underperforming trade across the continent is a favoured subject. To unravel the puzzle, they 
reel off facts and figures at conferences and workshops, pinpoint trade hurdles to overcome 
and point to the vast opportunities that lie ahead if only African countries could integrate their 
economies. It’s an interesting debate but with little to show for it until now. The problem is 
partly the mismatch between the high political ambitions African leaders hold and the harsh 
economic realities they face’. 
 
Mwanza (2014) seems more hopeful when he writes about the launching of the Global 
Infrastructure Initiative by the World Bank and about the agreement between the US and 
India to resolve the standoff on the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement. The Global 
Infrastructure Initiative seeks to unlock additional infrastructure financing for developing 
countries. Activities include the creation of a knowledge-sharing network on infrastructure 
projects and building the capacity of officials to improve institutional arrangements. This 
presents an important opportunity for African countries: for many of these projects it is 
important to ‘meet at the border’ to ensure effective development of projects on a regional 
basis. The Global Infrastructure Initiative’s primary focus will be on investment in hard 
infrastructure, while soft infrastructure such as simplification and harmonisation of customs 
and border procedures is primarily the focus of the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement. 
 
The data 
 
Minor (2013) provides a database of per day ad valorem costs to use in GTAP. These 
estimates are provided in ad valorem equivalents of the per day costs along with the number 
of days involved. These days include the number of days required for documentation 
handling, inland transport, customs clearance and technical control, and port and terminal 
handling. The days include both exports and imports. Obviously, trade costs cannot decline to 
zero, and in implementing the GTAP model we use the Singapore international best-practice 
benchmark of four days for imports. 
 
A snapshot of the days estimated by Minor (2013) that we use is shown in Table 1 for 
imports by country/region. This data, along with the time costs per day by commodity and 
country/region that we add later is the driving mechanism here. We use an estimate of 20% 
reduction in time over and above our benchmark of four days for imports; this is because 
costs cannot go below our global best-practice benchmark (Singapore). Thus, for example, 
South Africa has a total of 18 days, of which four involve customs and related processes, 11 
in 
 
 
4 
Slang term for policy analysts. 
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involve the terminal, and three involve inland transportation. Botswana has another eight 
days, with seven of these inland and one extra for customs. Further down the list there is 
great variation. Nigeria, for example, needs 12 days in customs, while the landlocked 
countries of Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe need 13 or 14 days in customs. Conversely, 
there are some bright spots, with Mauritius, Egypt and Morocco close to international best 
practice. The column headed 20% indicates how much improvement in transit times we are 
making for imports into each African country, while the right-hand side shows there is still 
room for improvement! Note how consistently close to best practice many, but not all, of the 
non-African entries in the lower part of the table are. This reinforces that transit delays and 
subsequent costs are largely an African issue. 
 
Table 1: Time in transit data in import days 
 
Customs Terminal Inland Total Extra 20% New 
South Africa 4 11 3 18 14 2.8 15.2 
Botswana 5 11 10 26 22 4.4 21.6 
Namibia 4 3 3 10 6 1.2 8.8 
Swazi-Lesotho 4 11 5 19 15 3.0 16.0 
Kenya 3 6 4 13 9 1.8 11.2 
Tanzania 5 10 1 16 12 2.4 13.6 
Uganda 7 6 8 21 17 3.4 17.6 
Rwanda 4 10 8 22 18 3.6 18.4 
Egypt 1 2 2 5 1 0.2 4.8 
Morocco 2 2 2 6 2 0.4 5.6 
Rest of east Africa 9 7 4 20 16 3.2 16.8 
Nigeria 12 5 3 20 16 3.2 16.8 
Angola-DRC 8 10 3 20 16 3.2 16.8 
Ethiopia 5 3 7 15 11 2.2 12.8 
Madagascar 3 2 2 7 3 0.6 6.4 
Malawi 3 9 14 26 22 4.4 21.6 
Mauritius 2 2 1 5 1 0.2 4.8 
Mozambique 3 5 2 10 6 1.2 8.8 
Zambia 6 11 13 30 26 5.2 24.8 
Zimbabwe 6 11 14 31 27 5.4 25.6 
Ghana 5 4 3 12 8 1.6 10.4 
Tunisia 3 3 2 8 4 0.8 7.2 
Senegal 3 3 2 8 4 0.8 7.2 
Rest of Africa 7 6 4 17 13 2.6 14.4 
EU 1 2 2 5    
UK 1 2 2 5    
US 1 1 1 3    
China 4 3 2 9    
India 4 5 3 12    
Brazil 4 3 2 9    
Russia 4 2 5 11    
Rest of world 2 2 2 7    
Source: Balistreri et al. (2014a: 90-92) 
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In our analysis we use only the data for imports into African countries. The reason for this is 
that there may be a danger of double-counting gains by using both days in transit to import 
and days in transit to export. We consider it best practice to examine the gains from 
infrastructural improvements to imports. In addition, there is the question as to which country 
the gains accrue to: we consider that using imports is the best method of ensuring that they 
accrue to those countries making the changes. Although we are only adjusting handling and 
transit times in Africa for imports, there will still be some gains to countries outside Africa. 
This is because their costs of exporting are effectively lowered. In contrast to a tariff 
reduction scenario whereby those outside the FTA almost invariably lose5 we would anticipate 
that there will be gains to all, albeit with those gains outside Africa being modest. 
 
We acknowledge that what we are using may be a lower-bound estimate and that we are only 
looking at part of the equation. However, we consider that our approach is consistent with 
economic theory that generally argues for gains of liberalisation accruing to the liberalising 
country. Technically, we are modelling these gains as efficiency gains to the importing 
country and therefore the benefits will show up directly in the results as technical efficiency 
gains in the welfare decomposition. In addition, the second-round effects of changes in terms 
of trade (ToT), allocative efficiency and change in capital and employment will be shown. 
 
Examining the work of Minor (2013) we find that the time allocated to trade costs reflects the 
willingness of the importer to pay for a product delivered earlier. In a personal 
communication with Minor he reaffirmed that in his experience with GTAP most of the 
welfare changes showed up on the importing side in any case. The GTAP model that we are 
running has perfect competition, and perhaps a more advanced model incorporating 
heterogeneity or monopolistic competition would enable a more elegant distribution of the 
gains to be split between exporters and importers. Meanwhile, we will use imports only, 
confident that we have avoided double counting by not introducing time in transit for exports 
into our simulation and that most of the benefits flow to importers in ‘the real world’ as we 
have modelled it. 
 
Balistreri et al. (2014a) discuss how the data was derived. It starts from a comprehensive data 
base from Hummels and Schaur’s (2013) estimation of the ad valorem cost of one day saved 
in transit for over 600 HS4 products. There is significant variation in these costs from zero 
for products (such as crude oil and coal) to much higher values in perishable commodities 
(such as fruit and vegetables). The HS products are then aggregated into the GTAP sectors by 
country, with statistical adjustments made for missing variables. Minor then combines this 
data with the World Bank’s Doing Business data set for 2012 showing the numbers of days to 
import and maps this data to the GTAP sectors by country. 
 
The result of these calculations generates a tariff equivalent of import barriers to trade. Thus, 
even though the time in transit is the same for each importer the ad valorem equivalents by 
GTAP sector are not; this is so because the ad valorem cost of one day differs by commodity. 
At one extreme one would perhaps find iron ore or coal (where costs of a delay are usually 
insignificant) while at the other extreme one would perhaps find fresh fruit and vegetables or 
manufacturing (such as parts for vehicles) that operate on just-in-time assembly processes. 
 
 
 
 
5 
But not Russia in our FTA simulation. 
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Given this degree of sophistication in the data set and our relatively conservative estimates of 
a 20% reduction in transit times over and above international best practices for imports only, 
we consider that our output values should be realistic. 
 
The results 
 
Table 2 shows the changes in welfare from the FTAs assuming the scenario of 20% 
reductions in transit times. The data is expressed in US dollars (millions) as one-off increases 
in annual welfare at the assessed end point of 2025. This data is presented for all the 
countries/regions used in the model. What is shown is firstly the total gains and secondly the 
four components (allocative efficiency, labour, capital and ToT) discussed in Chapter 1. We 
have also included in Table 2 the column headed 20% (from Table 1 above) that indicates 
how much improvement in transit times we are making for imports into each African country 
to put the relative size of the time in transit reductions in perspective. The right-hand side of 
Table 1 shows there is still room for improvement in many countries! 
 
Overall gains to Africa are valued at some $30.5 billion, a substantial figure. For South 
Africa, these gains are some $8,519 billion in real terms, and, as is usually the case, this is the 
most significant result for both Africa and the total world-wide gain of $31,231 billion. These 
gains for South Africa derive from increased investment which expands the capital stock 
($4,193million), allocative efficiency gains of $1,546million (as resources are better 
employed in the economy), gains from increased labour employment ($433million), but a 
terms of trade loss of $-533million resulting from an unfavourable change in relative prices 
between South African exports and imports. Following close behind South Africa are the very 
large gains to Nigeria of $5,112 million and the rest of Africa aggregation ($6,330million). 
All African countries gain, and only Brazil, Russia and the rest of the world outside Africa 
lose. It is important that here Zimbabwe gains almost one billion dollars from a reduction in 
transit times, and we would point out that much, but not all, of these transit costs are under 
Zimbabwe’s own control. 
 
Also note that in direct contrast to our tariff elimination scenarios there are gains to many of 
the large economies outside Africa. These gains are concentrated in ToT as their export prices 
rise in response to more efficient transit times in Africa. This shows that our generalisation 
below – that the African gains were almost all in the diagonal cells – is not strictly the 
case. Exporters do gain. On the right-hand side we have isolated the direct gains from 
import efficiency, and it can be seen that these are substantial. 
 
We have included the 20% reduction in days from Table 1 to allow an insight into the transit- 
efficient economies as represented by the low (that is under 1.0 days) values and, conversely, 
the high values indicate that there is still plenty of ‘slack’ in the system to be closer to the 
benchmarked four-day level. Those countries with low welfare gains as reported in column 3 
are generally associated with efficient transit times; this is indicated by column 2 that shows 
how close they are to international benchmarks. These economies are those of Egypt, 
Morocco, Madagascar, Mauritius, Tunisia and Senegal. Conversely, those economies with 
values of 4.0 or more have very costly transit times, as fully outlined in Table 1. This is true 
in particular of the landlocked countries (Botswana, Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe) that 
rely upon others for part of their transit delays. Overall, the message here is that even with a 
20% reduction the gains are larger than tariff elimination, and in many instances the 
remaining days shown in Table 1 are still 80% over and above international best practice. 
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This indicates that there are still significant gains ‘left on the table’ in the sense that there are 
more significant potential gains in many instances. 
 
Table 2: Welfare gains from reduction in transit time, $ (millions) 
 
 
20% Total Efficiency Labour Capital ToT 
Import 
efficiency 
Total Africa  30,507 4,678 1,206 10,494 -1,346 15,475 
South Africa 2.8 8,519 1,546 433 4,193 -533 2,880 
Botswana 4.4 376 29 13 172 29 134 
Namibia 1.2 173 9 7 102 8 47 
Swazi- 
Lesotho 
3.0 64 6 2 26 0 30 
Kenya 1.8 1,122 106 57 501 23 435 
Tanzania 2.4 880 171 36 228 -41 487 
Uganda 3.4 553 61 14 295 -16 200 
Rwanda 3.6 141 22 1 49 -6 74 
Egypt 0.2 81 16 8 28 30 0 
Morocco 0.4 25 2 2 7 15 0 
Rest of east 
Africa 
3.2 785 54 -10 143 -132 731 
Nigeria 3.2 5,112 473 293 1,179 -155 3,321 
Angola-DRC 3.2 2,331 251 -3 802 119 1,161 
Ethiopia 2.2 620 105 39 230 -58 304 
Madagascar 0.6 38 4 1 10 -2 26 
Malawi 4.4 213 19 5 52 10 127 
Mauritius 0.2 59 7 2 30 1 19 
Mozambique 1.2 371 34 32 169 -14 150 
Zambia 5.2 848 29 81 291 -102 549 
Zimbabwe 5.4 921 163 12 375 -128 499 
Ghana 1.6 634 86 11 158 -39 417 
Tunisia 0.8 49 12 4 16 17 0 
Senegal 0.8 261 55 6 129 -15 85 
Rest of Africa 2.6 6,330 1,418 160 1,309 -356 3,799 
EU  655 2 -5 47 611 0 
UK  197 29 1 61 106 0 
US  116 -59 -59 -57 290 0 
China  506 -21 6 68 452 0 
India  607 43 6 314 243 0 
Brazil  -4 -10 -1 -23 29 0 
Russia  -571 -123 -11 -222 -215 0 
Rest of world  -780 -152 -48 -407 -174 0 
Total world  31,231 4,388 1,096 10,276 -3 15,475 
Source: GTAP output 
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The unilateral and bilateral gains and losses 
 
In Table 3 we highlight the sources of the main bilateral gains for the major African 
countries as measured by the welfare gains in Table 2. The data is shown in a matrix of the 
full range of countries in the rows but only selected countries in the columns. The striking 
feature is that almost all of the gains are in the diagonal cells whereby the gains to each 
country overwhelmingly accrue to that same country. For example, South Africa’s total gains 
are $8,519million, with $8,444 million from its own internal reforms. Similar gains accrue 
to Nigeria, one of the many countries or aggregations that have internal cell gains actually 
larger than the total gains. Indeed, apart from some small gains or losses for South Africa 
in other countries there are effectively only the diagonal cells in Table 3 and many zeros 
or near zeros! 
 
This may in part be a function of the way in which we have modelled our reductions, as we 
only addressed changes in import times in transit whereby the benefits accrue to the 
importer. Had we introduced reductions in export times there would have been a wider 
distribution of the gains and an increased value of these gains, but we are not certain that an 
element of double-counting could be introduced. Also, altering our model closures and 
internal equations would redistribute the gains differently. Notwithstanding these technical 
issues the facts remain that (a) these gains are substantial, (b) they mostly accrue to the 
liberaliser, and (c) in only taking 20% of the costs of time over and above an international 
benchmark (a benchmark that several African countries are close to) we are leaving plenty of 
room for improvement in most African countries. And the gains in welfare to exporters 
outside Africa show that the benefits, although concentrated on the liberalisers, are global in 
nature. 
 
The implications for landlocked countries are harder to interpret from our results. Clearly, a 
country such Malawi or Zambia can do little about the terminal times,6 but they will have 
much more control over inland times even if they are reliant upon a partner on the other side 
of the border. Applied common sense would suggest that in an information age based upon 
electronic technology, time wasting at the border can be minimised with mutual cooperation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6 
Note, however, that there are low terminal times for Uganda and especially for Ethiopia, both of which are 
landlocked. It is therefore not entirely in the neighbours’ hands. 
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Table 3: Contribution to welfare by country, $ (millions) 
 
 zaf ken tza uga xec nga xac eth zmb zwe gha RAfrica 
zaf 8,444 13 -2 4 -5 -56 -14 -4 14 54 -3 -17 
bwa 3 0 0 0 0 -2 -1 0 1 -1 0 -1 
nam 5 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 1 0 0 1 
xsc 6 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
ken -7 1,018 9 6 -2 -11 -5 0 1 1 0 -3 
tza -11 18 882 1 -1 -8 -4 -1 1 0 -1 -4 
uga 1 29 2 539 -1 -1 0 0 0 0 0 10 
rwa 0 7 2 7 0 -2 0 0 0 0 0 2 
egy 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
mar 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
xec -5 6 -1 5 812 -1 -1 6 -1 0 -1 -2 
nga -18 6 -3 1 -2 5,234 -12 -2 -2 1 7 8 
xac 7 2 2 0 -1 -11 2,391 -1 -1 0 1 -17 
eth -7 3 -2 0 -10 -3 -1 624 -1 0 -1 -1 
mdg 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
mwi 4 3 -2 0 0 -1 -1 0 1 -1 0 -1 
mus 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
moz 19 0 2 0 0 -2 1 0 0 2 0 -1 
zmb 33 14 -7 0 -2 -12 -5 -2 832 2 -2 -16 
zwe 60 -2 0 -1 -1 -5 -4 0 2 864 -1 -7 
gha -5 1 -1 0 -1 1 -2 0 0 0 626 8 
tun 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
sen -2 0 0 0 0 -2 -1 0 0 0 0 8 
Rafr -8 4 -1 -8 -1 -6 -14 -1 2 1 9 6,364 
Total 8,519 1,122 880 554 786 5,112 2,331 620 849 921 634 6,330 
Source: GTAP output 
 
The GTAP sectors 
 
Table 4 shows the now familiar matrix of GTAP sectors in the rows and contributions that 
changes in each of these sectors make in the cells for the major African countries. In contrast 
to our results to date, agriculture does not feature heavily in the results. We have not 
examined the GTAP structure and the data to assess why this is the case. Indeed, in Table 4 
we deleted sugar as all the entries were zero, suggesting that time delays are not crucial in 
this sector. In Table 4 were also shown the global welfare gains by GTAP sector in the 
second column and next to this the African gain in column 3. The overall totals on the 
bottom row with both global and African gains are similar but there are some differences of 
up to one billion dollars among the GTAP sectors. 
 
We can say little about the cells other than there is a strong concentration of gains in the 
manufacturing sectors, for the industrial giant (South Africa in particular with Nigeria not 
too far behind). The vehicle sector (mvh) is a good example. 
88 
Chapter 8: Reduction in the time costs of transit 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Contribution to welfare by commodity, $ (millions) 
 
 World Africa zaf ken tza xec nga xac eth zmb zwe Rafrica 
PAgr 741 1,120 95 45 10 67 296 135 22 9 77 252 
SAgr 2,732 2,052 79 22 64 116 683 258 4 15 59 560 
nat 1,071 874 194 17 4 13 62 -1 146 291 34 30 
tex 582 506 95 24 30 32 111 -5 20 7 -2 150 
wap 234 94 55 2 2 16 -2 -1 0 1 3 4 
lea 132 61 18 3 4 6 11 4 0 0 3 0 
lum 172 108 33 4 5 8 8 18 1 6 0 14 
ppp 674 442 112 31 28 1 74 27 11 10 -12 70 
p_c 2,900 3,916 630 287 164 43 670 463 250 14 117 679 
crp 3,248 3,335 880 154 166 86 680 33 27 144 210 626 
nmm 860 763 108 7 17 10 151 85 3 17 24 237 
i_s 1,571 2,078 210 122 50 147 359 264 31 38 40 609 
nfm 1,109 1,218 819 21 13 14 221 21 -2 9 27 13 
fmp 1,017 896 171 40 26 31 156 80 1 33 13 253 
mvh 5,068 5,013 2,249 132 109 108 713 182 54 91 228 742 
otn 2,177 2,107 220 84 38 11 53 380 6 4 -2 1,213 
ele 1,328 1,113 793 17 16 -2 65 19 1 18 -1 53 
ome 5,290 4,602 1,751 107 122 80 747 362 44 137 104 766 
omf 327 212 8 3 16 0 57 7 0 4 0 59 
Total 31,232 30,508 8,519 1,122 880 785 5,112 2,331 620 848 921 6,330 
Source: GTAP output 
 
Changes in African trade 
 
Table 5 turns to the expected changes in aggregate trade as measured by the percentage 
changes in quantity of both exports and imports and changes to the overall trade balance as 
measured in dollars (millions). Again, the trade balance is a macroeconomic closure in the 
GTAP model heavily influenced by the difference on one side of an equation that measures 
savings and investment which has to balance with exports minus imports on the other side of 
the classic macroeconomic equation. The ToT as shown in Table 2 reflect the changes in the 
relative prices of exports and imports and their contribution to total welfare changes in each 
country. The export and import changes shown here in Table 4 are changes to quantities 
traded expressed in values, and they represent changes to both trade prices and quantities. 
 
We have also shown the changes in exports and imports from our base scenario in Chapter 2 
of tariff elimination across intra-African trade on the right-hand side of the table. While the 
welfare gains from Chapter 2 are usually lower than the welfare gains in this transit-time 
scenario the increases in exports and imports shown on the right-hand side are higher and, in 
most cases, significantly higher than our trans-time scenario on the left-hand side. Our gains 
in this scenario are directed more into improving the efficiency of the economies rather than 
direct trade-related gains. Recall that we are addressing the cost of delays on the import side 
only in Africa. 
89 
Chapter 8: Reduction in the time costs of transit 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: Percentage changes in trade for the partners 
 
NTB reductions  Base tariff to zero 
  
Exports% 
 
Imports% 
Balance$ 
(millions) 
 
Exports% 
 
Imports% 
South Africa 2.7 2.4 -243 2.7 3.5 
Botswana 0.8 0.2 54 1.1 1.8 
Namibia 1.2 1.4 21 2.6 5.0 
Swazi-Lesotho 1.1 1.0 4 2.4 3.6 
Kenya -0.1 1.0 -252 5.7 4.5 
Tanzania 0.5 0.9 -103 3.7 3.2 
Uganda 0.9 1.3 -43 4.3 6.4 
Rwanda 1.9 1.5 0 10.1 13.8 
Egypt 0.0 0.1 -12 0.3 0.4 
Morocco 0.0 0.0 -3 0.8 1.1 
Rest of east 
Africa 
 
2.0 
 
1.2 
 
11 
 
2.0 
 
1.4 
Nigeria 1.3 1.0 222 1.7 2.0 
Angola-DRC 0.8 0.9 56 2.1 3.1 
Ethiopia 1.9 1.2 -27 3.6 2.5 
Madagascar 0.5 0.4 0 0.2 0.2 
Malawi -0.3 0.4 -12 4.2 3.5 
Mauritius 0.3 0.3 -13 0.9 0.9 
Mozambique 1.1 1.2 -48 1.0 0.7 
Zambia 2.4 2.1 181 -0.7 -0.9 
Zimbabwe 0.9 3.5 -277 32.7 -2.4 
Ghana 0.2 0.5 -104 9.1 7.0 
Tunisia 0.1 0.1 -3 1.0 1.2 
Senegal 0.9 1.0 -59 8.2 9.4 
Rest of Africa 1.0 0.7 184 2.8 2.8 
EU -0.005 0.004 79   
UK 0.008 0.021 0   
US -0.002 0.007 149   
China 0.011 0.021 177   
India 0.001 0.035 -4   
Brazil 0.010 0.013 15   
Russia -0.002 -0.049 -38   
Rest of world 0.001 -0.003 89   
Source: GTAP output. 
 
Note that as the changes in trade to non-African partners are minimal we have not reported them. 
 
The changes to factors of production are shown in Table 6. As is generally the case there are 
improvements in the contribution of labour to production in every case, and some of these 
improvements are substantial (Zimbabwe, for example). In contrast to many of the other 
scenarios there is little movement in the agricultural sectors as much of the activity can be 
seen in manufacturing where gains are offset by losses in what seems to be random patterns. 
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Table 6: Increases in factors of production & actual production, % 
 
 zaf ken tza uga xec nga xac eth zmb zwe gha Rafrica 
Unskilled 0.26 0.21 0.14 0.12 -0.02 0.11 -0.01 0.12 0.43 0.21 0.03 0.09 
Skilled 0.28 0.22 0.16 0.13 -0.02 0.13 0.00 0.08 0.46 0.24 0.03 0.09 
Capital 2.59 1.98 1.93 2.96 0.81 1.09 1.02 1.12 3.20 7.50 1.20 1.31 
PAgr 0.37 0.21 0.10 0.15 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.21 -0.03 0.11 0.05 0.07 
SAgr 0.81 1.15 -0.55 0.76 -0.66 -1.41 -0.48 0.15 0.92 0.34 -0.64 -0.26 
sugar 1.32 -0.12 0.33 -1.88 0.69 -1.18 1.35 0.51 0.43 2.29 2.41 1.15 
nat 0.07 0.30 0.01 -0.06 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.02 -0.50 0.27 -0.05 0.17 
tex -0.18 -0.14 -4.18 -0.88 -1.68 -4.46 0.88 -3.30 -2.20 1.37 -2.79 -1.37 
wap 0.55 1.36 -0.81 0.00 -1.54 -0.17 0.87 1.14 1.98 2.86 -0.32 0.27 
lea 0.56 0.88 -1.03 4.08 0.60 0.71 0.27 0.23 1.43 0.52 -1.30 0.61 
lum 0.67 1.14 0.01 1.99 -0.59 0.45 1.16 0.36 0.86 2.99 0.47 1.13 
ppp 0.41 -1.78 -0.92 -0.86 -0.87 -3.18 -1.09 -2.45 -0.22 0.34 -2.93 -1.43 
p_c -0.38 -1.79 -5.32 -5.25 -1.11 -3.15 -4.05 -4.03 0.63 -2.84 -2.04 -0.94 
crp -0.47 -0.91 0.16 -0.62 -2.54 -1.56 -1.09 -1.09 -12.32 -2.40 -1.22 -0.58 
nmm -0.15 -0.47 -0.67 0.60 -0.70 -3.61 -2.27 0.37 -2.98 -4.68 -1.46 -2.32 
i_s 0.24 0.90 -2.46 -0.76 1.75 -4.12 -2.98 -3.15 -5.55 4.76 -3.00 -3.04 
nfm 5.63 3.71 1.55 3.72 5.94 9.30 2.20 3.08 3.37 0.03 0.50 2.75 
fmp 0.27 2.34 -5.16 0.82 -1.83 3.46 -2.61 -0.02 -9.87 -1.96 -1.64 -0.91 
mvh 0.62 1.43 -3.06 -1.61 -1.12 -3.82 -2.24 -2.43 -12.79 -3.25 2.76 -3.09 
otn -0.04 0.30 -1.13 -3.97 -0.96 1.13 -0.21 -0.27 -6.60 1.21 4.15 -2.07 
ele -1.55 0.31 -0.31 1.81 -0.48 1.64 0.21 -0.76 -10.17 1.12 8.31 -0.71 
ome 0.33 1.76 0.21 3.98 -0.66 0.64 -0.02 -0.36 -8.45 -2.67 0.62 -0.81 
omf 1.40 -0.73 -0.31 9.54 0.02 -4.23 -0.45 0.75 -4.51 1.23 2.94 -0.87 
serv 1.51 1.64 1.27 2.18 0.62 0.95 0.85 0.91 1.73 5.27 0.70 1.04 
Source: GTAP output 
 
Some technical economic results are shown in Table 7. Increases in real Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) are significant, with several countries showing an increase of around 2% and 
Zimbabwe showing an impressive 6.12% increase. Most ToT decline as relative import prices 
rise more than export prices, although this is a feature of the model in that we only simulate 
increases in import efficiency which will reflect back onto their prices as domestic demand 
increases. Table 2 shows the contributions to welfare from ToT expressed in dollar values, 
while Table 7 shows the same changes expressed as a ratio. Returns from factor income such 
as the standard land, labour and capital increase are indicated in almost all cases. Some solid 
increases in the returns to labour are a very pleasing outcome for Africa and a further 
demonstration as to how trade impediments are impacting adversely on Africa’s economy. 
The contributions from skilled and unskilled labour are often large, but we emphasise that 
these changes are not the same as those shown in Table 6 above which shows the changes in 
employment levels. The data shown in Table 7 is the contribution that changes in the total 
wage bill make to total factor income. In this version of the model we use a ‘closure’ or 
assumption that the wage bill is split between increased wages for those in work and new 
employment – with this based upon the unemployment rate in each country. 
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Table 7: Changes in ToT, real GDP and total factor income along with contributions to 
factor income by % 
 
 Terms 
of 
 
Real 
 
Total factor 
  
Contributions from 
 
 trade GDP income land unskilled skilled capital resource 
zaf -0.38 1.99 1.39 0.04 0.23 0.31 0.78 0.02 
bwa -0.07 1.65 1.03 0.02 0.22 0.14 0.49 0.16 
nam 0.02 0.95 0.77 0.04 0.18 0.08 0.44 0.03 
xsc -0.24 0.96 0.35 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.10 0.06 
ken 0.21 1.62 1.95 0.31 0.55 0.25 0.77 0.08 
tza 0.03 1.52 1.31 0.21 0.45 0.31 0.34 0.00 
uga -0.05 2.03 1.54 0.16 0.39 0.23 0.75 0.01 
rwa -0.19 0.97 0.74 0.26 0.27 0.06 0.13 0.01 
egy 0.03 0.02 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 -0.01 
mar 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 
xec -0.35 0.82 0.00 0.01 -0.05 -0.03 -0.01 0.08 
nga -0.23 0.88 0.39 0.06 0.15 0.11 0.02 0.06 
xac -0.11 0.99 0.10 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.12 
eth -0.23 0.83 0.71 0.28 0.26 0.02 0.16 0.00 
mdg -0.05 0.24 0.17 0.03 0.06 0.03 0.04 0.00 
mwi 0.33 2.08 1.88 0.33 0.43 0.46 0.60 0.04 
mus 0.04 0.25 0.24 0.01 0.06 0.04 0.13 0.00 
moz -0.03 1.32 1.30 0.20 0.37 0.22 0.50 0.01 
zmb -0.16 2.82 3.25 0.16 1.19 0.87 1.18 -0.15 
zwe 0.20 6.12 4.48 0.40 1.08 0.93 1.95 0.12 
gha 0.07 0.94 0.61 0.07 0.19 0.19 0.17 0.00 
tun 0.05 0.05 0.12 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.04 -0.01 
sen -0.07 1.12 1.00 0.06 0.21 0.11 0.56 0.07 
Rafr -0.16 1.33 0.58 0.04 0.15 0.13 0.14 0.13 
EU 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
GBR 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
usa 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
chn 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
ind 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 
bra 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
rus -0.05 -0.02 -0.04 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 
row 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 
Source: GTAP output 
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Changes to tariff revenues increase or stay the same. Recall that we are not changing the 
tariff rates in this scenario but rather removing some of the impediments to imports which 
will naturally lead to increases in tariff revenues for most countries. 
 
Table 8: Changes to tariff revenues 
 
 revenue US$ (millions) 
SACU 205 
Kenya 42 
Tanzania 18 
Uganda 7 
Rwanda 2 
Egypt 4 
Morocco 1 
Rest of east Africa 34 
Nigeria 132 
Angola-DRC 39 
Ethiopia 22 
Madagascar 1 
Malawi 4 
Mauritius 0 
Mozambique 5 
Zambia 0 
Zimbabwe 62 
Ghana 18 
Tunisia 5 
Senegal 8 
Rest of Africa 114 
Source: GTAP output 
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Chapter 9 
 
Summary 
 
Summary and policy implications 
 
The Trade Law Centre for Southern Africa (tralac) has recently capitalised upon the pre- 
release Version 9.2 of the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) database and the recent 
excellent data sets from the World Bank and other publishing quality data on trade barriers 
across the African continent. It undertook a series of simulations examining regional 
integration and intra-African trade barrier reductions. The results for tariff elimination on 
intra-African trade are promising. But the real news is in confirming that these barriers are 
not as significant as the various trade-related barriers except for tariffs. 
 
Especially impressive results were forecast by simulating a modest 20% reduction in the costs 
associated with the particular African problem of transit time delays at customs, terminals 
and internal land transportation. These gains are significantly above both just intra- African 
tariff elimination and what may be thought of as the more traditional non-tariff barriers that 
we modelled individually and separately. Although we have not modelled a combined 
approach which incorporates all three components of tariff elimination, non-tariff barrier 
reductions and time-in-transit cost reductions, the final combined outcome from all three are 
likely to be cumulative and generate very large gains to Africa. The overall results from 
especially time-in-transit costs support the current emphasis on projects such as the World 
Trade Organisation (WTO) infrastructural supports to Africa. 
 
In addition, the World Bank and others have produced a dataset of constraints in trade-related 
services for Africa and others that we are examining, adding these simulations to our 
portfolio. Again, the results here are likely to be significant and additive to reductions in the 
other three constraints (tariff barriers, more traditional non-tariff barriers, and time in transit 
costs). 
 
Our simulations for a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with a selected group of African 
countries show that this is very much a second-best option, and the inclusion of most of the 
significant economies in Africa generates the best results. Only in the event of a failure to 
achieve integration across the continent with all or most African countries should partial 
integration be pursued. 
 
The policy implications from our research are clear: while cooperation will enhance the gains, 
much of the benefits will result from unilateral actions and regional cooperation that does not 
need the long and drawn-out processes associated with FTA negotiations. However, against 
this background the concept of ‘governance’ must be emphasised, as must the crucial 
importance of a rules-based structure. In addition, provided African countries are willing to 
play their part, global funds seem to be available for these reforms. 
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The research 
 
At tralac for several years now we have been undertaking analyses using the GTAP computer 
model on South Africa’s ‘way ahead’ on trade policy options, and in recent times this 
analysis has focused on the Tripartite FTA (TFTA), with both tariff reduction/elimination 
scenarios and non-tariff barrier (NTB) reductions. For the NTB reductions we have opted to 
use a blanket (usually 2%) reduction in the tariff equivalent to assess the not inconsiderable 
costs to African economies of these trade barriers. 
 
In this research we have extended our GTAP analysis to focus on the benefits of continental 
integration. In particular, we believe that we have taken two very large steps forward in our 
analysis. The first is the use of the pre-release Version 9.2 GTAP database which is based on 
actual 2011 trade data. The second step forward is more significant, and we and the research 
community owe a large vote of thanks to the World Bank and others for the release of 
detailed and comprehensive datasets for trade-related barriers, by country, that have been 
dovetailed to match the GTAP model sectors. 
 
Our base simulation is to examine the trade and welfare effects of a full and comprehensive 
tariff liberalisation that sets all intra-African bilateral tariffs to zero. From that point we 
extend the analysis in subsequent chapters to simulating a reduction in non-tariff measures 
(NTMs or, interchangeably, NTBs) in the first alternative run and then extending analysis 
further by examining the gains to be made by trade facilitation along with integration into an 
FTA of selected African economies only. The chapters are: 
• Chapter 1: The model and background 
• Chapter 2: Africa-wide, all intra-African tariffs going to zero 
• Chapter 3: Africa-wide, a 50% reduction in NTMs 
• Chapter 4: Africa-wide, tariffs to zero and a 50% reduction in NTMs combined 
• Chapter 5: An integration of the selected ‘willing’ countries only, again with comprehensive 
tariff elimination between these parties 
• Chapter 6: A reduction in NTBs between these ‘willing’ countries only 
• Chapter 7: The ‘willing’ participants, tariffs to zero and a 50% reduction in NTMs combined 
• Chapter 8: An examination of the implication of the results of reducing the costs in transit for 
African goods by 20% above the benchmark of international best practice. 
 
 
For the ‘willing’ countries we identified the five Southern African Customs Union (SACU) 
members (South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland), East African 
Community (EAC) members (Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda and Rwanda), Nigeria and Ghana in 
western Africa, and Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia in northern Africa. We believe this 
juxtaposition of political-economy realism and modelling advances adds realism to our 
results. Our analysis for the simulations starts from an examination of intra-African trade, and 
this confirms the commonly held view that this trade is low. 
 
We used as our base scenario the simulation whereby we reduce all tariff between all African 
countries to zero (Chapter 2), and later in Chapter 5 we simulate tariff elimination of tariff 
barriers between the selected countries only. This is standard GTAP research. It is in the 
other scenarios that we are grateful to the World Bank and others by allowing much more 
sophistication in our NTB estimates by changing our earlier ‘blanket’ or common two 
percentage points estimate to using the ad valorem equivalents for both agricultural goods and 
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manufacturing goods as provided by Balistreri et al. (2014a and 2014b).1 This new database 
provides tariff equivalents for most GTAP countries. Crucially, these estimates vary (often 
widely) which therefore enables a much more accurate estimate of the costs of these 
barriers than our earlier two percentage points estimates. The range in these new estimates for 
countries of interest for agricultural goods varies from 0.0% in Rwanda to 42.5% in Kenya, 
while for manufacturing goods it varies from Zambia’s 0.0% (and South Africa’s 0.3%) to 
Tanzania’s 47.4%. These are significant differences, and in the few instances where these 
values are not individually shown we have estimated a proxy from the aggregates provided 
by Balistreri et al. (2014a and 2014b). 
 
These authors stated that they decomposed trade costs into three categories: costs that can be 
lowered by (1) trade facilitation; (2) non-tariff barriers; and (3) the costs of barriers to 
business services. Trade facilitation addresses costs such as delays at border crossings, 
roadblocks for trucks, and the necessity to pay bribes. For non-tariff barriers, the focus is on 
licences, quotas and bans; price control measures; competition restrictions; and technical 
barriers to trade (customs delays not included). Poor business services for trade are also a 
problem and improvements in a wide range of business services such as banking, insurance, 
communication and professional services (such as legal, auditing, engineering and computer 
services) would also lower trade costs. An examination of reductions for this final set of costs 
is likely to be on the tralac research agenda. 
 
Technically, we are reducing the NTBs by 50%, and this is done in two separate ways. 
Firstly, we recalibrate the initial GTAP Version 9 database to represent half of the World 
Bank’s ad valorem equivalent (AVE) estimates of NTB as tariff equivalent in the database- 
generating tariff revenues and then reducing these NTB tariffs by 50%. Secondly, we 
represent the remaining 25% reduction in the AVE of the World Bank’s NTB estimate as an 
increase in efficiency by augmenting technical change in the respective countries. Our 
welfare results (Equivalent Variation) therefore represent the combined effects of reducing 
the AVE NTB tariff calibrated into the database and the efficiency augmenting technical 
change. 
 
For our ‘time in transit’ analysis we use only the data for imports into African countries to 
avoid any possible danger of double-counting gains if we were to use both days in transit to 
import and days in transit to export. Also, in using imports only we consider that this is the 
best method of ensuring that they accrue to those making the changes. Although we are only 
adjusting handling and transit times for imports in Africa, there will still be some gains to 
countries outside Africa in that their costs of exporting are effectively lowered (although they 
will not obtain all the gains from this adjustment). In contrast to a tariff reduction scenario 
whereby those outside the FTA almost invariably lose2 we would anticipate that there will be 
gains to all, albeit with those gains outside Africa being modest. We acknowledge that what 
we are using may be a lower-bound estimate, but we consider that our approach is consistent 
with economic theory that generally argues for gains of liberalisation accruing to the 
liberalising country. Technically, we are modelling these gains as efficiency gains to the 
importing country and therefore the benefits will show up directly in the results as technical 
efficiency gains in the welfare decomposition. 
 
 
 
1 
These are World Bank estimates which are in turn based upon data from Kee et al. (2009: 119, 172-199). 
These are based on estimates for 105 countries at the HS 6-digit level 
 
2  
But not Russia in our FTA simulation. 
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Minor (2013) states that the time allotted to trade costs reflects the willingness of the importer 
to pay for a product delivered earlier. This is based on a comprehensive database from 
Hummels and Schaur (2013) estimating the ad valorem cost of one day saved in transit 
estimated for over 600 HS4 products. There is significant variation in these costs by HS 
products, and these are then aggregated into the GTAP sectors by country, with statistical 
adjustments made for missing variables. Minor (2013) then combines this data with the 
World Bank’s Doing Business data set for 2012 showing the number of days to import. He 
subsequently maps this data to the GTAP sectors by country to give a tariff equivalent of 
import barriers to trade. Thus, even though the time in transit is the same for each importer by 
country, the ad valorem equivalents by GTAP sector are not. 
 
The results 
 
In presenting a summary of the results we will only use five of our seven simulations. These 
are as shown in Table 1 representing Chapter 2, the baseline of tariff elimination across 
Africa for intra-African trade; Chapter 3 for a 50% reduction in NTBs only across Africa; 
Chapter 4 combining Chapters 2 and 3 for tariff elimination and NTB reduction across 
Africa; Chapter 5 representing a selection only of African countries with tariff elimination; 
and Chapter 8 representing a 20% reduction in the time of transit for goods over and above a 
four-day Singaporean benchmark. 
 
Note that we will not discuss Chapters 6 and 7 representing NTB reductions in the selected 
countries and a combined tariff elimination and NTB reduction in these same selected 
countries. We are not comfortable with a scenario that reduces NTBs in a selected group of 
countries only as, in general, NTBs cannot be reduced on a bilateral basis. Barriers or 
suspected barriers such as sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures for agricultural 
protection, for example, cannot be simply based upon FTA partners. Perhaps an FTA may 
provide enhanced avenues for bilaterally addressing barriers but they offer little more than 
this. This is especially the case where our selected African countries are widely dispersed 
across the continent and are seldom contiguous. 
 
We would also add that we have not simulated a scenario whereby we add tariff elimination, 
NTB reductions and reductions in transit costs. These are likely to be additive, as is the case 
with NTBs and tariff reductions, and therefore would produce very large gains for Africa. 
Our preferred approach is one of conservatism and we emphasise the NTBs and cost of the 
delays in transit only. We also emphasise that considerable research has gone into the 
estimation of the NTB estimates of the advalorem equivalents and the GTAP sector costs 
associated with transit times. However, this research is very much pioneering work and 
therefore needs to be treated as such. In addition, we are conscious that in using the pre- 
release Version 9.2 of the GTAP database there may well be some gremlins that need to be 
exposed.3 
 
We would also add that there is a third set of trade barriers identified by the World Bank and 
its associates, namely that of business service barriers. We have not yet simulated an 
improvement in these barriers for Africa but intend to do so in the foreseeable future. We 
expect these results to be significant and essentially additive to tariff reductions, NTB 
reductions and reductions in transit times. This would present dramatically large gains to 
re 
 
 
3  This pre-release version is provisionally only available to GTAP Board members for one year. 
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reinforce just how much Africa loses by being behind the world’s best practices in too many 
aspects of trade in both goods and services. Importantly, many of the solutions to these 
problems are in African hands. 
 
The results 
 
This summary table allows for a comprehensive review of our results, and we will use this 
table as the basis for our discussion. It shows the final economic gains from the simulations 
expressed in terms of EV welfare at 2025 as measured by the amount over and above the 
‘business as usual’ situation. Our discussions are presented below for each specific chapter. 
 
In general we can see from Table 1 that the gains from complete African integration in the 
form of tariff elimination only (Chapter 2) are substantial and spread across all African 
countries except Zimbabwe. A very similar pattern applies to the Africa-wide reduction in 
NTB costs as modelled in Chapter 3, with the important difference that Zimbabwe now 
reports modest gains. Those countries outside Africa lose as they are displaced through 
increased intra-African trade. Combining Chapters 2 and 3 into Chapter 4 where we simulate 
tariff elimination and NTB reductions produces a result whereby the welfare gains are 
roughly additive for most African countries to produce a substantial outcome for Africa. 
 
Chapter 5, an integration for selected African countries only, is very much a second-best 
option and only to be seriously considered in the event of political deadlock on a wider 
integration. 
 
The exciting outcome is from examining the benefits to Africa of reducing the notorious costs 
of transit delays that beset much of the continent (but not much of the rest of the world). We 
use these estimates from the World Bank and others to simulate these delays and their 
associated costs to Africa.4 This is not the first African analysis using this data. Mevel and 
Karingi (2012) show that, although an Africa-wide FTA would significantly contribute 
to increasing trade within the African continent, the removal of tariff barriers would not 
meet the political objective of doubling the share of intra-African trade by 2022.5 Meeting 
that objective needs actions on trade barriers such as the length of customs procedures and 
port handling – the very measures we are discussing here with the summary results 
under the heading ‘Chapter 8’ as shown in Table 1. Even using a conservative 20% 
reduction in these costs over and above an international benchmark the welfare gains are 
substantial: about double those from tariff elimination and about the same as tariff 
elimination and an NTB reduction combined. These results support Mevel and Karingi 
(2012) in showing that intra- African non-tariff constraints to trade are at least as important 
as but probably more important than actual tariff barriers. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4   
The African Union Commission and Economic Commission for Africa (2012) discuss this issue in paragraphs 
54 to 59 inclusive and again on pages 34 and 35; Mevel and Karingi (2012) use this data in their MIRAGE 
model. 
 
5     
This research is discussed in more detail in Chapter 1. 
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Table 1: Simulation results, welfare as EV in $ (millions) at 2025 
 
 Ch. 2 Ch. 3 Ch. 4 Ch. 5 Ch. 8 
Total Africa 17,072 18,060 38,690 4,705 30,507 
South Africa 5,742 2,690 9,920 2,228 8,519 
Botswana 68 12 87 0 376 
Namibia 463 188 758 8 173 
Swazi-Lesotho 100 61 190 73 64 
Kenya 1,289 2,117 3,451 439 1,122 
Tanzania 377 1,024 1,459 41 880 
Uganda 683 471 1,222 106 553 
Rwanda 301 66 391 14 141 
Egypt 518 1,422 2,028 350 81 
Morocco 572 489 1,292 111 25 
Rest of east Africa 15 59 68 2 785 
Nigeria 2,031 1,399 3,453 610 5,112 
Angola-DRC 1,168 1,917 3,428 -11 2,331 
Ethiopia 255 91 403 0 620 
Madagascar -1 22 20 -6 38 
Malawi 41 100 138 40 213 
Mauritius 76 223 315 -7 59 
Mozambique 14 44 56 -15 371 
Zambia 454 232 808 4 848 
Zimbabwe -1,486 174 -1,405 -34 921 
Ghana 813 485 1,793 694 634 
Tunisia 357 755 1,120 68 49 
Senegal 1,211 703 2,137 -3 261 
Rest of Africa 2,012 3,316 5,558 -6 6,330 
EU -2,386 -2,667 -5,919 -610 655 
UK -364 -306 -754 -119 197 
US -726 -1,037 -2,143 -336 116 
China -2,351 -2,767 -6,185 -891 506 
India -1,539 -1,395 -3,373 -557 607 
Brazil -188 -261 -536 -139 -4 
Russia 553 188 793 70 -571 
Rest of world -2,771 -4,529 -9,117 -1,413 -780 
Total world 7,299 5,285 11,456 710 31,231 
Source: GTAP output from tralac analysis 
 
It is likely that were we to combine tariff elimination, NTB reductions and transit time 
reductions into one simulation run the gains would be roughly additive. We are reluctant to 
undertake this simulation or the companion simulation on trade costs associated with some 
service barriers until we have researched the details more thoroughly. Indeed, it is also likely 
that the costs relating to business service constraints may be additive to the combined tariff 
elimination, NTB reductions and transit time reduction simulations. 
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Chapter 2: Intra-African tariff elimination 
 
This is our base of complete tariff elimination of all intra-African trade: where all intra- 
African tariffs are eliminated. It is generally, but not always, welfare-enhancing for African 
countries as shown in the second column. South Africa, as is usually the case, is the biggest 
gainer with an increase in welfare of $5.7 billion at 2025. Others to gain over a billion 
dollars each are Kenya, Nigeria, the Angola-Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) 
aggregation, Senegal and the residual ‘rest of Africa’6 aggregation. 
 
The cells in a bilateral matrix of other GTAP outputs show where each country is making 
gains or losses. This highlights that many countries gain from their own liberalisation as 
greater efficiencies flow through their economies. These countries include Kenya (which 
reforms and compacts its own inefficient sugar sector) and Nigeria, for example, while 
Zimbabwe loses heavily from its own liberalisation. South Africa is a major gainer in 
secondary agriculture, as are Namibia, Morocco and Senegal, while the rest of Africa gains 
in both primary and secondary agriculture. Of interest are the combined textile, clothing and 
footwear sectors (TCF), as many African countries benefit through improved access into 
continent-wide markets as tariffs reach zero in the TCF sectors. There are, however, some 
major losers, including non-African exporters of textiles and leather. However, other global 
apparel producers actually gain even though they face trade diversion. Virtually all countries 
and regions gain from duty-free access for vehicles and their parts across Africa, with, as 
expected, South Africa as the largest African gainer. 
 
Except for Zambia’s small decline of less than 1% in both exports and imports and 
Zimbabwe’s decline in imports, both exports and imports increase across the continent for 
all parties. Some of these changes are very large (Rwanda), while others (Egypt) are much 
smaller. The demand for both skilled and unskilled labour in most of the countries shown 
increases, with South Africa and Senegal displaying the most significant increases (more 
than 0.57%). 
 
Tariff revenue for SACU actually increases while, at the other extreme, tariff revenues into 
Zimbabwe decline by over one billion dollars. Several other countries have tariff revenue 
losses of nearly half a billion dollars or even more. For some larger countries (Egypt, 
Morocco, Tunisia and Senegal) tariff losses are not an issue. 
 
Notable, however, from our results is the case of Zimbabwe where there is a welfare loss 
from African integration of around $1.5 billion at 2025, based upon the current trade 
performance and profile. Tariffs against all African imports decline to zero, reduce 
Zimbabwe’s tariff revenues by over one billion dollars, and set a mechanism in place that 
results in a welfare loss of $1,471 million. Unfortunately, Zimbabwe has limited abilities to 
take the opportunities for extra exports in compensation, but the real issue concerns the 
capital market as capital leaves the country. 
 
The Angola-DRC aggregation has changed from a small loss in the tralac TFTA analysis to a 
significant gain of $1,168 million here as the two-country aggregation is becoming more 
integ 
 
 
5  
The ‘rest of Africa’ includes Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, the Ivory Coast, Guinea, Togo and the rest of 
north, central and west Africa. Some of these countries are major agricultural exporters, and changes to their 
individual trade profiles are hidden in the aggregation. 
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integrated into Africa. The welfare increases are driven by improved access to Africa, and 
although the aggregation is a major resource exporter there have been increases in the exports 
of some manufacturing products. There are, however, some possible questions about the trade 
data. It is very unusual for a country like Russia which is excluded from an FTA to make the 
reported gains from that FTA. But we find that Russia is gaining in terms of trade (ToT, in 
the energy sectors in particular. This gain attracts some additional capital and marginally 
increases employment; this is enough to more than compensate for the usual trade 
displacement in other exporting sectors. 
 
Chapter 3: NTB reductions across Africa 
 
Trade liberalisation is increasingly focusing on NTBs. To date, tralac has simulated changes 
in NTBs as an across-the-board reduction of two percentage points in the ad valorem tariff 
rate, but we will now reduce the World Bank estimates of NTBs as researched by country and 
GTAP commodity by 50%. These estimates vary (often widely) by country and often 
between agriculture and manufacturing within a country; this enables a much more accurate 
estimate of the costs of these barriers than our earlier two percentage points estimates. As 
outlined earlier, the World Bank decomposed trade costs into the three categories (1) 
trade facilitation; (2) non-tariff barriers; and (3) the costs of barriers on services 
trade. We only examine NTBs here. 
 
The results in the form of welfare gains show that South Africa’s gains of $2,690 million are 
only 47% of the full tariff elimination. But then the NTB levels are relatively low and 
especially so for agriculture in South Africa. Conversely, the gains for Tanzania are 271% of 
the initial tariff elimination gains, as the NTBs for Tanzania are extremely high. Gains to 
South Africa are still the highest individual country gains, but both Kenya and the Angola- 
DRC aggregation are now very close behind at around $2 billion each. Several countries gain 
more from NTB reduction than from tariff elimination and indeed Zimbabwe turned a major 
loss from intra-African tariff elimination into a gain with NTB reductions. Overall, our results 
have significant policy implications by adding further evidence to the theory that NTBs are a 
bigger problem in Africa than tariffs! 
 
Digging deeper, our findings also emphasise that in many cases the sums representing ‘own’ 
gains are often very large. Here the policy implications are again clear; this is because these 
‘own’ NTB reductions are directly under the control of the home government. Coordinated 
efforts to reduce NTBs are the best option but much can be gained in those countries with 
high barriers in unilateral actions. By GTAP sector, there is an emphasis on gains in 
agriculture for most but not all countries, as almost all of the NTBs used are higher for 
agriculture than they for manufacturing. As the emphasis on NTBs is on the agricultural 
sectors for most countries we find that there are often very significant gains to agricultural 
production. 
 
Chapter 4: Combining tariff elimination and NTB reductions across Africa 
 
There is an interesting outcome from Chapter 4: when we add the combined individual 
country welfare gains from Chapters 2 and 3 we find that in most cases they are close to the 
aggregate total for the country outcome in Chapter 4. The range is from where South Africa 
is 110% of the combined Chapters 2 and 3 outcome at one extreme while Ghana’s 72% is the 
other low extreme. Conversely, when we compare the outcomes in Chapter 2 and 3 separately 
we 
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we find a wide variation in their relative ratios in individual countries. There therefore seems 
to be some internal compensatory mechanism in operation here as in general the overall 
results are somewhat cumulative as indicated by the narrow range when comparing our 
results from Chapter 4 with the combined results from Chapters 2 and 3. 
 
Again, South Africa dominates the African welfare gains. Again the generalisation can be 
made that for some countries many of the gains derive from unilateral liberalisation while for 
others there are further examples where individual country gains are concentrated in one or 
two specific countries. Conversely, there are many cells containing a zero or close to it – 
meaning limited bilateral linkages. Only for South Africa is there a spread of countries where 
significant gains are made. Unfortunately, the ‘rest of Africa’ aggregation hides some 
potentially important individual country information as this is the aggregation which makes 
big gains. 
 
South Africa does particularly well from agricultural reforms across the continent, and 
especially from secondary agriculture and sugar: this is so because it enjoys better access into 
Kenya and, to a lesser degree, Uganda for sugar. Both Kenya and Uganda in turn gain by 
reducing production in their own heavily protected and inefficient sugar sectors. There are 
some rather large gains for individual countries in many manufacturing sectors, especially 
for Africa’s industrial giant, South Africa. 
 
The combined tariff elimination and NTB reductions result in increased exports and imports 
across the continent for all parties (except Zimbabwe) when measured against the pure tariff 
elimination scenario. Some of these changes are very large, with Rwanda the best example, 
while for others (Egypt and Mozambique) the changes are much smaller. 
 
Consequently, the demand for both skilled and unskilled labour in most countries increases, 
with South Africa, Kenya and Senegal displaying the most significant increases. Production 
increases in most but not all manufacturing sectors by country. The technical outcomes show 
an increasing real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) everywhere (except in Zimbabwe) while 
the ToT outcomes vary by country. Factor income in the standard land, labour and capital 
contributions usually increases and, in particular, the contributions from labour are 
encouraging. 
 
Chapter 5: Tariff elimination for selected countries only 
 
In this chapter we simulate an FTA of tariff elimination between those countries in Africa 
that we consider to be ‘willing and able’ to move forward towards full integration. We know 
that there are solid economic gains to almost all African economies from a comprehensive 
FTA, but there are also many political-economy type problems relating to full integration. 
We therefore take what can be described as the ‘European Union (EU) approach’ of starting 
regional integration slowly from a base of those few countries that appear to be ready for 
comprehensive liberalisation and gradually expanding over time. We assess the five countries 
in SACU, four in the EAC, Malawi, Zambia and Egypt in the TFTA region, Nigeria and 
Ghana in west Africa, and Morocco and Tunisia in north Africa; this selection represents 
64.7% of African GDP. 
 
The results show that integration between our selected countries only is very much a second- 
best solution. In all African countries within our selection the gains from the Africa-wide 
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countries are more (and often significantly more) than they are for the selected group only. 
The only bright spot is that those excluded are effectively neutralised rather than penalised 
for being outside this partial African integration. Indeed, in the case of Zimbabwe, they are 
rewarded by being ‘outside’! For the countries in the selection only South Africa has gains 
above Ghana’s $694 million, and for countries such as Botswana, Namibia, Tanzania and 
especially Zambia the gains from membership of the selected group are minimal at best. This 
partial integration derives less than 10% of the global gains from an Africa-wide scenario. 
 
A different country aggregation may lead to better overall results, but on our evidence we do 
not have a strong economic case to make for an FTA integration based upon these selected 
countries only. That case could only be made as a second-best argument if progress towards 
full African integration seems to be irretrievably lost. 
 
There are, however, some features which remain the same as in the Africa-wide FTA 
simulation. South Africa makes large gains from reforms in Kenya and Nigeria, while Kenya 
makes large gains from its own liberalisation. Ghana gains from liberalisation in Nigeria and, 
similarly, Nigeria mirrors this by making large gains from access into Ghana. Overall, we 
find that gains are almost identical between full and partial integration for the main countries 
on a bilateral basis, but in this scenario there are too many missing countries where large 
bilateral gains were made under an Africa-wide integration. 
 
South Africa continues to do particularly well from agricultural reforms and especially in its 
exports of sugar to Kenya and Uganda. Again, the heavily protected and highly inefficient 
sugar sector in Kenya is a drag upon its own economy. Our arguments for reform in Kenyan 
sugar policies are reinforced as Kenya makes significant unilateral gains in the sugar sector. 
This is because it both reduces sugar production significantly and transfers resources out of a 
sector which has been heavily protected but is technically inefficient. There are, however, 
few gains in agriculture outside South Africa or the sugar sector in Kenya and Uganda. Both 
Egypt and Nigeria gain in the TCF sectors, while South Africa does well in the 
manufacturing sectors. Gains in the motor vehicle sector are muted outside South Africa’s 
gains. 
 
Welfare changes for the participants are mostly increasing when expressed real GDP terms, 
with some of these increases around 1% of real GDP. The ToT vary, with some improving 
and others declining. All countries except Rwanda attract more capital. 
 
In terms of the tariff revenues collected at the respective borders there is little difference in 
the lost revenue between an Africa-wide FTA and the 'willing’ countries. The main exception 
is SACU where revenues increase by $16 million in contrast to the surprisingly large $167 
million increase from an Africa-wide integration. 
 
Chapter 8: A reduction in the time costs of transit 
 
In this chapter we examine trade facilitation by addressing the trade facilitation or 
infrastructural costs as outlined earlier where overall trade costs were divided into the three 
categories of (1) trade facilitation; (2) non-tariff barriers; and (3) the costs of barriers to 
business services. Trade facilitation addresses costs such as delays at border crossings, 
roadblocks for trucks, and the necessity to pay bribes. In Chapter 3 we kept tariffs as they 
were 
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were but reduced NTBs by 50%. We emphasise that this current chapter examines a 
distinctly different set of trade barriers. The gains from each may well be additive. 
 
African countries are well aware of these problems, and trade facilitation was the main 
outcome from the 2013 Bali WTO Ministerial Conference. The agreement was to streamline 
customs procedures and minimise delays at borders – with Africa expected to be the main 
beneficiary. World Bank researchers and others have combined to produce a database of per 
day ad valorem costs to use in the GTAP, with these estimates provided in ad valorem 
equivalents of the per day costs along with the number of days involved. In implementing the 
GTAP model we use the Singapore international best-practice benchmark of four days for 
imports. We assess a reduction of 20% in the days over and above this benchmark for 
imports only to avoid possible double counting. 
 
The data reinforces that transit delays and subsequent costs are largely an African issue, and 
in taking a calculation of a 20% reduction in these costs we believe that our approach is 
conservative. There is still plenty of ‘slack’ in the African system, although there are 
countries in Africa that are very close to international benchmarks, thus proving that Africa 
has the potential to improve. 
 
The welfare gains to Africa are substantial. For South Africa, they are some $8,519 billion in 
real terms and, as is usually the case, this is the most significant result for both Africa and the 
total worldwide gain of $31,231 billion. Following close behind are the very large gains to 
Nigeria and the rest of Africa aggregation. In direct contrast to our tariff elimination 
scenarios, there are gains to many of the large economies outside Africa as their export prices 
rise in response to more efficient transit times in Africa. 
 
The striking feature from the results is that almost all of the gains to each country 
overwhelmingly accrue to that same country. This may in part be a feature of the way in 
which we have modelled our reductions: we only addressed changes in import times in 
transit whereby the benefits accrue to the importer. Notwithstanding these technical issues 
the facts remain that (a) these gains are substantial, (b) they mostly accrue to the liberaliser 
and (c) in only taking 20% of the costs of time over and above an international benchmark 
we are leaving plenty of room for improvement in most African countries. And the gains in 
welfare, although concentrated in Africa, are global in nature. 
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